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THE maintenance of public order-when public order is conceived in its
minimal sense as community control and prevention of private violence-is
commonly and appropriately regarded as the first indispensable function of
any system of law.' The securing of a public order-understood in a broader
sense as embracing the totality of a community's legally protected goal values
and implementing institutions 2 -which seeks, beyond an effective community
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This article is the third in a series upon the law of war. The first article, Interna-
tional Coercion and World Public Order: The General Principles of the Law of War,
appeared in 67 YALE L.E . 771. (1958), and the second, The Initiation of Coercion: A
Multi-Temporal Analysis, in 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 241 (1958). The present article is con-
cerned with the first of the major problems of the law of war.
1. Recognition of the primacy of this function in the international as in municipal
arenas is widely reflected in the literature. See, e.g., Waldock, The Regulation of the
Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81. HAGUE ACADEMIE DE DROIT
I NT R.RNATI NAL, RECUEIL DES COURS [hereinafter cited as HAGUE RECUEIL] 455 (1952);
BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (1958); Pound, A
Snrrey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1943); STOzNE, THE PROVINCE
AND FUNCTION OF LAW 454-55, 555, 559-60 (1.950) ; KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
AND STATE 21-22 (1954); cf. DE VIsscHER, THEORY AND REAIITY IN PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 99 (Corbett transl. 1957). Studies on primitive and ancient systems indicate
that such communities accorded similar priority to control of disruptive violence. See,
e.g., HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954); LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, THE CHEY-
ENNE WAY chs. 10-12 (1941); MAINE, ANCIENT LAW ch. 10 (Everyman's ed. 1954);
1 SIMPSON & STONE, LAW AND SOCIETY 66-89, 284-97 (1948). See also Aberle et al.,
The Functional Prerequisites of a Society, 60 ErIcs 100, 103, 110 (1950).
2. For development of the reference assigned to a "system of public order," see
McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959). See also Dession & Lasswell, Public Order Under
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monopolization of force, the richest production and widest sharing of all values,
is today also commonly projected as appropriate aspiration by most mature
territorial polities. The intimate interdependence of these two conceptions of
public order is obvious. Effective prevention and repression of private vio-
lence are necessary prerequisites to establishing appropriate institutions for
the most rewarding pursuit of other values. Conversely, a full opportunity to
pursue individual and community values through peaceful procedures, by les-
sening predispositions to coercion and violence, may be expected to further
the continued maintenance of minimal order.
Conspicuous features of the world social process today include the in-
creasing unity of demand among most of the peoples of the world for achieve-
ment in the international arena of public order, in its widest as well as in its
narrowest sense, and the increasing awareness that efficient world institutions
for the optimum creation and distribution of values depend upon the securing
of minimum order. Subjecting the processes of coercion and violence among
nation-states to effective community controls is thus the most fundamental
contemporary problem for all who seek a world public order honoring, in
deed as in rhetoric, human freedom. This problem is not of course peculiar
to our age, although the implications of continued failure, given the existing
weapons of catastrophic destruction, are now perhaps unique. It had its origin
with the first conception of a community of states under a common law.3 When
emerging territorially-based polities first began to constitute an international
arena, the problem became, as it remains, the central one in international law.
This basic problem of legal regulation of resort to international coercion
may perhaps be most economically outlined by recalling in briefest summary
the related, but analytically separable, processes of coercion and legal deci-
sion.4 In an earlier article, we described the process of international coercion
in terms of nation-states seeking the fulfillment of their value goals and apply-
ing to each other for that end coercion of fluctuating degree of intensity, by
all available instruments of policy, under all the constantly changing condi-
tions in the world arena. We sought to indicate that some degree of coercion
is almost continuously observable in the ordinary processes of state interac-
tion for values,5 and perhaps in all human interaction, whether the processes
Law: The Role of the Advisor-Draftsman in the Formation of Code or Constitution, 65
YALE L.J. 174, 185 (1955); Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Con-
cepts of Criminal Law, 5 BUFFALO L. REV. 22, 23-24 (1955).
3. See SCHiFFER, THE LEGAL Co-,MUNITY OF MANKIND ch. 2 (1954) ; VAN VOL-
LENHOVEN, THE LAW OF PEACE chs. 1-3 (1936); VAN VOLLENHOvEN, THE TiREE
STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (1919); Van Vollenhoven, Grothis
and Geneva, in 6 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 5 (1926); SmiTrr, THE CRISIS IN THE LAW
OF NATIONS 8 (1947).
4. A recommended mode of inquiry into these processes is spelled out in some detail
in the first article of this series. McDougal & Feliciano, International Coercion and
World Public Order: The General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J.
771-817 (1958) [hereinafter cited as McDougal & Feliciano, General Principles].
5. Cf. ARON, ON )VAR 8 (Anchor ed. 1959): "Relations between sovereign states
may be more or less bellicose; they are never essentially or ultimately peaceful."
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be confined within the boundaries of a single state or transcend state boun-
daries. In the course of this continuous process of coercion among states, as
we also noted, contending participants make certain characteristic types of op-
posing claims about the lawfulness and unlawfulness of their respective exer-
cises of coercion. The contraposed claims with which we are here more par-
ticularly concerned relate to the initiation of coercion. Generally, one partic-
ipant asserts that it is lawful to employ highly intense coercion, or to acceler-
ate the intensity of coercion previously exercised, against the opposing partici-
pant; and the opposing participant then maintains that such is nlavful ini-
tiation or acceleration of coercion and justifies defensive coercion. To these
facts of initiative and response in coercion and these claims and counterclaims
of lawfulness and unlawfulness, certain decision-makers, established by com-
munity perspectives as authoritative, respond by determining both the require-
ments or limits of authority in respect of the coercion and the appropriate
community or unilateral measures. In fulfilling their community responsibility
decision-makers commonly find it necessary to appraise particular exercises of
coercion in terms of conformity to public-order goals, and when appropriate
to characterize such exercises as permissible or impermissible. In the making
of such appraisals and characterizations, the decision-makers seek to give ef-
fect to certain shared policy objectives. To this end they formulate and apply
authoritative community prescriptions.
Complementary Prescriptions on Permissible and Nonpermissible Coercion
The contemporary world prescriptions about the application of coercion
across state boundaries project in general terms a set of complementary poli-
cies designed, in ultimate effect, to secure and maintain an overriding policy
of peaceful change and of minimizing destruction of values. A principal pur-
pose of modern efforts at comprehensive organization of the community of
states has been to clarify a distinction between permissible and nonpermissible
coercion and to establish the institutions and procedures thought indispensable
and appropriate for sustaining that distinction. The Charter of the United Na-
tions indicates, in broad strokes, the level of coercion that is sought to be pro-
hibited: members are required-and this is declared a basic principle-to "re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the [organization]." ' The positive
aspect of this prohibition lies in the obligation of members to resolve their dis-
putes "by peaceful means" that do not endanger "international peace and se-
curity, and justice."'7 The commitment of members to "refrain from the use
or threat of force" is sometimes assumed by commentators to refer to the use
or threat of armed or military force." The apparent implication, however, that
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
8. See, e.g., 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATiONAL LAW 153 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952)
[hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIm-LAUTERPACHT]; BENTWICH & MARTIN, A COMMEN-
10591959]
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employment of nonmilitary types of coercion was never meant to be prohibited,
is subject to serious reservations. The authority of the Security Council to
characterize particular coercion as a "threat to the peace," "breach of the
peace," or "act of aggression," and to call for appropriate sanctioning meas-
ures, is not restricted, by the Charter at least, as to the modality of coercion
that may be so characterized. 9 Beyond cavil, political and economic pressures
may, in some particular contexts, endanger "international peace and security
and justice"'10 when they assume such proportions and intensity as to generate
a substantial likelihood of or need for a military response. In contrast with
the differences of opinion about nonmilitary instruments, there is no question
that the applications of armed force prohibited by the Charter include both the
comprehensive and highly intense uses commonly associated with "war" and
the less comprehensive and relatively milder exercises often described in the
past as "measures short of war."" These affirmative obligations, subsequently
and frequently reiterated in charters of regional governmental organizations, 12
TA1RY ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 13 (1950); GOODRICH & HAmBRO,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 104 (2d rev. ed. 1.949); Waldock, The Regulatio
of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 455,
492 (1952); BowErT, SELF DEENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1958).
The discussions and preparatory work at San Francisco appear somewhat confused
and equivocal on this point and hardly yield conclusive indication of the correctness of the
commentators' assumptions. For instance, while it is true that a Brazilian amendment to
article 2(4), one that would have added the words "and from the threat or use of eco-
nomic measures," was rejected by the Drafting Subcommittee of Committee I/1, 6
DocumENTs OF THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 334, 559 (1945)
[hereinafter cited as U.N.C.I.O.], the Report of Committee 1 to Commission I stated
that "The unilateral use of force or similar coercive measures is not authorized or ad-
mitted," id. at 400. (Emphasis added.) The commentators cited above commonly invoke
the "ordinary connotation" and the "plain, common-sense meaning" of "force"-a criterion
of interpretation which in other contexts is seldom regarded as conclusive.
See, further, Kelsen, General International Law and the Law of the United Nations,
in THE UNITED NATIONS: TEN YEARS LEGAL PROGRESS 4-5 (1956). He suggests that
"force" in article 2(4) may be construed to refer to both "armed force" and "non-armed
force."
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 39; see text accompanying note 103 infra. See, in this con-
nection, the argument made by Professor Kelsen, supra note 8, at 11, that "Member
states are not only under the obligations stipulated expressly in Article 2, paragraphs
3, 4, and 5, but also under the obligations to refrain from a threat to or breach of the
peace stipulated in Article 39; ... ."
10. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 286-87 (1954) suggests
that in such cases, "forcible or coercive" measures may be regarded as violative of article
2(3), if not article 2(4), of the U.N. Charter.
11. See, e.g., Waldock, supra note 8, at 489; 2 OPPENHEim-LAUTERPACrT 152, 184;
GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 104 (2d rev. ed. 1949) ; JESSUP,
A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 169-77 (1948).
12. Citations to these regional treaties are collected in McDougal & Feliciano, Gen-
eral Principles 802 n.100. See also Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand,
and United States, art. 1 (1951.) (text in 46 A-At. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 93 (1952)) ; Mutual
Assistance Pact Between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, art. 1 (1954) (text in 49 id.
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are supplemented by the "Nuremberg principles" which were unanimously
affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly as "principles of interna-
tional law" 3 and which authorize the imposition of negative (criminal) sanc-
tions on individual persons judicially ascertained to be responsible for the
"planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances. '14
The conception of permissible coercion, complementary to that of nonper-
missible, is characterized by multiplicity of reference. One reference is to all
coercion which is implicit in and concomitant to the ordinary interaction of
states, and which does not rise to the level and degree of prohibited coercion.15
Another and more common reference is to coercion of a high degree of inten-
sity, including the most comprehensive and violent uses of military instru-
ments, when employed in individual or group defense against unlawful co-
ercion. States traditionally have claimed and reciprocally acknowledged a
large competence to protect themselves by countering coercion with coercion.
The United Nations Charter explicitly mentions and preserves this permis-
sion to resort to force in response to unauthorized coercion, describes it as an
"inherent right," and recognizes that permissible coercion may be exercised
by the target state individually, or by a collectivity of states, without prior
authorization from the organized community (although, of course, subject to
its subsequent appraisal).1 6 A third reference is to coercion exercised in ful-
fillment of or in accordance with certain commitments and permissions of
members to participate in police measures required or authorized by the gene-
ral security organization to prevent or repress impermissible coercion. These
measures of collective peace enforcement are designed to supplement the ef-
forts of the participant or group of participants determined by the community
to have been exercising lawful defense.
The most elementary distinction that any system of law must make in at-
tempting to secure minimal public order is thus today established by the world
community in its fundamental prescriptions.' 7 By contraposing the prohibition
Supp. 47 (1955)); Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Philip-
pines, art. 1 (1951) (text in SuBoCiMITT ON DISARMAMENT, SENATE COMMITTEE oN
FOREIGN RELATIONS, DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY: A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTs 1919-
1955, 84th Cong., Zd Sess. 598 (1956)); Mutual Defense Treaty Between United States
and Republic of Korea, art. 1 (1953) (text in id. at 607) ; Mutual Defense Treaty Be-
tween United States and Republic of China, art. 1 (1954) (text in id. at 608).
13. U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. No. 95 (I), GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 1st Sess., Plenary 55
(1946).
14. Principle VI, Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, Report of the Inter-
national Law Commission covering its second session, June 5-July 29, 1950, in 2 YEAR-
B00K OF THE INT'L LAw CoMM'N 1950, at 376.
15. This and the other references of permissible coercion are explored in relative
detail in the second part of this article.
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
17. In the language of Professor Kelsen's system, the effect of establishing this dis-
tinction is to permit "war" to be characterized as either a "delict" or a "reaction against
a delict [sanction]." See KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE 34-55 (1942); KELSEN, THE LAw
1959]
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of unlawful coercion and the permission of lawful coercion, we seek to empha-
size the complementarity and polarity of these prescriptions."' Contrary to
the suggestion sometimes made,' 9 to couple the prohibition with the permission
is not to neutralize and nullify the prohibition. The world community's pre-
scriptions about coercion, like other world prescriptions, march and must
march in pairs of complementary opposites. An absolute interdiction of all
coercion is scarcely conceivable, or if conceivable, is hardly within the limits
of the achievable. A certain degree of coercion is almost always exhibited in
all the value-institutional processes that take place in the world arena. Cer-
tainly the world social processes, characterized in terms of the dominant value
at stake as power processes, pervasively and continuously manifest many as-
pects of coercion.20 Further, not even the most highly centralized and effective-
ly organized municipal public order attempts to prohibit private coercion ab-
solutely; some provision for self-defense in residual, exceptional cases always
remains.2 ' In a decentralized world arena, in which the general community of
OF THE UNIrzD NATIONS 707-08 (1950); KEtsEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
33-35 (1952). See also Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under Present International
Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11 (1951).
18. There is some recognition of this complementarity in, e.g., STONE, AGGRESSION
AND WORLD ORDER 75 & n.182 (1958); Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris and tihe Budapest
Articles of Interpretation, 20 TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'Y 178, 199 (1935) ; WILLIAMs, SOME
AsPEcTs OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 237 (1934). See also the Ameri-
can Note of June 23, 1928, issued during the drafting of the Briand-Kellogg Pact:
"Express recognition by treaty of this inalienable right [of self-defence], however, gives
rise to the same difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression. It is the identi-
cal question approached from the other side . . . ." (Text in MILLER, THE PEACE PACT
OF PARIS 214 (1928).) In contrast, see KELSEN, CoLLEcrivE SECURITY UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 27-28 (1957), and PompE, AGGRESSIVE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRImE 55-
60 (1953).
19. See, e.g., STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 243 (1954), who
lists article 51 of the U.N. Charter among "clauses of escape and evasion from peaceful
settlement and peace enforcement." Similarly, Professor Stone writes that "if these pro-
visions [e.g., articles 2(3), 2(4), 39-50] were not qualified by other provisions [e.g.,
article 51] of the Charter, and by the difficulties of operating them, they would virtually
have established legal control over the resort of states to war, analogous to that of muni-
cipal law over the resort of citizens to private violence." Id. at 303.
20. LASSWELL & KAPLAN, POWER AND SOcIETY 98 (1950), point out that power can
be described in terms of, inter alia, its degree of coerciveness which
depends on which values serve as the influence base (and function as positive or
negative sanctions), and on the amounts of those values promised or threatened.
... The exercise of power is simply the exercise of a high degree of coerciveness.
When the values promised or threatened are sufficiently important to those over
whom the influence is being exercised, the latter are being coerced: they are sub-
jected to a power relationship.
See also id. at 250-61.
21. Cf. KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1957). It is
made clear in JENKS, THE CoMMoN LAW OF MANKIND 139-43 (1958) not only that all
major legal systems recognize self-defense, but also that such systems exhibit an im-
pressive uniformity with regard to the appropriate limiting principles. Dr. Jenks made
[Vol. 68:1057106-2
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states still lacks effective capacity to protect constituent states from unlawful
coercion, it would seem a fortiori even less practicable to eliminate permissive
self-defense and achieve a truly complete prohibition of coercion. Inasmuch as
an absolute prohibition of coercion has not been feasible, the historical alterna-
tives of the general community have been either to permit complete disorder
or to aspire to minimal public order. Complete disorder, failure to forbid even
the most intense and comprehensive destruction of values, is not only possible,
but has in fact long characterized the perspectives of traditional international
law. If, on the other hand, the deliberate choice is made to pursue at least a
minimum of order in the world arena, the coercion that is to be prohibited
clearly must be distinguished from that which is to be permitted.2 2 The con-
ceptions both of impermissible and of permissible coercion are thus necessary
in the theoretical formulation of authoritative policy as well as in the practi-
cal application of that policy to interacting human groups.
The Basic Postulate of Peaceful Change
The fundamental policies embodied and projected in these prescriptions are,
as indicated, complementary. In formulating, interpreting and applying the
prohibition of impermissible coercion, authoritative decision-makers of the
world community attempt to regulate conflicting claims by states, on the one
hand, to effect changes, and, on the other, to avoid changes in the patterns of
power and other value allocation among the various nation-states.2 3 The de-
cision-makers seek to prevent coercive and violent unilateral modification and
reconstruction of value patterns and, simultaneously, to encourage recourse to
nonviolent, noncoercive methods of change and adjustment. This policy is
instinct with a community recognition that coercion of provocative intensity
and violence are not appropriate instruments for asserting and implementing
reference to the common law, Canadian, French, German, Italian, Islamic, Hindu, Jewish,
Chinese, Japanese, African, and Soviet systems.
22. Contrast the suggestions made in Cohn, The System of Sanctions of Article 16
of the Covenant and the Future Role of Neutrality, in COLLEcrIvE SEcuRITY 402 (Bour-
quin ed. 1936) :
The system of sanctions should be directed against war as such, as a fact, with-
out regard to its psychological basis .... [D]efensive war must be included as
well as offensive war, so that the States not involved in the conflict may not be
obligated to make a choice which would at the same time necessitate the moral
condemnation of one of the Powers, but may simply be confronted with the state
of war as a fact which must be prevented and combated [sic], in the common
interest of all the nations. It is of little importance to determine who, from a
purely formal standpoint, is playing the part of the aggressor. War is forbidden
in all cases and for all parties ....
The singular want of realism in these suggestions is all the more conspicuous when it is
recalled that they were addressed to the problem of making the League of Nations "more
and more effective and universal."
23. As to this mode of generalizing the opposing claims, cf. DuNNr, PEAc u_.
CHANGE 1-4 (1937).
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claims to a reallocation of values; the most intense coercive and violent uni-
lateral redistribution of values in the world arena not only wastefully entails
the expenditure of values for the destruction of values but also generates fur-
ther value expenditure and destruction in the shape of a countering response.2 4
The basic community policy might, therefore, simply be generalized in terms
of a demand for elemental public order and for the preservation of basic hu-
man values in the course of international change. In permitting, on the other
hand, certain coercion as lawful, authoritative decision-makers seek to utilize
coercion, under appropriate conditions, for the more effective securing of such
minimum public order by authorizing community enforcement action and, in
deference to the still poor degree of organization obtaining in the world arena,
by conceding individual and group defense against breaches of public order.
The assumption which underlies the permission of lawful coercion is, like that
which underlies the prohibition of unlawful coercion, not that the value dis-
tribution map and the particular configuration of the international arena exis-
tent at any given time should be immunized from change but that the common
interest in minimizing the destruction of values dictates that they should not
be reconstructed through intense coercion or violence.
In an arena as decentralized, primitively organized and afflicted with com-
peting conceptions of preferred world public order as the existing world is,
and absent effective, specialized institutions for prescribing and applying com-
munity policy about coercion, the essential distinction between permissible and
nonpermissible resort to coercion is, of course, difficult to apply in varying
specific contexts of coercion. At a later stage in this Article, we propose to
canvass these difficulties and to indicate in some detail the range of contextual
factors bearing upon application of the permissible-nonpermissible distinction.
The point of present emphasis is that neither difficulty of application nor the
continuing high expectations of violence should obscure the indispensability of
24. Indeed no more grave crimes can be conceived of than a conspiracy to wage a
war of aggression or the waging of a war of aggression, for the conspiracy
threatens the security of the peoples of the world, and the waging disrupts it. The
probable result of such a conspiracy, and the inevitable result of its execution is
that death and suffering will be inflicted on countless human beings.
JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 1142 (1948).
The comparable, and more frequently quoted, passage from the judgment of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal appears in OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF Axis
CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, OPINION AND JUDGMENT 16 (1947).
The character and capabilities of modern weapons have, of course, imparted new and
sharper point to this humanitarian recognition. As Professor Dunn observes in Peaceful
Change Today, 11 WORLD POLITICS 278-79 (1959):
The recent spectacular developments in military weapons have sharply restricted
the utility of coercion as a means of changing the status quo. The destructiveness
of nuclear weapons is out of all proportion to any political gains that might be
achieved by war. There is no certainty that even mild forms of coercion would
not eventually lead to their use. Hence, whereas change by voluntary agreement
is very difficult to achieve, change through the resort to forceful measures has in
most cases become entirely too dangerous to contemplate.
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the distinction for securing both minimum order and the necessary conditions
for a world public order of freedom and abundance. Withal the authoritative
establishment of that distinction represents a substantial achievement.2 5 The
long perspective of history precludes casual deprecation of prescriptions which
epitomize what has for centuries been a major aspiration of much of man-
kind-the institution of processes of authority, encompassing both prescrip-
tions and procedures, that permit and encourage the production and sharing
of values without the disruption of coercion and violence from across national
boundaries.2 0
Emergence of the Fundamental Distinction: Bellurn Iustum
These contemporary prescriptions have roots that reach far back into the
Middle Ages when comparable efforts to distinguish between legitimate and
nonlegitimate (iustum and iniustunm) violence were made.2 T The gist of the
conception of bellum iustuin, as formulated and systematized by the medieval
theologians and jurists, was that resort to violence could be regarded as a
legitimate procedure of self-help only if certain requirements relating to a
belligerent's authority to make war (auctoritas principis), and to the objec-
tives (husta causa) and intent (recta intentio) of the belligerent, were met. 28
25. Cf. Jessup, The Crine of Aggression and the Future of International Law, 62
PoL. SCI. Q. 1 (1947).
26. For surveys of the numerous peace plans, in which this ancient and continuing
aspiration found expression, conceived and put forward from the days of Dubois at the
beginning of the fourteenth century -down to the establishment of the United Nations,
see, e.g., BEALs, THE HISTORY OF PEACE (1931); HEMLEBEN, PLANS FOR WORLD PEACE
THROUGH SIx CENTURIES (1943); TRUEBLOOD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEACE IDEA
(1932); WYNNER & LLOYD, SEARCHLIGHT ON PEACE PLANS (1944). See also THE
EVOLUTION OF WoRLD-PEACE (Marvin ed. 1921); PHELPS, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PEACE
MOVEMENT IN THE MIm-NINETEENTH CENTURY (1930); SOULEYMAN, THE VISION OF
WORLD PEACE IN SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE (1941). A brief
summary is offered in SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER
7-18 (1936), and Possony, Peace Enforcement, 55 YALE L.J. 910 (1946).
27. See, e.g., BALLIS, THE LEGAL POSITION OF W: CHANGES IN ITS THEORY AND
PRACTICE FROM PLATO TO VATTEL (1937); BuTLE & MACCOBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-21. (1928); EPPSTEIN, THE CATHOLIC TRADITION OF THE LAW
OF NATIONS chs. 4-5 (1935); NussBAum, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
chs. 3-4 (rev. ed. 1954); Pom'PE, AGGRESSIVE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 116-38
(1953); ScOrr, THE CATHOLIC CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1934); WEHBERG,
THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR (Zeydel transl. 1931); Von Elbe, The Evolution of the Con-
cept of the Just War hs Interniational Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 665 (1939). References
to continental literature are compiled in SToNE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 298-99 nn.6 & 9 (1954).
28. Systematization of the conception of bellum instumn in terms of these three gen-
eral requisites was the work of St. Thomas Aquinas. The requirement of auctoritas
principLs was designed to exclude private violence. Ivsta causa required the showing of
fault on the part of the adverse party. Recta intentio was absent where the belligerent's
motive was aggrandizement rather than "securing peace," "punishing evil-doers," and
"uplifting the good." See ScoTr, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. 1,
19591 1065
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In this conception, the legitimate objectives of violence were limited to the
redressing of "a wrong received," 29 a "wrong" "serious and commensurate
with the losses the war would occasion" and "which cannot be repaired or
avenged in any other way."30 "Justa causa" thus anticipated the requirements
of consequentiality and necessity which seem implicit in present conceptions
of permissible coercion.
The classical doctrine of bellun instum may be seen to be comparable in
policy with contemporary prescriptions. The doctrine incorporated a policy
of limiting the incidence of violent change among the multitude of kingdoms
and principalities that comprised the medieval European world.31 In the con-
text of the arena that existed at least in the later middle ages, bellum justun
and the policy it embodied seemed much more practicable of application than
might be supposed from the epithets with which the doctrine has been de-
scribed by some modern writers.3 - The Western world in the later middle
ages exhibited a basic unity characterized, in its fundamental aspect, by one
widely and deeply shared body of spiritual perspectives, a centralized ecclesias-
tical organization that transcended political boundaries, and a common over-
riding respect for the supreme ecclesiastical authority, the Papacy. The degree
of unity and centralized organization of authority achieved by the Church was
such that medieval Christendom has been described by scholars as an "inter-
national state."'3 3 The Papacy, whose authority was conceived as derived from
at 1.92 (1934). Suarez much later modified the Thomist doctrine by substituting for
recta intentio, debitus modus, a proper mode of conducting a war. Suarez, De Triplici
Virtute Theologica, in 2 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTIONS FROm TREE
WoRxs 805 (1944). Grotius, beyond stating the just causes of war as defense, recovery
of property, and punishment, added little to the scholastics' analysis. DE Imm BELLI Ac
PAciS bk. II, ch. 1, § II, 2 in 2 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (1925).
29. Vitoria, De Indis et De lure Belli Relectiones, in SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at LIV (1934). Vitoria expressly rejected extension of empire,
differences of religion, and personal glory or advantage of the belligerent prince as just
causes of war. Id. at LIII-LIV.
30. ,Suarez, supra note 28, at 816; cf. Vitoria, supra note 29, at LIV-LV:
Not every kind and degree of wrong can suffice for commencing a war. . . .As,
then, the evils inflicted in war are all of a severe and atrocious character, such
as slaughter and fire and devastation, it is not lawful for slight wrongs to pursue
the authors of the wrongs with war, seeing that the degree of the punishment ought
to correspond to the measure of the offence.
31. See Vitoria, supra note 29, at LXX.
32. Nussbaunm, Just War-A Legal Concept?, 42 Mica. L. Ray. 453 (1943); Kunz,
Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 528 (1951) ; KUNz, LA PROB-
LEMATICA ACTUAL DE LAS Lvas DE LA GUERA 85 (1955).
33. See Krey, The International State of the Middle Ages: Some Reasons for Its
Failure, 28 Am. HisT. REv. 7 (1927); cf. FIGGIS, STUDIES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM
GERSON To GROTIUS 1414-1625, at 4 (2d ed. 1923) : "In the Middle Ages the Church was
not a State, it was the State; the State or rather the civil authority (for a separate
society was not recognized) was merely the police department of the Church." See also
HOFN ER, LA ETICA COLONIAL ESPANOLA DEL SIGLO DE ORO 3-44 (Caballero transl.
1957).
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a source independent of and higher than human volition, was regarded as com-
petent to formulate and interpret general standards for the ordering of rela-
tions among temporal rulers, to intervene in disputes between them for the
maintenance of peace and, in case of war, to pass judgment on the justness of
a belligerent's cause.34 Sanctioning procedures available for enforcing papal
judgments included the pronouncement of excommunication and interdict
which, in that age, entailed extensive material deprivations and, at times, even
the deposition of an offending prince.
35
Profound changes in the conditions of the medieval world-brouglt about
by the Reformation with its disintegrating impact on the unity and authority
of the Church, and by the consolidation of the effective power of territorial
polities 3 6-- deeply affected the viability of bellun, iustmn. With the authority
of the Papacy repudiated by many temporal rulers, there was no longer any
supranational organ commonly acknowledged as competent to give judgment
on the legitimacy of the cause asserted by a sovereign prince who resorted to
violence. The absence of an effective central authority enabled each belligerent
to be, in effect, his own and final judge; a prince's recourse to war was in
fact likened by commentators to a decree of a law court against a defendant.37
Thus, the question of the "subjective," as distinguished from the "objective,"
justice of a resort to violence, and the possibility and implications of an armed
conflict being "subjectively" just on both sides, were much discussed. Neither
Vittoria's conception of "invincible ignorance" as sufficient justification nor
Suarez' notion of "probabilism" 38 could infuse much vitality into the doctrine
34. SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND ch. 1 (1954); GIERKE, POLITI-
CAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 9-21 (Maitland trans]. 1900) (especially at 14-15) ;
WRIGHT, MEDIEVAL INTERNATIONALISM 18-50 (1.930). See also 4 CARLYLE & CARLYLE, A
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WEST 362 (1922) ; 5 id. 165-71 (1928);
EPPSTEIN, THE CATHOLIC TRADITION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. 8 and app. I (1935);
NussBAuM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 17-21 (rev. ed. 1954); 1
PERENYA VICENTE, TERIA DE LA GUERRA EN FRANcIsco SuAREz 27.1-82 (1954).
35. 2 CARL=Y & CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 200-06. For instances of excom-
munication and deposition of kings and princes by papal decree for breaking the peace,
see 1 WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 92-93 (1899).
36. FIGaIS, op. cit. supra note 33, at 55, summed up the changes as "a change from
a world-empire to a territorial State, and from ecclesiastical to civil predominance." See
also LAWRENCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-21 (7th ed. Winfield 1928); SCHIFFER, THE
LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND 27 (1954); STURZO, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
AND THE RIGHT OF WAR ch. I (Carter transl. 1929); NussBAum, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. 4 (rev. ed. 1954).
37. The judicial analogy is especially discernible in the writings of Vitoria, supra
note 29, at LV-LVI (1532), and Suarez, supra note 28, at 806 (1612). See also SCOTT,
THE CATHOLIC CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-41, 441-43 (1934); Husserl, The
Conceplion of War as a Legal Remedy, 12 U. CH. L. REv. 115, 258 (1945) ; Von Elbe,
supra note 27, at 679.
38. See SCOTT, THE CATHOLIC CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-49, 459-65
(1934) ; BUTLER & MACCOBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-14 (1928);
1 PERENYA VICENTE, TEORIA DE LA GUERRA EN FRANCISCO SuAREz 214-70 (1954).
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of bellhn iustum in an arena where no effective decision-maker was generally
accepted as authorized to apply it."9 By the eighteenth century, Vattel could
write that the rectitude of international violence was a question pertaining to
the "necessary law of nations" addressed to the "conscience of sovereigns,"
and that the "voluntary" or "positive law of nations" derived from the prac-
tice of states drew no distinction between wars on the basis of the "intrinsic
justice" of the respective belligerents' causes.40
Regression From Order: Decision by Relative Strength
In the theory and practice of international law during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, bellum iustuin had for all practical purposes been
brought to unobtrusive demise. Resort to coercion was, in the view of most
publicists and state officials of that century, the exercise of an attribute or pre-
rogative of sovereignty the legitimacy of which nonparticipating states were
not competent to judge.41 Traditional international law included no prescrip-
tion for controlling a resort to coercion or for characterizing coercion as per-
missible or nonpermissible; it attempted only the regulation and humanization
of violence once violence had in fact been initiated. In theory, the contending
belligerents stood on a plane of "juridical equality," and third states which
chose not to participate were said to be under a "duty of impartiality" and
nondiscrimination in their relations with both belligerents. 42 Consequently, as
some scholars have observed,43 a deep internal contradiction in the structure
of world prescriptions developed: the right to independent existence, though
classed as a fundamental right of states, did not include a prohibition against
states waging war and destroying one another.
The international law of the nineteenth century may thus be seen to repre-
39. It is in the light of Grotius' historic task of supplying secular principles to fill
the void left by the shattering of medieval religious and ecclesiastical unity and of giving
definitive form to the conception of a community of territorial states without centralized
organs, but under a common law, that his use of the bellum itustum doctrine is to be
considered. For a brief but excellent exposition of the function Grotius assigned to per-
missible coercion in his system, see SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND
ch. 2 (1954). Schiffer points out that Grotius himself was quite aware of the difficulties
presented by the then existing arena conditions. Id. at 40-41, 46.
40. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, in 3
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247, 305, 308 (Fenwick transl. 1916).
41. See, e.g., HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-52 (1st ed. 1880); HERSHEY, THE
ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 349, 351-52 (1912) ; LAwRENCE, THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 292 (2d ed. 1897); 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
55-57 (Ist ed. 1906); RiSLEY, THE LAW OF WAR 68-69 (1897). See also PoMPE, AGGRES-
SIVE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 138-52 (1953); Wright, Changes in the Conception
of War, 18 Am. J. INT'L L. 755 (1924).
42. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (1st ed. 1880); WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 697 (2d ed. Lawrence 1863) (quoting Bynkershoek).
43. See BRiERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1944) ; 2 OPPENHEIM-
LAUTERPACHT 178-79; Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under Present International
Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11, 13-14 (1951); 2 WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 950 (1942).
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sent a policy of indifference, 44 as it were, to the common interest in restraining
violence, and hence of permitting the speedy resolution of controversies be-
tween states simply on the basis of their relative strength. Its principal effort
appeared to be to limit the spatial extension of violence through application of
its "neutrality" rules, designed in theory to isolate the contending belligerents
and practically tending to make superior indigenous strength decisive. Ob-
viously, this policy manifests an acceptance of private coercion and violence
as permissive methods not only of self-help and self-vindication for conserv-
ing values but also of effecting changes in the international distribution of
values.4 5 In this way, the doctrine and policy of traditional international law
reflected the decentralized and unorganized character of the world arena of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the multi-polar structure of that arena
which permitted the operation of a system of power-balancing among the
stronger states, the great movements of Western nationalism and the expan-
sion of colonial empires, and the limitations of the contemporary technology of
violence.4 6
There were, it is true, a few prescriptions that purported to govern non-
comprehensive uses of coercion-coercion of limited dimensions for limited
objectives-technically denominated as "reprisal," "intervention," "pacific
blockade," and so forth, and generically classed as "measures short of war."
Without attempting any detailed exposition of the traditional theory about
the coercive exercises deemed not to bring about the "legal consequences"
compendiously, if confusingly, termed a "legal state of war," we may observe
that the rules on "measures short of war" restricted the lawful application of
44. POmPE, AGG;zsslvE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 138-39 (1953) speaks of a
"period of indifference," existing "from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries." On
the main point in the text, see 2 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1907) : "The truth
is that when war enters on the scene all law that was previously concerned with the
dispute retires, and a new law steps in, directed only to secure fair and not too inhuman
fighting."
45. Judge Lauterpacht made this clear:
Prior to that treaty [the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War] the
system of international law, glaringly inconsistent in many matters, was symmetri-
cal in one respect: while it made no provision for institutional peaceful change,
it permitted war as an instrument for changing the existing legal position. Every
State had the right, by formally going to war and thus risking its own existence,
to alter the status qio either by annihilating the defeated opponent or by dictating
to him the conditions of peace.
Lauterpacht, The Legal Aspect, in PEACEFUL CHANGE-AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM
139 (Manning ed. 1937).
46. See, e.g., CLAUDE, SWORDS INTo PLowsHREs: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 19-34 (1956); LIsKA, INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM
ch. 1 (1957) ; Wright, International Law and the Balance of Power, 37 Am. J. INT'L L.
97 (1943) ; Wright, Accomplishments and Expectations of World Organization, 55 YALE
L.J. 870 (1946). See particularly 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 73-74, 185-86
(1st ed. 1905), in which the author conceived of the "existence of international law"
as dependent upon "an equilibrium between the members of the Family of Nations."
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limited coercion to cases in which a prior unlawful act, or a culpable failure
to perform international obligations, was attributable to the state against which
coercion was applied. 4 7 The limitations which these prescriptions sought to
impose seem less real than ostensible: the initiating state could at any time
designate its operations as "war" and avoid the thrust of the limitations. There
is appropriate sarcasm in the analogy drawn by one scholar to a municipal
enactment that punished petty thieving while condoning armed robbery.48
"Measures short of war" were generally utilized only by participants with a
very substantial power differential over their opponents.49 The doctrines on
"measures short of war," like other nineteenth-century international law doc-
trines, in fact constituted but one expression of the general policy which would
localize the area of coercion and violence by permitting, in an unorganized
world arena, a quick settlement through superior strength. 0 The tacit assump-
tions were that the weaker participant would readily perceive the futility of
47. Thus, for instance, the German-Portuguese Arbitration Tribunal in the Naulilaa
case (1928) defined "reprisals" as "acts of self-help of the injured State, acts in retalia-
tion for an unredressed act of the offending state contrary to international law" and
stressed that "they will be illegal unless a previous act in violation of international law
has furnished the justification." BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 951 (2d ed. 1952). The
Tribunal specified two other requirements for the lawfulness of "reprisals": they must
"have been preceded by a request for redress which has been unavailing" and must not
be "out of all proportion to the act which has motivated them." Id. at 953. See also
COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1948); HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
433-43 (8th ed. Pearce Higgins 1924) ; HINDMARSH, FoRCz IN PEACE (1933) ; 2 OPPN-
HEim-LAuTERPACHT 136-51.
48. KELsEN, LAW AND PEACE 53 (1942). Compare JEssUP, A MODERN LAW OF
NATIONS 157 (1948).
49. Maccoby, Reprisals as a Measure of Redress Short of War, 2 CAmB. L.J. 60, 69
(1924) ; Giraud, Memorandum on Pacific Blockade up to the Time of the Foundation
of the Leagite of Nations, LEAGUE or NATIONS OFF. J., 7th Ass. 841, 842 (1927); HIND-
mARSH, FORCE IN PEACE 73-74, 87-88, 92-94 (1933) ; Westlake, Reprisals and War, 25
L.Q. Rav. 127, 133 (1909).
It seems an interesting commentary upon the change of perspectives exhibited in con-
temporary prohibitions of coercion that in 1897 Professor Holland could ask plaintively:
Why, again, is it made a matter of reproach that a pacific blockade has almost
always been employed, as a matter of fact, by strong against weak states? Unless
weak states are to be allowed to shelter their wrong doing, or their persistence
in a policy detrimental to the peace of the world, behind their weakness, they must
be brought to reason either by forcible pressure in time of peace, or by war. There
can be little doubt which of these two methods is better adapted to oblige and
enable a weak state to make concessions, which in any case are inevitable, with
the least injury to itself and the least disturbance of the peace of the world.
HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (1898). See also HOLLAND, LErTERs
TO THE TrmEs UPON WAR AND NEUTRALITY, 1881-1920, at 14 (3d ed. 1921).
50. As Professor Briggs points out,
justifications were found in allegations that such hostile measures were, in reality,
"pacific" in character, since States, instead of exercising their legally unfettered
right to resort to war, prevented the rise of general hostilities by confining their
measures to a restricted locale, a particular bombardment, blockade or occupation
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widening or prolonging the conflict and make haste to comply with the de-
mands of its more powerful opponent, and that such demands would be kept
so relatively modest as neither to create furious resistance on the part of the
weaker state nor to excite the alarm of nonparticipants fearful of a serious
imbalance of power in the arena.
The Fundamental Distinction Revived: From the Covenant to the Charter
The Covenant of the League of Nations represented the first significant
break with the theory of traditional international law.51 The Covenant set
forth a broad undertaking of members to "respect... the territorial integrity
and existing political independence" of each other.52 The specific obligations
it imposed upon its members were, however, less comprehensive. "Resort to
war" was, under the terms of the Covenant, unlawful in four cases: when
made without prior submission of the dispute to arbitration or judicial settle-
ment or to inquiry by the Council of the League; when begun before the ex-
piration of three months after the arbitral award or judicial decision or Coun-
cil report; when commenced against a member which had complied with such
award or decision or recommendation of a unanimously adopted Council re-
port; and, under certain circumstances, when initiated by a nonmember state
against a member state.53
It was of course no mere historical accident that the break with traditional
theory and the re-establishment of a distinction between permissible and non-
permissible resort to coercion coincided with the first attempt at a permanent,
institutionalized organization of the community of states. The necessity for
such organization was underscored by the collapse of the nineteenth-century
of territory. That such measures of armed coercion did not always lead to war
was due only to the preponderance of force on one side ....
BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 958 (2d ed. 1952); cf. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 434
(8th ed. Pearce Higgins 1924).
51. There had been prior but minor and fragmentary efforts to establish some limita-
tion on the "fins ad bellua' of traditional law. The Hague Convention II of 1907 pro-
hibited the use of force for recovery of contract debts, save in case of refusal of the
debtor state to arbitrate. The Bryan arbitration treaties imposed the duty not to begin
hostilities before the report of the conciliation commissions provided for in such treaties.
See generally White, Limitation Upon the Initiation of War, 19 Paoc. Am. Soc'y IN'L
L. 102-08 (1925). For a listing of the Bryan treaties, as well as of bilateral agreements
between Latin-American countries providing for recourse to arbitration or other peace-
ful modes of settlement before resorting to violence, see Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law, Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP.
858-61 (1939).
52. LEAGUE OF NATIONs COVENANT art. 10.
53. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 12, paras. 1., 2, arts. 13, 15, paras. 6, 7, art.
17, paras. 1, 3; see MARTIN, COLLECTIVE SECURTY 90-93 (1952). To Professor Brierly,
war under the circumstances listed above was "of a particularly heinous kind." 17 TRANS-
ACT. GROT. Soc'Y 77 (1931). The Eighth Assembly of the League unanimously approved
a resolution declaring that "all wars of aggression are, and always shall be, prohibited."
LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. No. 54, at 155-56 (1927). The effect of this
resolution upon the scope of the prohibitions of the Covenant was much debated.
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system of power-balancing in Europe, a system that had become increasingly
unstable and precarious as the number of effective territorial units of power
gradually diminished. The blood-letting of World War I, the first conflict
since the Napoleonic Wars to assume the proportions of "total war," generated
widespread revulsion over the use of violence to secure national goals. Thus,
promoting recourse to nonviolent procedures of change was a principal pur-
pose infusing the prescriptions of the Covenant. In fact, prior recourse to non-
violent procedures was made a test of permissible coercion. The prevention of
resort to violence was also sought in the Covenant by incorporating a "prin-
ciple of delay," upon the hopeful assumption that the effect of time on con-
tending participants would be a tranquilizing one.54 The Covenant prescribed
what was in substance a three-month moratorium on violence after the chosen
peaceful procedure had resulted in a decision; and it allowed a participant,
upon the expiration of such moratorium, to implement by force of arms a de-
cision in its favor against a noncomplying party.
The League's rudimental degree of organization, reflected in the modest
scope of the Covenant's specific prohibitions of coercion, was most clearly ex-
hibited in the decentralized character of the decision-making required for the
application of those prohibitions. Each member of the League retained author-
ity to characterize a particular exercise of coercion as one in breach of or con-
sistent with the requirements of the Covenant and hence to render operative
or inoperative its own commitments to participate in sanctioning procedures
against an offending state. The authority of the League Council did not ex-
tend beyond that of formulating recommendations to the individual members.5
The difficulties of application inherent in such decentralized decision-making
were not relieved by the phraseology of the Covenant's prohibitions. "Resort
to war" aroused confused contention as to the continuing legitimacy of force
and violence if participants used some verbal symbol other than "war," such
as "reprisal" or "intervention" of other "measure short of war," in designat-
ing their exercises of coercion, and if they disclaimed any intention to insti-
tute a "legal state of war."56
The formally modest limitations which the Covenant of the League placed
on the Jus ad belhlm of traditional international law were sought to be ex-
tended, and the so-called "gaps" in the Covenant closed,517 by the General
54. WILLIAMS, SOME ASPECTs OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 137-
38 (1,934).
55. See Resolutions 4 and 6 of the Resolutions on the Economic Weapon adopted by
the Assembly of the League on October 4, 1921. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spot.
Supp. No. 6, at 25. See also WILLA s, ASPECTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91
(1939) ; Williams, Sanctions Under the Covenant, 17 BRIT. YD. INT'L L. 130 (1936).
56. For a recent canvassing of the polemical literature on this point, see KoTzscH.
THE CONCEPT or WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-71
(1956). This debate related to the so-called "subjective" or "intention" and "objective"
theories of "war"; a possible mode of clarification is sketched in McDougal & Feliciano,
The Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-Temporal Analysis, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 241 (1958).
57. These "gaps" referred to cases in which unilateral resort to "war" (other than
in self-defense) was not prohibited by the explicit language of the Covenant. See the list
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Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928. This Pact of Paris (Kellogg-
Briand Pact) condemned "recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies" and set out comprehensive undertakings to renounce "war as
an instrument of national policy" and to seek the resolution of "all disputes
or conflicts, of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be" exclusively
by "pacific means." The policy objectives of preventing violence and promot-
ing noncoercive methods of adjustment were thus much more ambitiously
formulated than in the League Covenant. That the Pact of Paris left intact the
freedom of states to exercise violence in self-defense has at times been noted
with some aspersion,r8 as though that in some way impaired the Pact's pro-
hibition of "recourse to war." The fact is, of course, that self-defense is recog-
nized in even the most advanced municipal public orders, and is indispensable
in an arena as ineffectively organized as that of the present world, so long, at
least, as the assumption prevails that an arena of plural participants should
be maintained.r9 Some scholars have observed that the Pact of Paris did not
of "licit wars" conceivable under the Covenant set out in EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNMENT 480 (3d ed. 1957). See also MARTIN, COLLECrIVE SEcuarrT 92-93 (1952).
There had been, prior to the Pact of Paris, considerable efforts devoted to closing these
"fissures" in the structure of authoritative prescription, the most notable effort being the
drafting of the 1924 Geneva Protocol. Apropos of these efforts, Professor Brierly wrote
in 1943 (and hence with the benefit of hindsight) that they
implied that if war came, there was a real danger that the aggressor would first
carefully observe his Covenant obligations, and then take advantage of one of the
gaps to enter on a war not expressly prohibited; this was formally possible, but
it was always politically most improbable, and in fact none of the wars that have
broken out since the Covenant came into force has begun that way.
BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 283 (1958).
58. See, e.g., PoMPE, AGGRESSIVE Wa: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 157, 159 (1953);
Borchard, The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 116
(1929). See also FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIM 170-200 (1952). What could properly
be objected to was not the "reservation" of self-defense but the excessively broad state-
ment in the United States Note of June 23, 1928, that a state claiming self-defense
"alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self de-
fense." (Text in MILLER, THE PEACE PAct OF PARIS 213, 214 (1928).) Justice Pal in
his dissenting judgment in the Tokyo Trial took that statement in a literal and absolute
sense as making "the question whether a particular war is or is not in self defense . ..
unjusticiable." PAL, INTERNATIONAL "MILITARY TRmUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 35-48
(1953) ; see note 216 infra.
59. In laying stress upon self-defense here as elsewhere in this essay, we have no
intent to make a fetish of the nation-state as it is known today. It should be obvious
that the only rational hope is the common one that a much higher degree of effective
organization may be secured in the world arena. We do, however, assume the desirability
of some deconcentration and dispersal of power, both authoritative and effective, in the
world. The contemporary nation-state is, of course, not the only possible organizational
form that plural units of participation in world processes of power may take. The con-
figuration of the world arena and the interrelations of global and subglobal (the more
comprehensive and the less comprehensive) power processes are susceptible of nearly
infinite detailed variation and the number of possible organizational patterns for allocat-
ing authoritative power between a center and balanced regions is indefinite.
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inhibit the "customary liberty [of states] to resort to war" to the extent that
it prohibited "recourse to war" only as an instrument of "national" policy
and only as between its signatories."0 The importance of these observations
need not be exaggerated. First, "recourse to war," as an instrument of "inter-
national" as distinguished from "national" policy, referred simply to the use
of coercion in accordance with the mandates or authorization of the League
Covenant to participate in sanctions against a Covenant-breaking state, in a
word, to community-enforcement action.61 Second, practically every nation-
state in the world, certainly every state of any consequence in world-power
processes, became a party to the Pact.
It is true, however, that the Pact, by retaining "war" as a term of art,
failed to quiet the continued debate as to the permissibility of force that partic-
ipants might verbally describe as a "measure short of war.1 2 It was left to the
Charter of the United Nations to resolve and make moot that debate by dis-
carding the term "war" and employing in its stead the multiple references to
"threat or use of force," "threat to the peace," "breach of the peace," and "act
of aggression." Taken collectively, these phrases refer to a whole spectrum of
degrees of intensity of coercion, including (so far as force is concerned) not
only "war," understood as extensive armed hostilities or the highest degree of
destructive use of the military instrument, but also all those applications of
force of a lesser intensity or magnitude that in the past had been characterized
as "short of war." The Charter sought also to centralize the process of char-
acterizing, for purposes of requiring or authorizing enforcement action, a
particular exercise of coercion as permissible or nonpermissible, and to vest
that function in the organized community itself.
THE CONCEPTIONS OF PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE
RESORT TO COERCION: MULTIFACTOR ANALYSIS
FOR POLICY CLARIFICATION
PART I: THE CONCEPTION OF IMPERMISSIBLE RESORT TO
COERCION
The Debate About Definitions
The decision of the framers of the United Nations Charter to leave such
terms as "threat to the peace," "breach of the peace," and "act of aggression"
60. See, e.g., STONE, LEGAL COTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICt 300 (1954).
61. 2 OPPENHEIMI-LAUTERPACHT 182-83; KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE 39 (1942) (scm-
ble). See also PolyPE, AGGREssivE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIuE 153 (1953), who
writes that "war as an instrument of international policy is a contradictio int termninis.
The international action against a lawbreaker, to enforce exactly those rules the Kellogg
Pact preconised has . . . nothing but the laws of warfare in common with 'normal'
interstate war, 'war as an instrument of national policy.'"
62. See WEBERG, THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR 98-100 (Zeydel transl. 1931); Brier-
ly, International Law and Resort to Armed Force, 4 CAmB. L.J. 308 (1.932); McNair,
Collective Security, 17 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 150, 157 (1936); Williams, The Covenant of
the League of Nations and War, 5 CAmB. L.J. 1 (1933).
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ambiguous and comprehensive was a deliberate one.63 In recent years, how-
ever, the failure of the optimistic hopes for great power cooperation and in-
tensifying expectations of violence have caused renewed agitation for the
clarification and elaboration of basic concepts. The continuing debates today,
like those within the League of Nations, have centered principally on -the ques-
tion of "defining aggression." 64 Unfortunately, the efforts of the First and
Sixth Committees, the political and legal committees, of the General Assembly,
the International Law Commission, and the 1953 and 1956 Special Commit-
tees on Defining Aggression to formulate a generally acceptable "definition of
aggression" have not been blessed with conspicuous success.05 Representatives
of nation-states engaged in the enterprise of defining aggression conceive of
too many implications, real and unreal, for national security to permit much
consensus either on any particular proposed verbalization of the conception
of aggression or even on the utility of attempts at definition.
The principal formulations proposed have generally assumed one or the
other, or a combination, of two main forms. The first consists of a more or
less lengthy catalogue of stereotypes of aggressive acts. The formulation
vigorously propounded by the Soviet Union-a formulation which grew
from the five-item closed list of overt military acts incorporated in the 1933
London Conventions for the Definition of Aggression 66 to an open-ended
63. See the Report [on Chapter VIII, section B] of the Rapporteur of Committee
3 to Commission III. 12 U.N.C.I.O. 502, 505. The Committee, after rejecting the
Bolivian and Philippine proposals for inserting an enumerative definition of aggres-
sion in the Charter (texts of the proposals in 3 U.N.C.I.O. 584, 538), decided "to leave
to the Council the entire decision as to what constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of
the peace, or an act of aggression." 12 U.N.C.I.O. 505. See also RussELL & MATHER, A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARITE 669-72 (1958).
64. The term "aggression" has been in very common use both in international agree-
ments and in official statements of governments, at least since 1919. See Harvard Re-
search in International Law, Rights and Duties of States in Cases of Aggression, 33
Amt. J. INT'L L. Suer. 819, 848-55, 861-70 (1939).
65. See STONE, AGGREsSION AND WORLD ORDER 27-77 ('1958) for the most recent
brief and spirited survey of these labors, including those in the League period, at defini-
tion up to the consideration of the Report of the 1956 Special Committee by the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly at its Twelfth Session (1957). See Report of the
Sixth Committee, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 12th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 54, at
2 (1957). By Resolution No. 1181 (XII), the General Assembly established a committee
to determine "when it would be appropriate for the General Assembly to consider again
the question of defining aggression" which time would be "not earlier than the four-
teenth session." Id. at 5-6. This committee decided to defer, "until April 1962," deter-
mination of an appropriate time for considering again the definition question, unless an
"absolute majority" of its members subsequently call for an earlier meeting. N.Y.
Times, April 18, 1959, p. 2, col. 7.
66. Signed by the Soviet Union, the Baltic states, some of the Balkan states, and
Turkey and Persia. 147 L.N.T.S. 66, 69 n.2 (1933); 148 L.N.T.S. 211 (1933); 27 Am.
J. INT'L L. Supp. 192-94 (1933). This was the same list that had been incorporated,
upon a Soviet proposal, into the Draft Act Relating to the Definition of Aggression
prepared by the 1933 Geneva Disarmament Conference, Committee on Security Questions,
Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (1933), Politis Report, Conf.
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fifteen-item inventory of acts of military, "indirect," "economic," and "ideo-
logical" aggression in 1956 67 -is perhaps the best-known species of this
genus of definitions. The point of such an inventory is that the state "which
first commits" one of the listed acts is to be declared the aggressor. More
distinctively, the Soviet formulation includes a list of negative criteria, of
acts which are not to be characterized as aggression and internal conditions
which do not justify the commission of any act catalogued as aggressive. The
most basic defect of the Soviet and other comparable definitions is an over-
emphasis on material acts of coercion and on a mechanistic conception of
priority; concomitantly, they fail to take into account other factors which
rationally are equally relevant, factors such as the nature of the objectives
of the initiating and responding participants and the character or intensity
of the coercion applied.6 8
The second major type of definition exhibits a different approach which
rejects the technique of specific enumeration and seeks instead the construc-
tion of a broad and general formula that would comprehend all possible in-
stances of aggression. Perhaps the broadest of these formulas was that sub-
mitted by M. Alfaro to the International Law Commission:
Aggression is the threat or use of force by a State or Government
against another State, in any manner, whatever the weapons employed
and whether openly or otherwise for any reason or for any purpose
other than individual or collective self-defense or in pursuance of a de-
cision or recommendation by a competent organ of the United Nations.09
This formulation emphasizes the complementarity of aggression on the
one hand and self-defense and collective peace enforcement on the other. It is,
D/C-G 108 (1935.IX.4 League of Nations Publications) 679-90 (1935). Subsequent
treaties adopting this listing, verbatim or substantially, are enumerated in the Report by
the Secretary General, Question of Defining Aggression, A/2211, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF.
REc. 7th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 54, p. 50 A/2211 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
Report of the Secretary General].
The interesting fact may be noted that, at the 1945 London Conference on war crimes,
the United States proposed the inclusion of the Litvinov-Politis definition in the Charter
of the International Military Tribunal. There the Soviet representative resolutely opposed
such inclusion, stating that "when people speak about 'aggression,' they know what that
means, but, when they come to define it, they come up against difficulties which it has
not been possible to overcome up to the present time." See Report of Robert H. Jackson,
U.S. Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, PuB. No. 3080, at 328 (1949).
67. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.77/L.4 (1956); also in Report of the 1956 Special Com-
mittee on the Question of Defining Aggression, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rac. 12th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16 (A/3574), at 30-31 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Report of the 1956 Special
Committee].
68. See text accompanying notes 131-49, 170-82 infra.
69. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.31, at 27 (1951). See also Alfaro, La Cuestidn de
la Definici6n de la Agresi6n, 59 RPvisTA DE Dmzmco INTERNACIoNAL 361 (Cuba 1951).
Comparable drafts were submitted to the Commission by Mr. Amado, U.N. Doc. No.
A/CN.4/L.6 (1951); Mr. Cordova, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.10 (1951); Mr. Hsu,
U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.11 and Corr. 1 (1951); and Mr. Yepes, U.N. Doc. No.
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however, little more than a posing, in highest level abstraction, of the general
problem involved, and offers no index for the guidance of decision-makers
who must apply it in specific cases. 70 Only slightly less abstract is the defini-
tion achieved by Professor Scelle:
Aggression is an offense against the peace and security of mankind.
This offense consists in any resort to force contrary to the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations, for the purpose of modifying the state
of positive international law in force or resulting in the disturbance of
public order.71
Thus, Professor Scelle appropriately stresses the relevance of the character
of the objective or purpose of the state resorting to force; but he fails to
specify any operational index of the nonpermissible objective of modifying
"the state of positive international law in force." In further illustration of
this second major type of definitions, the formulation incorporated in the Act
of Chapultepec signed by all the American republics on March 8, 1945, may
be noted. The act provides that
[A]ny attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integ-
rity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political inde-
pendence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression
against all the American States.72
In contrast with Professor Scelle's definition, this act offers some indication
of the character of the perspectives that make coercion and violence unlawful.
It exhibits, however, little effort to clarify what operations, "attempts," when
moved by these perspectives, may be characterized as aggression.
A/CN.4/L12 (1951). A very similar draft was proposed by the Netherlands representa-
tive in the 1953 Special Committee. See Report of the Special Committee on the Ques-
tion of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.66/L11, at 35 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as Report of the 1953 Special Committee].
70. Cf. Fitzmaurice, The Definition of Aggression, 1 INT'L ComP. L.Q. 137, 142-43
(1952).
71. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.19 and Corr. 1 (1951).
72. 9 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 286 (1950). A comparable treaty pro-
vision is found in the Finnish-Soviet peace treaty of 1939: "Any act of violence attack-
ing the integrity and inviolability of the territory or the political independence of the
other High Contracting Party shall be regarded as an act of aggression, even if it is
committed without declaration of war and avoids warlike manifestations." 157 L.N.T.S.
397.
If still another illustration of this general approach to definition were desired, the
Harvard Research formulation may be adduced. The Harvard draft reads: "'Aggression'
is a resort to armed force by a State when such a resort has been duly determined, by
a means which that State is bound to accept, to constitute a violation of an obligation."
Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States in Case of Aggression, art. l(c), 33 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 827 (1939). The draft
emphasizes the need for authoritative third-party determination but does not seek at all
to indicate the factors that rationally may enter into a "due determination" of the law-
fulness of a particular resort to armed force. From this perspective, the formulation
amounts to little more than the tautologous statement that aggression is a prohibited
resort to coercion.
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A third type of definition, the so-called "mixed" definition, seeks to com-
bine both the enumerative and "broad-formula" approaches by appending an
illustrative but nonexhaustive list of specific examples of aggression to a rela-
tively abstract statement of general policy. Although the facile objection has
been raised that such "mixed" definitions would only tend to cumulate the
difficulties that the catalogue and abstract types of definition have individually
presented, 73 the great majority of states that support the formulation of some
definition have favored the "mixed" kind as a possible via media.7 4 The draft
definition submitted by Iran and Panama at the ninth session of the General
Assembly is representative:
1. Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against another State
for any purpose other than the exercise of the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation
of a competent organ of the United Nations.
2. In accordance with the foregoing definition, in addition to any other
acts which such international bodies as may be called upon to determine
the aggressor may declare to constitute aggression, the following are acts
of aggression in all cases:
(a) Invasion by the armed forces of a State of territory belonging to
another State or under the effective jurisdiction of another State;
(b) Armed attack against the territory, population or land, sea or air
forces of a State by the land, sea or air forces of another State;
(c) Blockade of the coast or ports or any other part of the territory
of a State by the land, sea or air forces of another State;
(d) The organization, or the encouragement of the organization, by a
State, of armed bands within its territory or any other territory for in-
cursions into the territory of another State, or the toleration of the organi-
zation of such bands in its own territory, or the toleration of the use by
such armed bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of
departure for incursions into the territory of another State, as well as di-
rect participation in or support of such incursions.7"
The Demand for Ad Hoc Decision
Throughout the course of this contention in the United Nations and even
in the debates during the League period, one view consistently and energeti-
cally put forward is that all definitions of whatever type are undesirable re-
strictions on the discretion of the appropriate decision-making organ. "[All]
73. See, e.g., the statement of the Belgian representative, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc.
6th Comm., 6th Sess., 287th mtg., para. 34 (1952) ; Report of the 1953 Special Commit-
tee 14; Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 9th Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Item No. 51, at 10 (1954) ; Report of the 1956 Special Committee 8-9.
74. Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 12th Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Item 54, para. 21 (1957).
75. This draft was resubmitted by Peru to the 1956 Special Committee. See Report
of the 1956 Special Committee 31. See also the draft definition proposed by the Dominican
Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru to the 1956 Special Committee, id. at 9-10, and
the drafts submitted by China, Mexico, and Bolivia to the 1953 Special Committee, Re-
port of the 1953 Special Committee, Annex 4-8.
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definition[s] delimit," it is said, and make certain factors decisive while pass-
ing over other elements and circumstances that may be equally relevant.76
The primary desideratum, in this view, is that the decision-maker should be
unfettered by a priori rules and tests, and completely free to make ad hoc de-
terminations upon appreciation of the peculiar elements of each specific situa-
tion of coercion. 77
Recently, a distinguished scholar has undertaken to restate at detailed
length, to document, and to build upon this view. Professor Stone inveighs
mightily against those who, in his opinion, seek to find a "mechanical test of
aggression, insulated from the merits of the situation in which States act,"
a test that would be "clear and precise enough for certain and automatic appli-
cations to all future situations," in short, a "juristic push-button device."7 8
The purpose behind the continuing search for "precise definition" has been,
as Professor Stone sees it, "to control determinations to be made when pas-
sions are aflame by advance criteria agreed upon before national passions were
embroiled .... ,,79 "to make it clear in advance of the particular crisis what the
judgment will be and remove the agony and the conflict of national interests
76. See PomFS; AGGREsSIvE WAR: AN IN NATIONAL CRIME 80 (1953), summing
up this view.
77. Such is the official view of the United States and United Kingdom governments
as of now. See McDougal & Feliciano, General Principles 819 & n.151. For a collection
of statements of these and other governments urging this view in its many detailed forms,
see Report of the Secretary General 54-59. These arguments, which, as will be developed
below, rest on a singular conception of the processes of decision making, have been re-
peated uncritically ever since Sir Austen Chamberlain dropped his mot in the House of
Commons about any definition of aggression being "a trap for the innocent and a sign-
post for the guilty." Observations of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain on the
Programme of Work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, Minutes of the
Second Sess. of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, LEAGUE Doc. No. C.165.-
Mf.50.1928.IX, p. 176 (1928).
In the discussions of the 1956 Special Committee, the U.S. representative added a
mildly astonishing ground: the limitations of the human mind. He said:
It would be no remedy to say that any definition must, of .course, be interpreted
and applied in the light of circumstances. That would, in his opinion, be another
way of saying that it was impossible to avoid appraising a threat or act of agres-
sion in the light of the circumstances as a whole. Since each threat of aggression
varied in its history and its facts in an infinite number of ways, it taxed human
ingenuity and wisdom beyond reasonable limits to evolve a formula which would
anticipate events and provide useful guidance.
Report of the 1956 Special Committee 12. The suggestion may not be inappropriate that
the principal deficiency lies, not in the human intellect as such but in the character of
the intellectual tools of analysis which thus far have been applied to the problem of
clarification. The infinitude of the number of possible combinations of specific circum-
stances is scarcely unique to aggression and defense; it has not deterred other decision-
makers, including both the Congress and the courts of the United States, from pre-
scribing and applying policy with respect to any number of municipal problems.
78. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 10-11 (1958).
79. Id. at 25.
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from the moment of decision." 80 The referent of the notion of aggression in-
cludes, he emphasizes, "a judgment of value, and in particular of justice" ;81
and if the application of a criterion of aggression is not to "outrage minimal
levels of justice as between the contending Parties," that criterion "must al-
low consideration of the full socio-political context of the conduct under judg-
ment."8' 2 But for it "to be precise enough to control the future judgment of
aggression," the criterion must be "a violent abstraction from that full con-
text of the crisis which consideration of the merits of the dispute would re-
quire to be taken into account. '8 3 Thus, the failure of states and scholars to
achieve agreement on a definition is ascribed by Professor Stone, "at least in
part," to "the impossibility of containing the unceasing struggle for a minimal
justice in international relations within the straitjacket of precise formu-
lae . . . . 84 Professor Stone makes explicit his conviction that a satisfactorily
precise and certain definition is unattainable. Even if advance criteria were
agreed upon, there will still be, he states, "additional elements of uncertainty
of interpretation of the criteria themselves" :85 the "verbal formulation . ..
still has to be interpreted and applied by the very organs whose unreliability
is the reason for the formulation. . .. "86
Goal Clarification by Configurative Analysis: An Alternative Conception
The mechanistically conceived function of a "definition of aggression" which
Professor Stone appropriately castigates is, in the light of what is known
today about the processes of decision-making, a curious one indeed. To seek
to construct a set of words that will automatically determine all future deci-
sions and relieve human decision-makers of the anguish of choice and judg-
ment in responding to events of coercion and opposed claims about coercion
is, of course, a futile enterprise; to recognize its futility is, however, only the
beginning of wisdom.8 7 It is no more feasible or desirable to attempt to define
80. Id. at 151-52.
81. Id. at 81.
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 156.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id. at 24.
86. Id. at 25.
87. Today it is commonly recognized that the process of applying authoritative words
in concrete instances requires creative choice. The late Judge Jerome Frank some three
decades ago made classic disposition of the illusion of verbal absolutism. FRANK, LAw
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). It is not the collocation of letters or concatenations of
noises in verbal signs but rather the fundamental perspectives of decision-makers, seldom
adequately expressed in brief technical definitions, which importantly affect decision (save,
perhaps, for an occasional judicial robot). See, e.g., RAPAPORT, OPERATIONAL PHLOSOPHY
(1953); Probert, Law, Logic and Communication, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 129 (1958); Wil-
liams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. Rzv. 71 (1945).
It is not our brief that a short technical definition of aggression, if agreement on one
were secured, would adequately serve community policy purposes. As Judge Lauterpacht
has, however, suggested, because "no definition acts automatically," the objection that
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aggression "once and for all" than it is so to define any other legal term or
concept of international or municipal law. For observers with full awareness
of the factors realistically affecting decision, the task of "defining aggression"
is not appropriately conceived as one of searching for a precise, certain, and
final verbal formula that would abolish the discretion of decision-makers and
dictate specific decisions. It is rather, in broad outline, that of presenting to
the focus of attention of the various officials who must reach a decision about
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of coercion, the different variable factors and
policies that, in differing contexts and under community perspectives, ration-
ally bear upon their decisions; of indicating the interrelations of these factors
and policies in context; and, perhaps, of making some lower-order generaliza-
tions about the relative weighting of pertinent factors and policies in different
contexts."" The task, again, is not so much to abolish, with quasi-magical ar-
adoption of a definition of aggression would necessarily deprive governments and tri-
bunals of "the freedom of appreciation of the merits of a particular situation" lacks
thrust. 2 OPPENHEIm-LAUTERPACHT 189 n.2.
88. The task of clarifying general community objectives in the process of authorita-
tive decision about the coercive relations of states is entirely comparable to that with
respect to the consensual relations of states. For assistance and guidance in the appli-
cation of agreements between states to specific instances of interaction, authoritative de-
cision-makers over the centuries have developed a comprehensive set of principles of in-
terpretation, including both content principles and principles of orderly inquiry. The
content principles guide decision-makers to all the relevant features of the process of
agreement (parties, objectives, situations, base values, preliminary negotiations, modes of
expression, immediately indicated shared expectations of commitment, subsequent conduct,
etc.) and of context (the embracing conditions of more general community processes)
and offer certain tentative weightings to such features both in terms of the presumptive
meanings that parties of the specified characteristics would attach to their expressions
when affected by such features and in terms of certain relevant community policies. The
principles of orderly inquiry prescribe the modalities of analysis by which an interpreter
can get the most rational results in applying the content principles. Thus, in most gen-
eral summation, the two sets of principles, taken together, require an interpreter to pro-
ceed as follows: first, to seek a preliminary orientation among possible inferences of
shared expectation in community-wide ("plain" and "natural") meanings; next, to test
these possible, preliminary inferences by logical (syntactical) principles for contradic-
tions, ambiguities, and omissions; and, finally, to seek the closest possible approximation
of the actual active expectations of the particular parties by a pragmatic and systematic
examination of all of the relevant features of the process of agreement and its context,
as such process and context might have been viewed by parties of the ascertained charac-
teristics. Introduction to the literature may be had from materials referred to in note
255 infra.
Similarly, decision-makers who are asked to pass judgment upon the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of acts of coercion have their attention directed to a series of specialized
events that are provisionally designated by the parties (claimants) as "acts of aggression"
or "acts of self-defense" (or otherwise). The problem confronting such decision-makers
is to discover and assess the perspectives (conservatory or expansionist) of the parties
who formulated and executed the coercive policies whose designation and lawfulness are
in dispute. Whether the coercive policies in question are permissible or impermissible
coercion depends in significant measure upon the demands and expectations of the clainm-
ant parties at the times of formulation and execution; and these expectations must be
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rangements of words, conflicts of national interests (more or less myopically
perceived) as it is to clarify common, long-term interests in the maintenance
of minimal public order. To dissolve the problem into one of determining "jus-
established and assessed both according to their "manifest" content and according to
other features of the context which may be more indicative of actual demands and ex-
pectations.
What we urge here is the need for principles of interpretation of coercive policies,
as for persuasive policies, to provide guidance for decision-makers. Such guidance might
again take the form both of principles of content (pointing to and weighting the relevance
of the important features of the process of coercion and its context) and of principles
of orderly inquiry (outlining the sequence in which the components of process and con-
text may most rationally be brought to the focus of attention of decision-makers). See
Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and Procednre, 1 INQUmY
87 (1958), for some amplification of these principles. Emphasizing the contextual basis
of inference, such principles would systematically explore the way in which the special-
ized events of formation and execution of coercive policies are interrelated with the
manifold events relevant to their characterization. Thus, beginning with the manifest con-
tent of the parties' demands and expectations as indicated by community-wide intelli-
gence, such principles might provide for the orderly examination of the alleged demands
and expectations on both sides of the controversy for contradictions, ambiguities, and
omissions, and then outline a pragmatic appraisal of the actual, active perspectives of
each set of parties in terms both of their special characteristics and of the intelligence
in fact known to have been available to them.
In this Article, we attempt both to outline some of the more important features of
processes of coercion which may affect the actual perspectives of participants charged
with "impermissible" and claiming "permissible" coercion and to relate these features by
tentative general weightings to fundamental community policy. Any claimed perspectives
may be appraised according to the typicality of the predispositions affecting them and
their rational plausibility in context, and may be explored at many different levels of
intelligence. The range of possibilities may be indicated by such questions as these:
a. Were the expectations of the claimants based upon the overwhelming concord of
public and secret intelligence content?
b. If public intelligence was divided, were the bases of inference relied upon by the
claimants more plausible at the time than the contradictions? (E.g., statements
by elite "enemy" figures? Deeds of elite "enemy" figures? Statements and deeds
of elite figures of third powers? Of our body politic? E.g., reputable commen-
tators, investors?)
c. Were the public bases of inference overwhelmingly confirmed by the secret chan-
nels of intelligence?
d. If public bases were tenuous and the secret sources were contradictory, were the
secret bases of inference more plausible at the time than the contradictions? (E.g.,
were the sources relied upon plausibly regarded as relatively trustworthy?)
e. If the public and secret bases of inference at the time were both tenuous, does
subsequently available knowledge show that the inferences made by the claimants
were actually correct?
It may be added that intellectual procedures of sufficient refinement are today avail-
able to permit increasingly relevant estimates at the different levels of intelligence of
the actual perspectives of participants resorting to coercion. See, e.g., HILLSMAN, STRATE-
GIC INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL DECISIONS (1956); PLATT, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTION (1957) ; RANSOM, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY (1958).
See also the literature referred to in note 129 infra.
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tice" as between contending participants makes conscious efforts at more de-
tailed clarification for policy guidance neither impossible nor dispensable. It
can scarcely be assumed that no policies of a lower level of abstraction than
"justice" can be articulated and described. Nothing inherent in nature pre-
vents the objective scholar from describing past applications of a distinction
between permissible and nonpermissible coercion (it seems salutary to recall
that there have been some), from identifying the variables that have condi-
tioned and affected these applications, from making estimates of probable fu-
ture applications, and from appraising both past and projected future applica-
tions in terms of their probable consequences upon the goal values of the kind
of world public order the scholar prefers.8 9
Of course, every definition of aggression, as of any other legal term, is an
abstraction; indeed, one of the principal lessons which contemporary studies on
semantics and linguistics offer is that every verbalization, whether definitional
or not, is an abstraction from the "un-speakable level of objective events." 90
It does not follow from this, however, that all verbalization about aggression,
of whatever order of generalization, is futile and undesirable or creates any
unique risk that decision-makers may be misled in particular cases and fail
to take some relevant element of the "full context" into appropriate account.
Such a risk seems inherent in the application of any general concept or stan-
dard of any legal system, if not all processes of human decision-making, au-
thoritative or otherwise. That risk is more likely to be reduced to tolerable
levels, and the incidence of rational decisions (in the sense of closer approxi-
mation of community-approved value goals) is more apt to be increased, by
explicit, sustained and systematic efforts at clarifying relevant variables and
policies affecting decisions about coercion. Certainly it cannot be reduced by an
approach that assumes a completely futilitarian attitude towards words, views
each specific case of coercion in microcosm with no more than a few terms of
highest level of abstraction, and relies upon calculation of momentary ex-
pediencies and, as it were, on visceral sensitivity.
Semantic Equivalents or Roses as Sweet
The suggestion has also been made that the notion of aggression is unim-
portant since the legal powers of the organized world community can be acti-
vated as well by any "threat to the peace" and "breach of the peace" as by any
"act of aggression," and hence that any "supposed 'aggression'" can be "more
easily brought home as a breach of the peace." 91 The addition, it is also said,
of the "factual" terms "breach of peace" and "threat to the peace" makes it
unnecessary to locate responsibility for aggression or to weigh equities before
89. These intellectual tasks, see references in McDougal & Feliciano, General Prii-
ciples 778 n.23, relate to indispensable component operations in problem-solving processes.
90. Ko zyBnsi, SCIENCE AND SANITY chs. 24-27 (2d ed. 1941). See also HAYAKAWA,
LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION (1949) ; MoRRIS, SIGNS, LANGUAGE AND BEHAVIOR
(1946); OGDEN & RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING (10th ed. 1949).
91. STONE, AGGREsSION AND WORLD ORDER 22-23, 152 (1958).
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police action is undertaken by the organized community; the Security Council.
indeed, is neither required nor authorized to wait until the "guilty party" has
been identified beyond a reasonable doubt. The Council, the argument runs,
has only to resolve a "simple question of fact"-whether or not an actual or
imminent "threat to the peace" or "breach of peace" exists . 2 While some
verbal symbol less emotionally charged than "aggression" may well be pre-
ferred, and while the scope of authority of United Nations organs is not de-
pendent upon the use of one rather than another symbol, the point bears em-
phasis that the intellectual complexities that attend characterizing impermis-
sible coercion are not successfully evaded simply by the substitution of less in-
vidious labels. Even initial, noncoercive, community intervention for concilia-
tion and settlement requires guidance by an understanding of fundamental long-
term goals, guidance not likely to be secured by verbal legerdemain. 3 With re-
spect to the security organs of the United Nations, the problem of characteriz-
ing coercion in particular cases as permissible or nonpermissible is principally
one of determining the appropriate direction or target of the collective repres-
sive action that is decided upon for the organization or recommended to the
several states ;94 it arises when noncoercive community intervention has failed,
92. EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 525 (3d ed. 1957) ; MARTIN, CoLLECTrVE
SECURITY 118 (1952). See also the statement of Dr. Pasvolsky, Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Charter of the United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 282 (1945).
93. We recognize that different types of decisions reflecting different degrees of
community involvement may be taken in the application and implementation of funda-
mental community policy about recourse to coercion, from traditional exercises of di-
plomacy in "good offices," through collective conciliation and political pressure, to col-
lective military enforcement action. Differing emphases upon different specific factors
and policies may be appropriate in varying types of decision.
The kind of process of clarification that is suggested in this essay is intended to be
of assistance in the making of any type of decision. The assumption made is that con-
sideration of goals is relevant to any kind of decision-making which purports to affect
the future. Whatever the specific type of decision and whatever the degree of involve-
ment of the general community, continuous and purposeful focus upon long-term goals
and policies may help in promoting rationality in decision. Certainly, orderly intellectual
procedures for examining contextual factors and policies need not interfere with or im-
pede the negotiation of a compromise or settlement. All -we urge is that such compromise
or settlement should be as rational, in terms of basic community goal and policy, as
particular circumstances may permit.
When the general community of states is most deeply involved, as when collective
military action is required or authorized, the need for systematic reference to and ap-
praisal of relevant factors and policies in context is most obvious. In insisting that the
most serious decision the general community may make be explicitly related to funda-
mental goals, we are not recommending the making of facile judgments about guilt or
blameworthiness for their own sake. Any decision to engage in collective enforcement
that does not impose a plague upon both houses must rest upon some assumption about
an appropriate allocation of responsibility. Rational decision requires conscious, ordered,
and goal-oriented examination of such assumptions.
94. Cf. Professor Bourquin in COLLECrIVE SEcuRITY 329 (Bourquin ed. 1936):
Why is the need felt of determining the guilty party? It is not for the pleasure
of attributing blame or praise; it is because the point of departure is the idea
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and it persists as long as one or both of the contending participants refuses to
cease acts of coercion. Thus, although characterization for coercive intervention
may in some measure be forestalled through successful collective conciliation
and compliance by both participants with injunctions to cease and desist, the
replacement of "aggression" with some other nonemotive words of the same
level of abstraction offers little guidance toward rational decision, even in the
diplomacy of conciliation, once the problem has arisen. In fact, commonly im-
plicit in arguments such as those noted above is a facile analogy drawn from
municipal law situations: a municipal peace officer separates two individuals
who are in violent conflict and brings them before a court for a determination
of their rights and liabilities.95 The appropriateness of this analogy in an arena
such as that of the contemporary world is, obviously, highly questionable.
While, in point of theory, the United Nations as keeper of the international
peace may have competence to coerce both contending participants into stop-
ping hostilities, with the exception of peripheral situations involving only small
powers of negligible military capability, the dispatch of international armed
forces to do battle with both participants does not presently seem a significant
possibility.
that the aggression must be repressed, that sanctions must be applied to the guilty
and aid brought to the victim or victims.
The problem of the determination of the aggressor is of capital importance;
it is a problem leading to a practical consequence, tending to set in motion a social
reaction against one of the States in conflict, and to secure to the other the ad-
vantage of the protection of the society... [T]he determination of the aggressor
... is an act of reprobation, tending to designate, among the States in conflict,
the one against which sanctions are to be applied.
See also ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL SANCrIONs 13
(1938) : "The international community, if it would apply coercion for the restoration of
order, must reach some conclusion as to guilt before using either economic pressure or
military action as in either case it would be necessary to inflict material loss, possibly
on large populations, in order to restore peace." See also Braat~y, The Quest for Treaty
Definitions of Aggression, 5 AcrA ScANDINAViCA JuRls GENTum 29, 35 (1934).
The point we seek to underscore-the irrelevance of the particular term employed
in making the characterization-may be illustrated by the Security Council resolutions
of June 25 and 27, 1950, (-S/1501 and S/1511) in the Korean case. The Council there
used the term "breach of the peace" which neither prevented nor dispensed with the
Council's discriminating between the North Korean authorities and the Republic of Korea
and recommending assistance to the latter as against the former. It should be obvious
that "threat to the peace" and "breach of the peace" are, in this sense, little more than
functional equivalents of "act of aggression" and call for the same act of judgment if
coercive enforcement measures are at all to be taken.
95. The analogy is explicitly developed in Kopelmanas, The Problem of Aggression
and the Prevention of War, 31 Am. J. INT'L L. 244, 253-56 (1937).
JEssUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 196-97 (1948) envisaged the aerial bombard-
ment of the "positions" of both belligerents who refuse to heed a U.N. call for cease-
fire and withdrawal of troops, but conceded that where the fighting continues despite
such bombardment, the U.N. would have to decide against whom sanctions are to be
applied. The suggestion of a preliminary air bombardment by "international air con-
tingents" must today seem quaint.
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From this perspective, the basic intellectual task is one of categorizing the
variable contextual factors and policies which relate to the distinction between
permissible and impermissible coercion for the guidance of differing particu-
lar decision-makers.9 6 The burden of this task is not so much the distillation
of brief, black-letter definitions for authoritative projection in treaty or other
form as it is the clarification of a process of intellectual analysis by which re-
sponsible decision-makers may discipline themselves for the consideration of
relevant factors and policies.
We are hopeful enough to believe that to attempt to clarify the community
policies at stake in this most fundamental of all problems is not entirely fu-
tile, and that these policies can be clarified and refined in sufficient opera-
tional detail to give significant guidance to the various officials who must re-
spond to varying specific controversies.9 7 We are acutely aware that the formu-
lation and assignment of operational meaning to policies which, while inher-
ent in the structure of authoritative myth, are there expressed only in the
highest order of abstraction, may be most difficult in some particular contexts.
There is no way of escaping these intellectual difficulties, just as there is no
avoiding the uniquely human problem of choice which all decision-makers ul-
timately must face. We do not purport to have any magic means of coercing
the raw living flow of events into imaginary absolutes of word-categories. We
96. See the insightful suggestion made by the United States representative (Maktos)
in the 1953 Special Committee that "instead of trying to establish a general formula
which would probably be incomplete, it would be better to offer the competent organs
of the United Nations, and in the first place the Security Council, a list of factors to
be taken into account in deciding a given case." Unfortunately, although some other
members of the Committee "thought this idea constructive and worth examining," the
suggestion apparently was not followed up in subsequent discussions in later Conumittees
by either the U.S. representative or other delegates. The objection raised by the Polish
delegate in the 1953 Special Committee that "such a list of factors could only circum-
vent the important problem of clearly defining aggression and would serve no useful
purpose" indicates less than adequate grasp of the character of the task involved. See
Report of the 1953 Special Committee 14.
97. The suggestion is sometimes made that for decision-makers to discipline their
judgment by a comprehensive "check list" of factors would mean protracted debate and
delay when prompt action may be of the utmost importance. It is not, however, our
contention that decision-makers must consider each and every factor in minutest detail
in every single case. The specific factors upon which inquiry, in a given case, should
center and the degree of detail to which such inquiry should be carried, are a function
of the particular context to which the decision-maker is responding, including the type
of decision to be made. An appropriate metaphor is that of the telescope: the inquiry
may be compressed or drawn out as particular contexts may require. But however in-
sistent may be the demand for prompt action, some reference to relevant factors and
policies in context must be made if the decision is to make any pretense towards being
a rational one, that is, related to the securing of both long-term and short-term com-
munity goals. The reluctance to become explicit about such factors and policies may
occasionally be only a reflection in actual operation of the destructive skepticism that
minimizes or denies the role of authority, and its efforts to achieve policy clarification,
in power processes.
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do not seek an impossible perfectionism of complete and permanent precision.
Our belief is that here, as in other problems of international law, both approxi-
mations of policy clarification and rough practical judgments to promote clari-
fied policies are possible, and that perfection is as unnecessary as it is unattain-
able.
It may be useful to anticipate in summary manner the mode of inquiry that
we recommend for detailed clarification of community policies about both non-
permissible coercion and permissible coercion. We propose, as a step pre-
liminary but indispensable to clarity, to identify the different types of decision-
makers from whom a judgment as to the lawfulness of particular applications
of coercion may come to be demanded, to locate their differing positions in the
structure of authority, and to note differences in function, in purpose, and in
the conditions under which they operate. Next, we shall consider the method
of analysis which is relevant when decision-makers are confronted with claims
that a certain act or series of acts of coercion is impermissible, and which may
enable them to identify and focus upon the more important factors that in
various specific contexts may rationally condition or affect a characterization
of coercion as nonpermissible. Finally we will suggest a rough and tentative
categorization which includes such interrelated items as: the factor of priority
in exercise of substantial coercion; the relative size and strength of the con-
tending parties; the nature of their objectives; the conditions under which
coercion is applied; the methods employed; the effects achieved; their rela-
tive willingness to accept community intervention; and expectations about the
effectiveness and costs of decision.
It is well to stress in advance that the significance of any particular factor
or set of factors is relative and may be expected to vary from particular con-
text to context. The significance of any factor is in principal measure a func-
tion of its location in the whole constellation of variables in a specific context,
and of the interrelations of these variables.
Typically, the set of events with which a decision-maker is confronted in-
cludes not only a claim of impermissible coercion but also a countering claim
by the participant charged with unlawful resort to coercion that it was in fact
acting in lawful defense. It is thus necessary to examine in systematic detail
the coercion applied by each party upon the other. Claims of lawful defense
involve factors which are comparable to, and just as complex as, those raised
by charges of unlawful coercion. Parallel analysis is called for and this we pro-
pose also to outline.
The Differing Functions of Different Decision-Makers
The first indispensable requirement is to identify the types of decision-
makers who may, on different occasions, be confronted with conflicting claims
about the lawfulness of particular coercive acts and to whom differing con-
figurations of factors may make a difference. A general categorization must
include officials of international governmental organizations; judges of courts
1959] 1087
HeinOnline -- 68 Yale L.J. 1087 1958-1959
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
or tribunals, national or international, permanent or specially constituted;
and officials of nation-states.98
Officials of the United Nations offer the most convenient illustration of the
first type. The principal function of the United Nations, and the relevant one
for present purposes, is expressed thus in the Charter: "to maintain interna-
tional peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace . . . ."9 In practice, re-
sponsibility for the exercise of this security or peace-enforcement function is
shared by the Security Council and the General Assembly. Although the
Charter assigns "primary responsibility" to the Council, 0 0 the Assembly has
formally and effectively claimed authority to exercise that function when the
Council is veto-bound. 10' The competence of the United Nations to deal with
situations of coercion is comprehensive. The exercises of coercion which the
Security Council may determine to be impermissible and whose prevention or
suppression may be sought through measures of community coercion are
characterized only in such broad formal terms as "threat to the peace,"
98. See the related categorization achieved in the 1956 Special Committee of the
various functions which a definition (or definitions) of aggression may perform and
which differ as the decision-makers utilizing such definition (or definitions) differ: (a)
guidance for U.N. organs in carrying out the task of safeguarding international peace;
(b) guidance for members claiming self-defense; (c) guidance for an international tri-
bunal punishing individuals under the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
Security of Mankind; (d) possible functions in relation to disarmament arrangements
and regulation of atomic weapons. Report of the 1956 Special Committee 5-7. It should
be noted that (d) was raised in the form of a call for postponement of discussions on
aggression until "the results of disarmament negotiations were known." See also STONE,
AoGGRFSSoN AND WORLD ORDER 23, 137-39 (1958), who focuses only upon functions (a)
and (c). Compare POmpE, ACGRosslW WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRiIE 66-71 (1953)
and Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 514, 520 (1956). Earlier
and somewhat fragmentary recognition of this variation in function is found in the Re-
port of the 1953 Special Committee 32-35; U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. No. 599 (VI), U.N.
GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 6th Sess., Plenary 368 (1952) ; U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. No. 688 (VII),
U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 7th Sess., Plenary 408 (1952).
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
100. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
101. Under the "Uniting For Peace" Resolution, U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. No. 377 (V),
U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5th Sess., Plenary 302 (1950). In the light of the effective
structural modifications which the organization has undergone, the debates about the
"legality" and "constitutionality" of the "Uniting For Peace" Resolution appear remark-
ably detached from reality. The effects of the "process of structural evolution" have
been summed up in the following terms:
[T]he principle of differentiation of function, as between the Security Council and
the General Assembly, has been cast into the discard. The scheme of division of
labor, involving the supervisory Assembly and the specialized Councils, has tended
to break down. The concept of decentralization has given way to a situation in
which the General Assembly is the dominant organ within the United Nations.
TENTH REPORT OF THE COMMfSSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION ;F EAt F, r
ENING THE UNITED NATIONS 26 (1957).
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"breach of the peace," and "act of aggression." Neither the authority of the
Council to require or recommend in a particular case collective enforcement
action, nor the type, military or political and economic, of enforcement meas-
ures that may be required or recommended, is made contingent upon the par-
ticular technical nomenclature invoked. Except, perhaps, to the extent that
"threat to the peace" may be thought implicitly to convey the notion of a
lower degree of coercion than "breach of the peace,"102 the possible references
of these phrases (and of "act of aggression") -in terms of the kinds and in-
tensities of coercion that may be determined to be nonpermissible-are de-
liberately left indeterminate. Distinguished authorities have accordingly em-
phasized that the Council's authority to order or call for enforcement action
is not conditioned upon a finding of a use or threat of armed force in violation
of article 2(4) of the Charter. 0 3 It would then seem a clear inference that the
Council may designate as unlawful coercion that which is applied by other
than military instrumentalities and which has not reached the level of open
military violence.
The conditions under which the United Nations has exercised or attempted
to exercise its peace enforcement functions have usually been characterized
either by overt military hostilities or by high or rising expectations of violence.
The corresponding objectives of community intervention in these situations
may be expressed, in most general description, as to prevent accelerating co-
ercion from reaching the intensity of overt violence, and, where that stage has
already been reached, to effect the termination of unlawful violence. Beyond
these objectives, the organized community may also seek to bring about con-
ditions calculated to prevent the recurrence of violence. The measures adopted
to this end may be partial and provisional arrangements. Thus, in the Suez
affair, for example, a United Nations Emergency Force 104 was stationed in
the Gaza area to preclude further incursions of guerrilla forces across belli-
gerent lines. In some instances the measures may extend to complete and final
,settlement of the original dispute as in the 1932 Peruvian-Colombian conflict
over the Leticia trapezium.'05
Both the objectives sought in efforts at peace enforcement and the conditions
that commonly attend such efforts place a considerable premium upon ex-
peditious action by the organized community, a premium which tends to in-
crease as capabilities of modern weaponry and techniques of coercion mature.
Despite modern means of communication, and sometimes because of their
character, difficulties of objectively ascertaining facts and of verifying pro-
102. See Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 Am. 3. INTL L. 514, 524-26
(1956).
103. See 2 OPPENrEIm-LAUITERPACHT 163-64; KELszx, THE LAW OF TEE; UNITED
NATIoNs 726-31 (1950). See also Bow=-r, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 147,
176 (1958); Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under Presen-t International Law, 4
INT'L L.Q. 11, 25 (1951).
104. U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. Nos. 1000 (ES-1.), 1001 (ES-1), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF.
REC. 1st Emer. Spec. Sess. Supp. No. 1 (A/3354) (1956).
105. See 2 WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 536-40 (1952).
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claimed purposes may be compounded. If the exercise of authority and the
application of community enforcement measures are not to be prejudiced, or
conceivably entirely nullified, the United Nations must obviously be authorized
to act quickly and upon less rigorous standards of evidence than those appro-
priately demanded of other decision-making bodies, such as judicial tribunals,
or of scholarly historians writing a hundred years post facto. To put the point
most comprehensively, shifting concatenations of relevant factors may be ap-
praised by the security organization differently from other decision-makers
who have different functions and purposes and who speak under different
conditions.106
Judges of tribunals may also have occasion to pass upon the permissibility
of resort to coercion in particular cases. The tribunals may be municipal in
character, that is, unilaterally established, as were the Chinese War Crimes
Military Tribunal 1o7 and the Polish Supreme National Tribunal for trial of
war criminals,108 or international, that is, established by multilateral agree-
ment, as were the International Military Tribunal (the Nuremberg court)
and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.1°9 They may be
temporary ad hoc creations or, as a higher degree of organization is achieved
in the world arena, permanent institutions." 0 The function of these judicial
106. It might, for more specific instance, be suggested that the organized community
may appropriately consider itself as authorized to intervene with measures of varying
scope and severity in contexts of intense and accelerating coercion, even before the stage
of critical intensity is reached, when the target state may itself be authorized to react
militarily.
107. See Trial of Takashi Sakai, 14 LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
1 (1949).
108. See Trial of Greiser, 13 id. 70. Mention may also be made of the military
tribunals and courts established by each of the occupying powers in Germany in its re-
spective zone, pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10. These tribunals and courts had
jurisdiction to try, inter alia, alleged crimes against peace. See 15 id. 39-43.
109. The aptness of the adjective "international" as applied to the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals has been impugned by some scholars. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 238 (1952) contends that the Nuremberg Tribunal was not an "interna-
tional" tribunal but a "common tribunal" of the Allied Powers on the ground that the
Axis Powers were not parties to the London Agreement. Schwarzenberger, The Judg-
ihent of Nuremberg, 21 TuL. L. REv. 329, 338 (1947), wrote that it was "more akin to
a joint tribunal under municipal law than to an international tribunal in the normal
sense of the word." Anent this preoccupation with word-labels, what is important, it may
be suggested, is that those tribunals were established by multilateral agreement and that
they invoked and sought to apply inclusive policies. It is hardly practical to stipulate
an absolute "universality" as the only possible reference of "international."
110. Such as the proposed international criminal court. See Report of the Commit-
tee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 7th Sess., Supp.
No. 11. (A/2136) (1952) ; Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jur-
isdiction, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12 (A/2645) (1954). The
problems that confront contemporary efforts to establish such an institution are of course
vast and complex, and a high probability of realization in the near or foreseeable future
is difficult to posit. See STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CoN.IcT 378-79
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bodies is not the enforcement of peace among nations but rather the determina-
tion of the criminal responsibility of individual persons for unlawful resort to
coercion. The individuals brought before these tribunals would commonly be
political, military, or economic elites, in other words, the top effective decision-
makers of the state which breached the prohibition of unlawful coercion."1
The objectives embodied in the imposition of criminal punishment upon these
types of individuals may, but need not, differ from, and may include, all the
ordinary purposes for which criminal justice is administered in municipal
public orders." 2
The Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, it may be recalled, evoked much
learned, if at times confused, contention about the "criminality" as distin-
guished from the "illegality" of aggressive war under international law. This
contention has, today, been largely muted. Perhaps few will doubt that the
present corpus of authoritative myth permits the punishment of individual
persons responsible for impermissible recourse to violence, and that the real
problem is creating appropriate international institutions and sustaining per-
spectives and dispositions of effective power for the implementation of author-
ity. It may be observed in this connection that the charters and judgments of
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals as well as the International Law Com-
mission's formulation of the "Nuremberg principles" refer to individual crimi-
nal responsibility in the context of a "war of aggression,"" 3 that is, impermis-
sible coercion that has reached the dimensions and intensity of overt and ex-
tensive military violence. The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind would extend the policy involved to "any act of aggres-
sion''114 and thereby include unlawful coercion falling short of naked, armed
violence. The realism of this projection obviously depends in considerable de-
gree upon the extent to which an effective community monopoly of force is
secured in the international arena.
(1954) ; Report by Sandstrom on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, 2
YEARBOOK OF IN'L LAW Comm'N 1950, at 18. But approval may be given to the con-
tinuation of efforts to clarify the conditions under which such probability may be
increased.
111. See High Command Trial, 12 LAW REPORrS OF TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS 1,
69-70 (1949) ; Krupp Trial, 10 id. at 127-28; I. G. Farben Trial, id. at 37-38.
112. For an excellent, recent inquiry into these purposes, see Lasswell & Donnelly,
The Continuing Debate Over Responsibility: An Introdction to Isolating the Condem-
natio'n Sanction, 68 YALE L.J. 869 (1959).
113. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(a), in 1 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS at XI (1949); Char-
ter of the International Military Tribunal For the Far East, art. 5(a), in JUDGmENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, ANNEXES 21 (1948);
Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, principles I & VI, 2 YEARBOOK OF INT'L
LAW COMI'N 1950, at 374, 376.
114. Article 2(1) ; Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work
of its Sixth Session, June 3-July 28, 1954, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. Suep. No. 9
(A/2693), at 11 (1954). For brief general comment, see Johnson, The Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INT'L Comp. L.Q. 445 (1955).
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Realistically, the judicial attribution of criminal responsibility can, of
course, be carried out only after the termination of violence, and only upon
the assumption that the State identified as having unlawfully exercised co-
ercion has been so far forcefully subdued as to permit the arrest and seizure
of its leaders and top policymakers. With respect to coercion that has not
matured into open military violence, it is conceivable-though history as
yet offers no precedent-that a revolutionary elite may emerge in the offend-
ing State, capture power and surrender the ousted elite for trial or try them
in its own courts. The point of emphasis, however, is that, with either
the termination of violence or the subsidence of expectations of violence,
judges inquiring into individual guilt would not experience the same insistent
need for quick decision that presses upon the security organs of the organized
community. The judges may and appropriately do require more exacting de-
grees and procedures of proof.', Difficulties of fact-finding may be substan-
tially relieved by access which the judges presumably would have to the secret
files and archives of the accused leaders of the subdued state, and by other
evidence not available to the preceding decision-makers. The judicial organs
would have full opportunity for more extended inquiry into the relevant fac-
tors in context; the relevant context might indeed be defined, and the signifi-
cant segment of time delimited, somewhat differently for purposes of indivi-
dual punishment than for purposes of peace enforcement. In particular, in
the weighing of equities and apportionment of blame, close consideration can
be given to the subjectivities of the individuals accused-in terms of the de-
gree of voluntary and purposeful participation in the making of decisions un-
lawfully to engage in coercion- - "16 which may be pleaded in mitigation or
exculpation of responsibility.
The third group of authorized decision-makers is composed of the officials
of nation-states who make judgments about the lawfulness of coercion for a
number of differing purposes. First, state officials must be continually ap-
praising that degree of constraint, usually minimal, exercised in the ordinary
course of interaction with other states. These officials must also assess and
115. A wide-ranging survey and evaluation, encompassing the procedures utilized
in both trials for crimes against peace and trials for "conventional" war crimes, is pre-
sented in Tsai, Judicial Administration of the Law of War: Procedures in War Crimes
Trials, 1957 (unpublished thesis in Yale Law Library).
116. Cf. PomPE, AGaGRSSIVE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 252 (1953). In the
Krupp trial, Judge Anderson stressed that for conviction there
must be knowledge of facts and circumstances which would enable the particular
individual to determine not only that there was a concrete plan to initiate and
wage war, but that the contemplated c6nflict would be a war of aggression and
hence criminal. Such knowledge being shown, it must be further established that
the accused participated in the plan with the felonious intent to aid in the accom-
plishment of the criminal objective. In the individual crime of aggressive war
or conspiracy to that end as contra-distinguished to the international delinquency
of a state in resorting to hostilities, the individual intention is of major importance.
10 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 123 (1949).
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decide upon an appropriate response to any drastically accelerated coercion
that may be applied against their states. Third, in the event that one or both
security organs of the organized community, the Security Council and the
General Assembly, are unable to arrive at a characterization of coercion exer-
cised by two contending participants, individual third states may need to decide
about permissive discrimination and participation on the basis of such residu-
ary authority as the Pact of Paris. 17 States, finally, who are parties to col-
lective defense arrangements must make determinations as to the occurrence of
a casus foederis, and must appraise a party's claim for assistance in collective
self-defense.
We focus here upon officials of a state against which highly intense coercion
has been exercised. Such officials, in responding to coercion with coercion and
in asserting a claim to act in self-defense, in fact make a determination that
the coercion to which they respond constitutes an unlawful breach of world
public order. A determination of this sort is and must be provisional. It is a
claim to self-redress without prior authorization from the organized commun-
ity, and is subject to review and appraisal by that community." 8 In the un-
certain interval, however, between initiation of substantial coercion and subse-
quent determination by the organized community, the individual state must
be conceded competence to respond quickly if response is to serve the purpose
of protection. The need for celerity in decision may be even more pressing, the
perils of delay more portentous, for the target state than for the general se-
curity organization. Thus, the target state may appropriately be regarded as
authorized to act upon a prima facie evaluation of the coercion exercised
against it, and on standards of proof at least no more demanding than those
upon which decision-makers responsible for the enforcement of peace may
find it necessary to act.
Tihe Analysis of Alleged Initiating Coercion
We turn now to the mode of analysis which we suggest as relevant for in-
quiring into contextual factors that influence decisions about the lawfulness
of coercion. The order in which we proceed to analysis of these factors reflects
requirements of convenience in exposition rather than a posited hierarchy of
intrinsic importance.
Priority in the Exercise of Substantial Coercion
There has been much discussion in the United Nations committees that have
sought to define aggression of a purported "principle of priority" or, as it is
sometimes called, a "principle of the initial act."" 9 This discussion has, how-
117. On residual bases of permissive discrimination and participation, see the refer-
ences cited in McDougal & Feliciano, General Principles 826 n.170.
118. See text accompanying notes 213-17 ifra.
119. See, e.g., Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 9th Sess.,
Annexes, Agenda Item 51, at 11-12 (1954); Report of the 1956 Special Committee 9-10;
Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 12th Sess., Annexes, Agenda
Item 54, at 4 (1957).
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ever, been characterized in large degree by misdirection; it has focused
too much upon a reference to the chronological priority of some single, "pre-
cisely defined," physical act, divorced from the subjectivities of attack or de-
fense accompanying the act. Much of the argument has centered about the
"principle of priority" incorporated in the enumerative Soviet draft definition:
the stipulation that of two contending participants, that party is the aggressor
which first commits any of the acts specifically catalogued as aggressive acts.
Some have urged that this particular "priority principle" furnishes the only
available criterion for distinguishing a prohibited act of aggression from per-
missible self-defense. "None of the acts mentioned in the USSR draft resolu-
tion," the Ukrainian SSR delegate explained, "amounted to aggression per se.
Two acts might be the same in the military sense yet from the legal point of
view, one would be an act of aggression and the second legitimate retaliation
[sic]. Aggression would inevitably be the first act, which induced or provoked
the second."' 20 From an antithetical perspective, the representative of the Uni-
ted Kingdom asserted with equal confidence that "the question of which State
was 'first' to commit a certain act was basically irrelevant and that everything
depended essentially upon the circumstances.' 21 More recently, it has been
appropriately emphasized that the "tasks of evaluation" involved in a deter-
mination of aggression "simply cannot be performed by limiting consideration
to the occurrence of a precisely defined act, at a particular moment, in insula-
tion from the broader context of the relations of the States concerned.' 12 2
The factor of priority cannot lightly be dismissed as wholly irrelevant to
judgments about permissibility or impermissibility of coercion. A conception
of priority is implicit in the very notion of impermissible coercion;123 what
community policy seeks to prohibit is resort to certain coercion, not responding
coercion in necessary protection of values. Completely to reject the relevance
120. U.N. Doc. No. A/C.6/SR 408, at 13 (1954); cf. Report of the [Politis] Cons-
inittee on Security Questions, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Anna-
ments, [1933] 2 CONF. Docs. (1935.IX.4) 680 (1935) ("The chronological order of the
facts is decisive here."). See also the statements of Politis in the Records of the Confer-
ence for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, 2 MINUTEs OF THE GENERAL CoMT-
MISSION 500 (League of Nations, Ser. B 1933).
121. U.N. Doc. No. A/C.6/!SR.406, at 8 (1954). The United Kingdom delegate,
curiously enough, went on to echo the argument made by the Soviet Union in the 1945
London Conference and stated that "Everyone could recognize aggression when it oc-
curred and the matter should be left at that . .." Id. at 9. As to the argument referred
to in the text, see also Report of the 1956 Special Committee 9.
122. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 70-71 (1958).
123. Cf. Spiropoulos, Second Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 YEARBOOK OF INT'L LAW COM MN'N 1951, at 43, 67. The
same point was stressed by the Netherlands representative to the 1956 Special Commit-
tee: "[T]he priority principle was inherent in every definition dealing with armed at-
tack and self-defense. The only problem was to what kind of acts the priority principle
was related." Report of the 1956 Special Committee 19. Even the United Kingdom dele-
gate conceded that 'it was self-evident that for a legitimate exercise of the right of self-
defence something must have first happened to call it into play." Ibid.
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of priority is thus, in substance, to reject the fundamental community policy
of limiting permissible change to change by peaceful procedures only.124 It is,
on the other hand, equally obvious that to assign exclusive relevance to a
"principle of priority" whose reference is limited to the timing of a particular
"precisely defined" operation indexed, as in the Soviet list, as aggressive, is
hardly more rationally designed to secure the fundamental community poli-
cies at stake; such a unifactor test ignores the significance of subjectivities or
objectives of coercion which must be considered when ascertaining responsi-
bility for breaches of basic policy.
Any conception of priority takes on meaning and must be appraised in terms
of the fundamental policies to be served, policies which in considerable meas-
ure determine the categories of phenomena to be observed and considered in
terms of their sequential relationships of anteriority, simultaneity, and pos-
teriority. Priority, in other words, can here as in other types of problems be
ascertained only within a temporal sequence which the decision-maker deems
relevant. To delimit the relevant sequence in time necessarily involves specify-
ing the kind of behavior (subjectivities and operations) that may be charac-
terized as unlawful. This specification obviously depends upon the policies the
decision-maker seeks to realize. Determination of priority can lapse into an
infinitely regressive historical excursion only when the decision-maker is un-
clear about basic policy or in fact secretly rejects the minimum policy which
demands that no change shall be effected through intense coercion and vio-
lence.
The diverging views in the United Nations about priority have been inspired
by deep discontent with the attempt to utilize, for purposes of fixing responsi-
bility for breach of the public order, a much too mechanistic rule relating
single "precisely defined" operations in abstract chronological sequence. The
124. 'STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 71 (1958) appears to come perilously
close to such a position. Professor Stone writes:
This difficulty was increased to the point of caricature by the express provision
in the Soviet draft that virtually no considerations whatsoever "political, strategic
or economic!', nor in particular any of a rather exhaustive list of provocative in-
vasions by the "victim" of the "attacker's" legal rights and legitimate interests,
could justify the attack. In a state of the world in which there is usually no other
possible means of vindicating rights and interests, this is rather like proposing a
municipal legal order in which the only law which is enforced is a law forbidding
physical trespass against the realty or person of another.
See also id. at 43, 95, 100. The list of nonjustifying circumstances incorporated in the
Soviet definition is, of course, in some of its items, open to serious objection. But Pro-
fessor Stone himself failed to indicate what "legal rights and legitimate interests," other
than the right and interest in defending against "physical trespass against [one's] realty
or person," may or should be permitted to be "vindicated" by unilateral force. It may
be well to recall that that prohibition is the first indispensable law of any public order.
And it is travesty of customary international law to analogize the general community
of states to a "municipal society [where] no means whatever existed for changing the
law except with the consent of every individual member of the society." Id. at 71 n.164.
(Emphasis added.)
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conception of priority that would determine community policy simply by the
chronology of individual physical acts without reference to any other contex-
tual factor was appropriately rejected. The rejection of this notion, however,
at times came too close to denying any relevance to conceptions of priority.
For proper clarification, neither priority in conducting a specified operation
alone nor priority in certain subjectivities unattended by operations is crucial.
What is crucial is, rather, priority in the exercise by certain operations and
with certain perspectives, of destructive coercion which reasonably creates in
the target state-as reasonableness can be tested by third parties-expecta-
tions that it must react with violence to conserve its own values.12 A physical
operation alone, considered simply as an act of coercion, is deaf, dumb, and
blind to policy and yields no necessary indication of its impact on demanded
policies. The question of priority is, we submit, appropriately posed not in
terms of marking the exact date or hour of some one physical act, such as
the landing of a battalion or the firing of a cannon, but in terms of ascertain-
ing initiative in creating, by certain operations impelled by certain perspec-
tives, the stipulated realistic expectations as to the requirements for protect-
ing values. Subjectivities about coercion are, of course, no more open to direct
observation than are subjectivities about persuasion and agreement, and must
often be inferred from operations; but inference is no more impossible with
respect to coercion than with respect to agreement. Inference about subjecti-
vities, in processes of coercion as of agreement, may and must be drawn from
many different particular operations, not merely from one, and from the
varying configurations of the specific operations performed by each partici-
pant in detailed contexts, including the relative chronological sequence of in-
dividual operations. 12 A judgment as to priority thus requires, if chronology
is to serve fundamental community policy, appraising and relating to a calen-
dar or clock whole constellations of factors, encompassing both acts and quali-
fying perspectives, exhibited in the coercion exercised by the respective
participants.
The Characteristics of Participants
In considering the relevance of the character and constitution of partici-
pants for determining the lawfulness or unlawfulness of coercion, it is neces-
sary to recall that the nation-state is still the major type of participant in
125. We are here anticipating inquiries made below; see text accompanying notes
170-79 infra. -
This conception of priority does not compel an infinite regress in historical search for
responsibility. The thrust is upon initiative in creating expectations in a contemporary
context of a need for military reaction. Difficulty in finding a "time of beginning" for
determining responsibility-that is, selecting the appropriate target of community inter-
vention--only arises where one does not accept the basic postulate of no change through
too intense coercion or assumes the impossibility of clarifying standards for identifying
too intense coercion for expansionist purposes.
126. See note 88 supra. With respect to processes of agreement, see also notes 254-
55 infra.
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world processes of coercion and ordinarily commands control of armed
forces, the power base which permits the application of the most intense de-
gree of coercion. The relative size and power of a state which is alleged to
have unlawfully initiated coercion, that is, its size and power in relation to
that of its opponent, may serve as indices of the real, as distinguished from
the proclaimed, objectives of each participant, of the intensity of coercion
exercised by each (particularly before the stage of open military violence is
reached), of the realism of asserted expectations that violence is necessary
for protection, and hence of the probable situs of responsibility. The more
conspicuous the disparity in relative fighting capability, appraised in terms
of both forces-in-being and potential for war, the more easily inferences of
responsibility may be drawn. Both common sense and the history of such
wars as the Italo-Abyssinian war, the Sino-Japanese conflicts of 1931 and
1937, and the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 suggest that, in the ordinary
course of events, a state with a low level of fighting capability is not likely to
initiate highly intense coercion against a much more powerful state. A plea
of self-defense has a characteristically implausible ring when uttered by a
great power against a weak or disorganized or primitive state.'2 7
In weighing relative power and strength, account must be taken of the
capabilities not only of the immediately contending participants but also of
those defined by each participant as its allies or potential allies. The external
structure of identifications that each participant projects, indeed the very
configuration of the world arena, may thus be relevant. In the current world,
however, the significance of an appraisal of relative capability may depend
upon the extent to which the patterns of power move toward diversification
rather than toward a simple, rigid bipolarity. Inquiry into such identification
structures may yield a more direct indication of the character of the objec-
tives or purposes of the respective participants by revealing the kind of world
public order each demands, whether it be one which requires the subordina-
tion or destruction of independent power centers or one which seeks peaceful
coordination and cooperation in a pluralistic arena.
The nature of the internal structures of authority and control in each of the
contending states may also suggest relevant probabilities. A distinguished
scholar has submitted that "among factors which appear to influence the war-
likeness of a state are the degrees of constitutionalism, federalism, division
of powers and democracy established in its political constitution."'1 2 8 The
127. There may, however, be cases of small and weak states deliberately engaging
in attacks of a minor and diminutive scale, largely of nuisance value, against a more
powerful state. This may be illustrated by the recent incidents at the ill-defined Yemen-
Aden border where, it was reported, Yemeni troops with a few field guns and machine
guns fired at British forces in the Aden protectorate. British forces reacted by bombing
and strafing Yemeni gun positions. The United Kingdom, in a letter to the U.N. Secre-
tary General, stated that the British air action was taken under article 51 of the UjN.
Charter. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1958, p. 13, col. 5, p. 34, col. 5.
128. 2 WRIGHT, A STUv OF WAR 833-48 (1942). See also id. at 1.164, 1168, 1172,
where some generalizations about possible interrelations of economic structure and war-
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degree to which both authoritative and effective power are shared by several
organs of government and the extent to which a system of power-balancing
is maintained within a state, as well as the character and composition of the
ruling elite and of predominating symbols, 2 appear in the present world to
have some impact on the capacity and likelihood of a state undertaking arbi-
trarily to resort to force and violence. It is significant that the States which
have been explicitly determined by an international organization or tribunal
likeness are attempted. More than half a century before Professor Wright wrote, a com-
parable insight into the relation between internal value systems and external policies
of states was offered by F. de Martens:
I have tried to show the existence of a connection between the internal system
and external relations of each country in successive historical periods from antiq-
uity to our times and I have reached the conclusion that when civil and political
rights in a State are based on respect for human personality and its inalienable
prerogatives, the foreign policy of the government seeks as a natural result to pro-
tect the legitimate interests of the nation in its external affairs in upholding order
and right abroad and in encouraging every attempt to spread the benefits of
civilisation throughout the world. Such a foreign policy should generally produce
firmly established peaceful relations and respect for the acquired rights of others.
On the other hand, relations with states where human personality enjoys no rights
but is oppressed, surrendered to arbitrary caprice, and subject to brutal force can-
not be established on a firm basis or develop.
1 TRaIT DE DRT INTERNATIONAL at ii-iii (Leo transl. 1883), as translated and quoted
in JENKs, THE COMVMON LAW OF MANKIND 73 (1958).
More recent studies sustain these insights. E.g., LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL RECON-
STRUCrION 86 (1946):
The distinction [between a political democracy and an autocracy] acquires point
when applied to the system of international relations. There is an interrelationship
or, it may be said, a causality between form of government and world peace or
world organization; and the two are identical, as we have learned the hard way.
In the simplest and least controversial terms, a nation organized as a political
democracy is more inclined to cooperate peacefully with other nations, and is less
prone to resort to violence and war, than one organized as an autocracy.
Id. at 90: "But the causality between autocracy and war does not end here. A govern-
ment which has come to power and must maintain itself by internal violence cannot be
expected to behave peacefully towards other countries." See also NEUMANN, PEMA-
NENT REvOLUTION (1942); ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 394-96, 427-28
(1951); FRIEDRICH & BRZEZINSKI, TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY 57-68
(1956); Mosxowinz, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER 87-88 (1958).
129. The significance for war and peace of the character and composition of elites
and of dominant symbols are explored in, e.g., ABRAHAMSEN, MEN, MIND AND POWER
(1945) ; BLUEMEL, WAR, POLITICS, AND INSANITY (1948) ; LASSWmEL, LERNER & DE SOLA
POOL, THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SYMBOLS (1952); LAsswELL, LERNER & ROTHWELL,
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELITES (1952); LAsswELL, POWER AND PERSONALTY
(1948). Contemporary techniques of content analysis appear promising and may provide
operational indices for elite and symbol factors and trends bearing on the use (or non-
use) of coercion and violence. Recent suggestive studies include DE SOLA POOL, SYMBOLS
OF DEMOCRACY (1952); DE SOLA POOL, SYMBOLS OF INTERNATIONALISM (1951); LASS-
WELL, LEITES & ASSOCIATES, LANGUAGE OF POLITICS: STnIES IN QUANTITATIVE SEMIAN-
Tics (1949).
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to have unlawfully resorted to force and violence were commonly totalitarian
in internal structure: Fascist Italy, prewar Japan, Soviet Russia, Nazi Ger-
many, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. Again, it does not
seem unreasonable to suppose that the internal characteristics of a state, like
its external identifications, reflect in certain measure the kind of public or-
der it projects in the international arena and hence the nature of the objectives
that motivate it.130
The Nature of Participants' Objectives
In the United Nations committees that sought to define aggression, certain
delegations contended that the objectives or purposes or "subjective mo-
tives"'131 of a participant charged with having unlawfully initiated coercion
were not to be considered in determining the lawfulness of coercion. This view
was urged principally in connection with the supposed merits of the enumera-
tive Soviet definition. "The Soviet draft," the representative of Roumania
stated, "rightly excluded the subjective element, animo aggressionis. The ag-
gressor would, of course, always maintain that whatever his actions, his in-
tention had not been to attack but merely to defend himself or to forestall ag-
gression. Hence no opportunity should be given to the aggressor to plead al-
leged good intentions."' 32 A comparable view was submitted by the Iranian
delegate who objected to the inclusion of a reference to "territorial integrity
and political independence" in a joint Iran-Panama draft. He argued that this
130. We are not, it might be made explicit, suggesting that nontotalitarian states
can never be guilty of prohibited coercion and violence. See also note 156 infra. The
suggestion made is simply that in examining a participant's publicly asserted perspectives
for their realism or spuriousness, inquiry may appropriately extend to the authority and
control arrangements, the system of public order, maintained within such participant
and projected in the world arena.
131. We speak of "objectives" or "purposes" as referring to preferred and actively
sought configurations of events. For purposes of clarity, this reference should be dis-
tinguished from that frequently given to "aggressive intention" or "animus aggression"
-the deliberate, rather than merely inadvertent or accidental, initiation of violence. The
latter reference is made explicit in, e.g., the Report of the Secretary General 68. In-
advertent or accidental initiation may, for instance, occur where a state, mistaking
weather or freakish electronic disturbances on radar screens for approaching hostile
missiles, reacts by launching its own missiles. The Secretary General's report pointed
to a historical example: during the Second World War, Allied bombs meant for enemy
territory fell on Swiss towns.
Purpose can of course be projected only by human beings. It is not easy to appre-
ciate the fine subtleties about "State viens red' spun in STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORnD
ORDER 141 (1958). An appropriate conception of top formal and effective decision-makers
may go far in clearing such alleged difficulties. The Tribunal in the High Command
Trial explained that "war whether it be lawful or unlawful is the implementation of a
national policy. If the policy under which it is initiated is criminal in its intent and
purpose it is so because the individuals at the policy making level had a criminal intent
and purpose in determining the policy." The German High Conmand Trzai, 12.LAw
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 67 (1949).
132. U.N. Doc. No. A/C.6/SR.520, at 11 (1957).
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language introduced a "subjective element" and that "the effect of the act,
rather than the intention of the aggressor should be the decisive factor in de-
termining aggression . .. .,,33
The objectives or subjectivities of participants (or, more precisely, of the
top effective decision-makers in participating states) cannot, as suggested
earlier, be wholly disregarded in characterizing coercion as impermissible.
Fundamental community policy does not seek to prohibit all coercion, nor
even all highly intense coercion; it explicitly permits coercion for certain
purposes, such as that necessary to protect certain indispensable values and
to enforce certain community decisions. A participant should not, of course,
be allowed to escape responsibility by simply asserting some secret legitimate
intention that is belied by any reasonable construction of its acts. This is only
to say that proclaimed objectives must be distinguished from objectives sought
in fact, and that verbal proclamations alone do not offer conclusive indications
of the purposes actually pursued. In the exercise of coercion, as in the making
of agreements, the purposes or subjectivities of a participant must be "objec-
tively" ascertained; they are, it may again be emphasized, appropriately in-
ferred from acts and the effects of acts, the totality of a participant's opera-
tions, verbal and nonverbal, considered in detailed context. From this perspec-
tive, the dichotomy posed by the representative of Iran between the "effect of
the act" and the "intention of the [actor]" or, as formulated by Dr. Pompe,
between the "purport of the act" and the "purpose of the actor,"'134 appears
unreal. To speak of the "purport of the act" apart from the purpose of flesh-
and-blood actors is like, in Professor Williams' figure, "speaking of the grin
without the Cheshire cat."1 35 The available quanta and kinds of evidence from
which inference as to purposes is to be drawn may obviously differ as decision-
makers differ in function, objective, and operating condition. The point which
we would emphasize, however, is that the purposes that impel an exercise of
coercion must be relevant to policy, whatever the specific controversy and who-
over the decision-maker purporting to apply community prescription. 130
In authoritative myth and doctrine, the nature of objectives or purposes
that may not lawfully be sought through destructive coercion is characterized
only in terms of a very high level of generality. Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force "against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." "Territorial integrity" and
"political independence," phrases which, it is well known, were inserted in the
133. U.N. Doc. No. A/C.6/SR.416, at 9 (1954).
134. POmPE, AGGaEssivE WAR: AN INTMrNATIONAL CRIME 103-04 (1953).
135. Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REv. 71, 83 (1945).
136. "Whether," the Tribunal in the High Command Case said, "a war be lawful,
or aggressive and therefore unlawful under International Law, is and can be determined
only from a consideration of the factors that entered into its initiation. In the intent
and purpose for which it is planned, prepared, initiated and waged is to be found its
lawfulness or unlawfulness." Trial of Voit Leeb, 12 LAw REPORTs oF TRIALS or WAR
CRIMINALS 67 (1949).
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original Dumbarton Oaks draft at San Francisco upon the insistent behest
of small states,137 are classical, technical terms embracing in summary refer-
ence the most important bases of state power, the values or interests whose
impairment and destruction are sought to be prohibted and, correlatively,
whose necessary protection by coercion is permitted. "Political independence"
is commonly taken most comprehensively to refer to the freedom of decision-
making or self-direction customarily demanded by state officials. 13 Impair-
ment of "political independence," as an attack upon the institutional arrange-
ments of authority and control in the target state, thus involves substantial
curtailment of the freedom of decision-making through the effective and drastic
reduction of the number of alternative policies open at tolerable costs to the
officials of that state. It may further consist of an attempt to reconstruct the
process of decision in the target state, to modify the composition or member-
ship of the ruling elite group, and, perhaps, to dislodge that group completely
and to substitute another more acceptable to the attacking state. The reference
commonly assigned to "territorial integrity," on the other hand, is that con-
trol which state officials hold over a certain geographic resource base and the
peoples there located. Impairment of "territorial integrity" as an objective of
coercion thus implies that control over all or part of a state's physical and
demographic resources will be reduced or eliminated. The appropriate em-
phasis is upon effective control or possession rather than upon formal recog-
nized title, 39 for community policy seeks change only by peaceful modalities,
a policy whose applicability is not contingent upon lack of disputation about
the formal "legal status" of the area involved or upon the recognition of an
opponent's technical "statehood." Initiating coercion intended to accomplish
factual modification in resource distribution is prohibited.
The phrase "or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations" was designed to emphasize the inclusiveness of the basic
policy and to "insure that there should be no loophole."' 40 Since the purposes
137. 4ODRicH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 103 (2d rev. ed. 1949);
see 6 U.N.C.I.O. 557, 720.
138. Cf. PoMPE, op. cit. supra note 134, at 106: "Political independence opposes the
other classic aim of war: the imposition of one's will upon the attacked State." See
also GOODRiCH & HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 137, at 105.
139. See BowErr, S F DEFENcE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-36 (1958). The refer-
ence to effective control or possession is made not only in the Draft Act prepared by
the 1933 Geneva Disarmament Conference and the 1947 Rio Treaty cited by Bowett, but
also in, e.g., the definition of aggression proposed by Bolivia to the 1953 Special Com-
mittee, which included "the invasion by one State of the territory of another State across
the frontiers established by treaties or judicial or arbitral decisions and demarcated in
accordance therewith, or, in the absence of marked frontiers, an invasion affecting ter-
ritories under the effective jurisdiction of a State . .. ... U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.66/L.9
(1953) ; Draft Submitted by Iran and Panama, Report of the 1956 Special Committee
31; Draft Proposed by Mexico, id. at 32-33; Joint Draft Proposal of the Dominican
Republic, Mexico, Paraquay, and Peru, id. at 33.
140. 6 U.N.C.I.O. 335. Contrast the singular reading of article 2(4) by Professor
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of the United Nations are formulated in such broad terms as "to maintain
international peace and security," "to develop friendly relations among na-
tions," and "to achieve international cooperation in solving international prob-
lems,"'141 the omnibus phrase may be seen to include in its reference an inde-
terminate number of possible objectives which are, on the one hand, less ambi-
tious in scope than the total destruction of the "territorial integrity" or "poli-
tical independence" of the target state and which are, on the other hand,
Stone: "Article 2(4) does not forbid 'the threat or use of force' simplciter; it forbids
it only when directed 'against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.'"
He goes on to suggest, in effect, that "the use of force for the vindication of rights"
(i.e., other than in self defense) "where no other means exist," is not inconsistent with
either article 2(4) or 2(3), and that a "blanket prohibition" is difficult "to reconcile"
with the words "and justice" found in article 2(3). STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD
ORDER 95 (1958). It may be noted that what Professor Stone seeks to demolish by this
argument is "the extreme view of Article 2(4) prohibiting resort to force by States for
the vindication of their rights, save in reaction to armed attack or pursuant to collective
decisions .... ." Id. at 98.
A partial and preliminary answer is that the "extreme view" with which Professor
Stone grapples is, to the extent that it purports to limit the reference of permissible self-
defense to defense against overt military violence, largely a straw man. Such a limita-
tion of reference represents a highly selective reading of the drafting history of article 51
and other relevant articles of the U.N. Charter, as well as a projection of doubtful
realism. Further, appropriate application of the requirements of necessity and proportion-
ality of response should provide adequate answers to alleged difficulties of having "to
submit in default of collective action, to all kinds of illegality, injustice and inhumanity
as long as these do not take the specific form of an 'armed attack' under Article 51."
Id. at 99.
One principal difficulty with Professor Stone's view is that it misconceives the pur-
pose and scope of articles 2(3), 2(4), and 1(1) and treats too casually the preparatory
work on these articles. Thus, for instance, he assumes that the inclusion of "territorial
integrity" and "political independence" in article 2(4) somehow had a limiting effect
upon the prohibition there projected. Contrast the observation made in Bower, SELr
DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 151 (1958) that the "origin [of those words) is found
in the desire of the smaller powers to secure some express guarantee of their territorial
integrity and political independence; the introduction of this phrase at San Francisco had
not, as its purpose, the qualifying of the obligation ... "' See also 2 OPPENHEIM-
LAuTRmPACHT 154; 6 U.N.C.I.O. 334-35, 400, 564. Again, Professor Stone makes too
much of the insertion of "and justice" in article 2(3). "[A]nd justice" was meant to
refer to the terms of the disposition and settlement of a dispute-in other words, the
settlement should not only not threaten the peace and security of others but should also
be just; it was not intended to qualify "by peaceful means." 6 U.N.C.I.O. 399. The
location of the phrase "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law"
in article 1(1) was carefully chosen precisely with such a purpose in mind. See 6 U.N.
C.I.O. 203, 245-46, 318, 394-95, 422. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that the
unilateral use of force for vindication of rights (other than in self-defense) in the name
of "justice" was intended to be permitted. But the cumulative effect of Professor Stone's
view is to place an enormous premium upon the unilateral determination and vindication
of "justice" by resort to force. See STONE, AcGaESSIO AND WoRLD ORDER 100 (1958).
141. U.N. CHARmaa art. 1.
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different from the objectives embodied in "legitimate self-defense" and en-
forcement of decisions of the organization. 42
The appraisal of the objectives of a participant alleged to have resorted to
unlawful coercion would, of course, present no difficulties if the participant
explicitly and publicly declared its intention to destroy the "territorial integ-
rity" or "political independence" of its opponent. Such open explicit declara-
tions, however, are bound to be rare.143 The more usual case has been, and
in all probability will remain, that in which actual objectives are not so can-
didly expressed. For characterizing actual as distinguished from publicly
declared purposes, and for considering the concordance of actual purposes with
the fundamental policies outlined in the Charter, certain general factors relat-
ing to such purposes may, we submit, be usefully examined. A number of
tentative categorizations are suggested below.
Consequentiality. The comprehensiveness or consequentiality of the objec-
tives, considered in terms of the nature, scope and relative importance (to each
participant) of the values a given state seeks to affect, is of obvious, if pre-
liminary, significance. The spectrum of possible objectives ranges from the
most modest to the most comprehensive. The degree of consequentiality of
particular objectives is commonly related in roughly direct proportion to the
intensity of the coercion applied to secure an objective ;144 and both these fac-
tors taken together bear upon the degree of realism attributable to the target
state's expectation that it must react with violence. Objectives of relative in-
consequentiality may be expected to involve no more than a low degree of
coercion and may thus be but an incident of the ordinary intercourse of states
arousing no appreciable expectations of a need for countering violence. Al-
though, in principle, the authority of the security organs of the general com-
munity may be said to extend to these cases, they would not ordinarily be
expected to seize upon such minimal coercion as conduct appropriately calling
for community intervention. A certain degree of consequentiality is, as a prac-
tical matter, an implicit condition for an exercise of the policing functions of
the organized community. On the other hand, objectives that approach the
upper extremes of consequentiality, such as the total destruction of the "terri-
142. The comprehensive reference of this omnibus phrase makes it, we submit, all
the more clear that article 2(4) is-notwithstanding Professor Stone's valiant exegetics-
appropriately interpreted to exclude the unilateral use of force other than in permissible
self-defense, in particular, the recourse to force for the protection or vindication of lesser
rights and interests than those involved in "territorial integrity" and "political independ-
ence." Detailed, multiple-factor or configurative analysis such as is recommended in this
Article remains, however, as necessary for distinguishing the lawful use of force in self-
defense from its unlawful use for lesser purposes as it is for discriminating between
lawful self-defense and prohibited aggression.
143. In the Suez case, the Israeli representative to the U.N. argued that the Egyptian
government had made unequivocal and public statements of a purpose to destroy and
eliminate Israel. See U.N. GEx. Ass. OFF. Rzc. 1st Emer. Spec. *Sess. 21-23 (1956).
144. See McDougal & Feliciano, General Principles 796-97.
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torial integrity" and "political independence" of the target state, require for
their achievement the application of highly intense coercion. An objective of
this sort arouses strong expectations of a necessity for violence in response.
The more comprehensive the objective and the more intense the coercion ini-
tiated, the easier it may be to arrive at a rational determination of impermis-
sibility.
Extension or Conservation. A major category clearly discernible in the pre-
scriptions of the Charter is that of extension or conservation; a participant
charged with unlawfully initiating coercion may be seeking to expand its
value resources by attacking and acquiring values held by its opponent or to
conserve and maintain its own values against acquisition by its opponent.
Characterizing objectives in these terms is obviously required by the funda-
mental policy of the community respecting permissible modes of change. In-
ternational change in an arena exhibiting in high degree "position scarcity"
and "resource scarcity"'145 realistically involves a reallocation of values among
the participants concerned, and reallocation commonly means expansion for
the one and diminution for the other.146 It is perhaps just as obvious that this
distinction, to be meaningful in determinations of lawfulness, must be con-
sidered in conjunction with both the relative consequentiality of the values
involved and the degree of coercion employed to acquire or conserve those
same values1 4T
In partial reiteration, for the overriding purpose of securing public order
in its most elementary sense, basic community policy seeks to protect from
destructive unilateral reconstruction those patterns of value allocation that
actually exist and manifest at least a minimal degree of stability. Such patterns
need not entirely coincide with those which other, less critical policies and
prescriptions, or perspectives of "justice and equity," may require. It is not
a theme of an international law of human dignity that our inherited distribu-
tion of values among peoples accords completely with humanity's noblest con-
ceptions of justice, nor is it an expectation of such an international law that
no future wrongs against peoples will be done. The dominant theme is only
that both a more just distribution of values and the revindication of future
wrongs must be effected by less primitive methods than the destruction of
145. See id. at 785 n.50.
146. See generally BLOOMFIELD, EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION? THE UN ITED NATIONS
AND THE PROBLEM OF PEACEFUL TERRIToRiAL CHANGE (1957); DUNN, PEACEFUL CHANGE
(1.937); PEACEFUL CHANGE (Manning ed. 1937).
147. This posing of complementary categories need not imply any rigid dichotomy nor
any assumption about the existence of an absolute "zero-line" between conservation and
extension, with one party invariably and wholly located on one side of the line and its
opponent always and entirely on the other side. "Pure" cases are bound to be few. What
matters is the relative position of each party with respect to the other in the particular
context considered; differentiation of degrees-with one party so much more conserva-
tionist and the other so much more expansionist-is sufficient for the making of practical
judgments of policy.
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peoples and resources. While in particular cases it may be difficult to draw
lines betveen conservation and revindication, between defense and redress, it
is necessary to continue at attempt to make a practical judgment because there
is in their impact upon policy a crucial difference, a difference arising from
the interposition of the community's elemental interest in minimal order.
Inclusiveness or Exclusiveness. The relative inclusiveness or exclusiveness
of the objectives that move a participant may also be relevant in appraising
the lawfulness of coercion. Objectives manifest inclusivity to the extent that
they admit of widespread participation in the sharing of the values involved,
that is, to the extent the values are sought on behalf of other states, or possibly
of the entire community of states, as well. Exclusivity, on the other hand,
marks objectives which preclude a sharing of the demanded values, with the
acting participant seeking unilateral control thereof. Inquiry into the degree
of inclusiveness or exclusiveness of belligerent purposes thus entails inquiry
into the degree of comprehensiveness of a participant's "self-system" or ex-
ternal structure of identification. But much more than a mechanical counting
of heads on each side is involved, for members of a coalition may quite possibly
have as little in common as a collective enemy. Objectives of coercion may
range from the most exclusive, such as conquest and annexation of the target
state, to the most inclusive, such as participation in community peace-enforce-
ment action.148 The more exclusive a participant's objectives are, that is, the
closer their approximation to a program of self-aggrandizement, the less diffi-
cult it may be to assess their impact on that fundamental policy which seeks to
ensure "that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."'1 49
Consideration of relative inclusiveness or exclusiveness may find particular
application in appraising the objectives of subsequent participants-partici-
pants other than the states originally involved in the conflict situation-who
intervene under a claim of collective defense. The legitimate objectives en-
visaged in the permission of collective defense are inclusive in nature; they
comprise a demand for common safety. Appraisal of the objectives of subse-
quent participants would of course present little difficulty when the organized
community had previously achieved, through either of its security organs, a
characterization of the original coercion. The aims of later participants may
then be measured against the previous characterization for concordance or
contrariety, for sustainment or defiance.
The Context of Conditions
We have previously generalized the relevant conditions under which an
allegedly unlawful resort to coercion takes place so as to embrace all the vari-
148. Some illustrations are suggested in McDougal & Feliciano, General Principles
784.
149. U.N. CHARTR preamble. In the apt words of Lord McNair, force is sought to
be "collectivized, denationalized." McNair, Collective Security, 17 BRIT. YB. IN T'L L, 150,
161 (1936).
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able interacting components of a world power process. 150 The more important
factors of fairly obvious significance to our present problem of appraising law-
fulness include expectations about the nature of the available technology of
violence, and about the relative probabilities of effective community interven-
tion, and the kind of public order demanded by the respective participants.
The expectations of the participant accused of unlawful coercion as to the
character of the technology of violence available to, and the relative vulnera-
bility of, itself, its allies, opponents, and potential opponents may partially ex-
plain both the participant's perspectives and its expectations concerning the
necessity and costs of recourse to violence. We have adverted to the capability
of some contemporary weapons systems for quick and comprehensive destruc-
tion. Possessors of these weapons enjoy an overwhelming advantage over
those without them. This disparity makes it difficult to give credence to a
claim that violence is necessary to protect the stronger against the weaker
participant. In the event of an armed conflict between powers possessing
them, these weapons may conceivably make, under certain present circum-
stances, surprise and the first strikes "decisive"; they may thus place a con-
siderable premium on an effective capacity to counter an expected blow by an
anticipatory thrust.15' In these and analogous circumstances, to the extent that
an imminently impending attack is realistically expected, seizing the initiative
in the actual exercise of violence need not be incompatible with perspectives
of lawful defense. The same velocity and destructiveness of contemporary
weapons, by reducing to a few minutes the time available for accurate ascer-
tainment of an approaching attack and of the identity of the attacker and by
correspondingly increasing the need for instant reaction, 5 2 may further make
so-called "accidental war" a significant possibility,15 3 a possibility not likely to
150. See McDougal & Feliciano, General Priciples 786-91.
151. The conference convened at Geneva last November 10, 1958, between Western
and Communist Powers, for exploring technical means of preventing or detecting surprise
attacks, strongly suggests continuing concern over such a possibility. Proposals and
counterproposals have been made for specific detection systems against specific weapons
that can be used in massive surprise attacks. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1958, p. 1, col. 5; id.,
Nov. 29, 1958, p. 1, cols. 7-8. The factors that contribute to this possibility, that is, that
make the effectiveness of both offensive and defensive capabilities sensitive to who
strikes first, are ably discussed in Rathjens, Deterrence and Defense, 14 BULL. OF ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 225 (1958) and Schelling, Surprise Attack and Disarmament (P-1574, Rand
Corp., Dec. 10, 1958) (discussion paper). See also Brodie, The Anatomy of Deterrence,
11 WORLD POLITICS 173 (1959); Phillips, The Growing Missile Gap, The Reporter,
Jan. 1959, p. 10; Puleston, Should the United States Ever Strike the First Bloz?, U.S.
News & World Report, Dec. 13, 1957, pp. 64-66. It does not seem impossible that tech-
nological factors of weapons development may overtake cultural perspectives which pre-
dispose a nation to accept the "first blow."
152. See Shelton, Impact of the Ballistic Missile on Defense, in U.S. AIR FORCE RE-
PORT ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE 127 (Gatz. ed. 1958) ; Sheridan, Impact of the Ballistic
Missile cm Warfare, id. at 139.
153. See Leghorn, The Problem of Accidental War, 14 BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
205 (1958); Rabinowitz, Accidental War, Missiles and World Community, id. at 202.
The very necessity for maintaining deterrence capabilities tends to increase the possibility
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be reduced by the continuing development of new weapons systems."5 4 "Acci-
dental war," understood as violent action impelled by a misapprehension that
an attack has been launched, raises problems that may be inescapable in a
primitively organized world which lives under the shadow of ever more fear-
ful instruments of destruction.
Common estimations of participants as to the dependability of timely and
effective intervention by the organized community, estimates which obviously
reflect the degree of organization and integration achieved in the world arena,
may have a significant bearing upon the reasonableness of asserted expecta-
tions that violence was necessary for self-protection. When the prevailing es-
timations of the possibility of such intervention are low, there are evident diffi-
culties in requiring a participant to wait very long, in a context of rapidly
accelerating coercion, before responding with violence. These expectations
also have particular relevance for officials and members of regional security
organizations, established precisely because those expectations were low, who
must respond to demands for assistance made in the name of collective de-
fense. Furthermore, to tribunals determining the criminal responsibility of
particular members of an accused elite, these expectations may present them-
selves as possible mitigating circumstances.
In a world marked by deep, continuing conflict among differing concep-
tions or systems of world public order, it is no longer revolutionary to suggest
that the kind of public order demanded by a participant charged with unlaw-
ful coercion is a factor relevant to a decision on permissibility. The suggestion
amounts to this: that decision-makers rationally should take account of the
probable effects of various alternative decisions upon the values of the system
of world order to which they are committed. There is growing recognition
that conflict between competing conceptions or demanded systems in fact deep-
ly affects both the prescription and application of policy on recourse to co-
ercion, as on other problems.1' 5 Clarification of fundamental policy about per-
of accidents. Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, 37 FORMGN AFFAIRs 211, 231
(1959):
A deterrent strategy is aimed at a rational enemy. Without a deterrent, general
war is likely. With it, however, war might still occur.
In order to reduce the risk of a rational act of aggression, we are being forced
to undertake measures (increased alertness, dispersal, mobility) which, to a sig-
nificant extent, increase the risk of an irrational or unintentional act of war.
154. Such as the submarine-ballistic-missile complex, as to which see Brinckloe,
llissile Araz~v, 84 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. No. 2, at 23 (1958) ; Garthoff, Sea Power in
Soviet Strategy, id. at 85; and the report by Witkin on ballistic missiles capable of being
launched from sea and air, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1959, p. 12.
155. Citations to the growing body of relevant literature are collected in McDougal
& Feliciano, General Principles, 805 n.109, and McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification
and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Ali. J. INT'L L. 1 n.1 (1959).
See also, Pinto, International Law and Coexisteice, 82 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
307 (1955) ; Schwarzenberger, Scope and Limits of International Legislation, in GEGEN-
WARTSPROBLEME DES INTERNATIONALEN RECHTES UND DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE, FEsT-
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missible and impermissible coercion requires clarification of the permissible
and impermissible objectives of coercion. Differing conceptions of world order
which incorporate different perspectives about law, human nature, and human
society, and appropriate patterns for the production and sharing of values,
define differently the objectives or occasions that, in terms of each system,
legitimate the use of coercion and violence. The Soviet doctrine of "just" and
"unjust" war offers an important illustration:
(a) Just wars, wars that are not wars of conquest but wars of libera-
tion, waged to defend the people from foreign attack and from attempts
to enslave them, or to liberate the people from capitalist slavery, or,
lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of im-
perialism; and
(b) Unjust wars, wars of conquest, waged to conquer and enslave
foreign countries and foreign nations.150
SCHRIFT FUR RUDOLF LAUN 65 (1953); Berlia, International Law and Ruesso-Aterican
Coexistence, 79 JoURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 27 (1952) ; International Law Ass'n,
American Branch, Report of the Committee on Peaceful Co-existence, in PROCEEDINGS
AND ComIrrE REPORTS 85 (1957-1958); INTERNATIrON LAWV Ass'N, N.Y.U. CON-
FERENCE, REPORT OF THE RAPPORTEUR (RADoixOVIc) OF THE COMMITTEE Or CO-EXIST-
ENCE (1958).
The suggestion made above that probable impact upon values should be considered
appears implicit in Professor Goodrich's eloquent warning:
[T]he United Nations cannot be satisfied with a role which is basically neutral
as to values. It must seek to preserve the peace by harmonizing the policies and
actions of states, but always on terms which will represent progress toward the
achievement of those values for which the United Nations stands. These consti-
tute the life blood of the Organization and unless it is loyal to them, and continually
seeks to bring their fulfillment nearer by its actions, it loses its vital force and
becomes a piece of lifeless machinery that can easily and properly be dispensed with
once it has served or failed to serve its utilitarian purpose.
GOODRICH, THE UNrITn NATIONS 330 (1959). Three pages earlier, Professor Goodrich
had observed that "Unlike nationalism, Communism offers as part of its basic ideology
the promise of an integrated world community, but the goal to be achieved and the path
to it are not those of the Charter." Id. at 327.
156. HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS),
SHORT COURSE 167-68 (ed. Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. [B],
1939). In the 1950 sessions of the U.N. General Assembly's Sixth Committee, the Nether-
lands representative observed that under the above Soviet doctrine, "there would be two
fundamentally different concepts of aggression. On the one hand, the [U.N.] Charter
forbade a change in the status quo brought about by armed force. On the other hand,
there was the view that wars could be fought to achieve an ideological purpose." The
reply of the Soviet representative was characteristic: "[F]rom the actual description
given by the great Lenin and the great Stalin of just, non-aggressive wars, it followed
that they were not aggressive wars but wars of liberation, whereas unjust wars were al-
ways wars of aggression." U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5th Sess., 6th Comm. 135, 157
(1950).
For a more recent statement, note the speech delivered by Premier Khrushchev at
Leipzig on March 7, 1959, where he is reported to have said, after stressing that "the
military power of the Communist bloc is greater than that of the 'imperialists' ": "We
recognize the right of using strength in dealing with the imperialists. When you talk
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With such differences as to the legitimate purposes of coercion and violence
existing,157 universal consensus on any clarification of policy must seem un-
likely except, perhaps, on the level of rhetoric of a sufficiently high order of
generality. Furthermore, whatever the consensus achieved on an abstract ver-
bal formulation, differences in specific interpretation and application are to be
expected. In point of fact, even a cursory review of the records of the General
Assembly and Security Council and of the United Nations committees on de-
fining aggression reveals that both the draft definitions of aggression-in par-
ticular, the types of specific indices of aggression and of nonexculpating cir-
cumstances-and the specific interpretations of broad prescription in particular
cases that have been urged by states projecting totalitarian systems of world
order, are constantly designed to enhance the strategies, and promote move-
ment towards the goal values, of their systems. In these circumstances, for
decision-makers committed to a system of world order that seeks to honor
human dignity either to dismiss as totally irrelevant the probable impact of
possible alternative resolutions upon the values embodied in such system, or
else to assume a nonexistent universality, may be only to engage in traumatic
self-delusion. Even in today's extreme crisis, 'however, we do not recommend
with the imperialists, morals are not enough. You must be supported by strength." N.Y.
Herald Tribune, March 8, 1959, p. 14, col. 4.
Lest the contrary impression arise by default, it may be made clear that, in contrast
with the quoted Soviet doctrine, we make no proposal for incorporation of a double or
multiple standard in the conception of permissible coercion. The policy we recommend
is, on the contrary, that of demand for effective universality, for the uniform applica-
tion to all participants of a basic policy that excludes the acquisition or expansion of
values by coercion and violence. In urging the explicit examination of the fundamental
public order perspectives of participants, in particular their definitions of the legitimate
purposes of coercion, the hope is precisely that decision-makers may thereby escape the
double standard which in specific interpretations may be created against those who do
not accept as permissible the use of coercion for expansion. We think of the interest to
be clarified, the demand for change by noncoercive and nonviolent procedures only, as a
general community interest, as the long-term interest of all individual states, and recog-
nize that there must be a promise of reciprocity from states who reject totalitarian con-
ceptions of world order. It does not need elaborate demonstration that this interest has
special significance for the newly emergent, the small, or the weak territorial communi-
ties who comprise the bulk of the peoples of the world and who cannot even hope by
their individual resources to maintain their identities as distinct and self-directed partici-
pants in the contemporary arena as against powerful states which may seek self-expan-
sion.
157. In further illustration of such differences, the doctrine of jihad, so important
in traditional Islamic law, may be noted. Islamic law theory divided the world into the
dar al-Islam (abode or territory of Islam) and the dar al-harb (abode or territory of
war). Jihad imported an obligation upon the Moslem state to transform the latter into
the former by war as well as by other means. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAw
OF IsA.Am 51-73 (1955); Khadduri, International Law, in 1 LAw IN THE MIDDLE EAST
353-54, 359 (Khadduri & Liebesny ed. 1955).
For an authoritative statement of the dynamic contemporary purposes and aspirations
projected for the Islamic world, see NASSER, EGYPT's LIBERATION: THE PmrLosoPHY OF
THE REvoLuTION 81-114 (1955).
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that expansion by violence be held permissible for the half-world or regions or
states adhering to nontotalitarian systems of public order. Any violent expan-
sion involves a destruction of values that is, we submit, incompatible with the
overriding conception of human dignity.
Any clarification of permissible and impermissible purposes of coercion must
obviously be sustained by a certain minimum community of interest and shar-
ing of values. In last resort, all law must depend for its efficacy upon the com-
mon interest and shared values of the participants in the arena to be regulated.
From the perspective of proclaimed doctrine-postulating an implacable hos-
tility and irreconcilable conflict between the Communist world and the Western
"bourgeois, capitalist" world, and explicitly envisaging the eventual liquida-
tion of the latter at the most economic speed-a serious question arises whether
the necessary community of values remains between leaders and peoples com-
mitted to such a doctrine and other peoples.158 From the more realistic per-
spective of the conditions that must eventually affect specific demand, how-
ever, there may be discernible at least an immediate mutual interest in con-
tinued survival. The fundamental import of the conditions of power which,
in the contemporary global arena, manifest themselves in a precarious equili-
brium of capacity for inflicting fearful destruction, is that the proponents of
one system cannot destroy by violence the proponents of the other without
bringing their own world to enduring radioactive ruin.15 9 As peoples dedi-
158. See, e.g., PossoNy, A CENTURY OF CONFLICT (1953); Aaron & Reynolds, Peace-
ful Coexistence and Peacefid Cooperation, 4 POLITICAL STUDIES 283 (1956); Cottrell &
Dougherty, Hungary and the Soviet Idea of War, 16 RussIAN REv. No. 4, at 17 (1957);
Lissitzyn, Soviet Interpretation and Application of International Law, 8 NAVAL WAR COL-
LEGE REV. No. 5, at 33 (1956); Strausz-Hupe, Protracted Conflict: A New Look at
Communist Strategy, 2 Onis 13 (1958) ; Triska, A Model for Study for Soviet Foreign
Policy, 52 Am. PoL. Sci. REV. 64 (1958). Compare Hula, The Question of Russian Ob-
jectives, in EAST-WEST NEG OTIAT oNs 52 (Wash. Center of Foreign Policy Research,
1958).
In his Leipzig speech, as reported in the N.Y. Times, March 8, 1959, p. 3, col. 4,
Premier Khrushchev affirmed that "if there is a new %var--one could start in a small way
-it will end with the downfall of capitalism," and that "even the blind will see what is
white and what is black and they will see that for the world there are not two ways but
only one way-the way of communism." Premier Khrushchev is here reiterating the theme
of systemic revolution which he, Adlai Stevenson reported, had previously expressed:
You must understand, Mr. Stevenson, that we live in an epoch when one system
is giving way to another. When you established your republican system in the
eighteenth century, the English did not like it. Now, too, a process is taking place
in which the peoples want to live under a new system of society; and it is neces-
sary that one agree and reconcile himself with this fact. The process should take
place without interference.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1959, p. 6, col. 1.
159. The type of situation that may be referred to here has been characterized in
terms of "determinate," meaning calculable, but "unlimited" risks associated with the pro-
secution of "unlimited objectives," that is, objectives "related to survival." See King,
The Rationale of Agreement Between Nuclear Powers-A Method of Analysis, in EAST-
WEST NEGOTIATIONS 38, 42 (Wash. Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1958). King
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cated to freedom maintain this last and narrow common ground, they may
cherish the hope that others will recognize such common ground and that it
may slowly be widened to include sharing of other values sufficient to sustain
a common policy against coercion.
The Modalities of Coercion
In considering the relevance of the methods used by a participant who alleg-
edly has initiated unlawful coercion, it may be recalled that, while armed
force has for centuries been the classical instrumentality of coercion between
states and still remains the ultimate means of applying the most intense co-
ercion, it is today a commonplace that all instruments of policy-military,
economic, and political---can be and are being used to achieve varying degrees
of coercive effect. The burden of the experience of recent decades is that many
objectives for which armed force was used in an earlier day may now fre-
quently be realized, or at least substantially facilitated, by highly developed
nonmilitary techniques of coercion without open violence. Of principal im-
portance in this connection are the exercises of coercion emphasizing political
or ideological instruments, with military instruments in a muted and back-
ground role, commonly referred to as "indirect aggression" and frequently
described as more dangerous than the "direct" or military type of aggression.
A chief characteristic of "indirect aggression" appears to be the vicarious com-
mission of hostile acts by the aggressor state through the medium of third-
party groups located within the target state and composed either of foreigners
or nationals of the target ostensibly acting on their own initiative.10 The hos-
tile acts may include the giving of aid and support and, frequently, strategic
and tactical direction to rebellious internal groups. The classic postwar case is
that of the Greek Communist guerrillas to whom Albania, Bulgaria, Yugo-
slavia and Roumania furnished both open military aid and the use of their
territory as a base for military operations against the constitutional Greek
government and also as a safe refuge in tactical defeat.' 6 ' The assistance given
suggests that in this situation, negotiations "indicating mutual recognition of the stand off
and a mutual resolve not to challenge the status quo" might be useful. Id. at 47. The
sensitivity and precariousness of the equilibrium is underscored by, e.g., Wohlstetter, The
Delicate Balance of Terror, 37 FoREIGN AFFAIRS 211 (1959).
160. Report of the Secretary General, 72.
161. In Resolution No. 193 (III), the General Assembly declared that "the continued
aid given by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to the Greek guerrillas endangers peace
in the Balkans, and is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations." U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 3d Sess., Part I, Resolutions 18, 19 (1948).
The Assembly later recommended that all U.N. members and "all other States" "take
into account, in their relations with Albania and Bulgaria, the extent to which those two
countries henceforth abide by the recommendations of the General Assembly in their re-
lations with Greece". U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. no. 288 (IV), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 4th
Sess., Resolutions 9 (1949). Detailed findings of fact are contained in the Reports of the
U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans; U.N. GFN. Ass. OFF. REc. 3d Sess., Supp. No.
8 (A/574) (1948); U.N. Gzx. Ass. OFF. Pm. 4th Sess., Supp. No. 8 (A/935) (1949).
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to internal groups may frequently assume more covert and subtle forms in-
cluding the training, exportation, and financing of leaders and specialists in
subversion, sabotage, infiltration, fomentation of civil violence, and coups
d'etat. "Indirect aggression," disguised as a purely domestic change,10 2 pre-
sents peculiar difficulites for external decision-makers. The organized com-
munity may suddenly be confronted with a fait accompli, as in the case of
Czechoslovakia in 1948, which may leave as an alternative to passive acqui-
escence only the improbable prospect of collective coercion against the victim
state in an effort to dislodge the new revolutionary elite. Persuasive evidence
of common fear and expectations of the effectiveness of "indirect aggression"
may be found not only in the repeated proposals specifically to include con-
demnation of its use in a definition of aggression but also in declarations of
the United Nations General Assembly. In the "Peace through Deeds" Resolu-
tion, the General Assembly did "solemnly reaffirm" that "whatever the wea-
pons used, any aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil
strife in the interests of a foreign Power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all
crimes against peace and security throughout the world."1 3 In a world exhibit-
ing in ever increasing numbers military weapons of awesome capability for
destruction and in which the possibility of avoiding or limiting the use of such
weapons once violence breaks out remains problematical, there is growing
awareness that recourse to military force even of the "conventional" type may
impose unacceptable risks of grievously exorbitant costs. Consequently, in-
creasingly frequent resort to methods of "indirect aggression" may be antici-
pated since they provide more economical means of achieving unlawful objec-
tives. The most serious problem confronting adherents to systems of world
order which seek to honor freedom may thus be to devise appropriate pro-
cedures for identifying and countering unlawful attack disguised as internal
change. 16
4
162. See, e.g., with respect to capture of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the statements of
the Soviet representative in the Security Council invoking article 2 (7) of the U.N.
Charter on "domestic jurisdiction" on behalf of the Czech Communist government. U.N.
SEC. COUNCII, OFF. Rac. 3d Year, No. 56, at 2-21 (1948). For exposition of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the seizure of power and the techniques employed by the Com-
munists in Czechoslovakia, see the statements of the U.S. representative, id. at 25-33. See
also POSSONY, A CENTURY OF CONFLICT 292-95 (1953) and, more generally, SzroN-
WATSON, THE EASTERN EuROPEAN REvOLUTION (1951).
163. Resolution No. 380 (V), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20
(A/1775), at 13 (1950). See also Resolution No. 381 (V), id. at 14. Cf. The "Essentials
of Peace" Resolution where the Assembly condemned "any threats or acts, direct or in-
direct, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at
fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State." Resolution
No. 290 (IV), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 4th Sess., Resolutions 13 (1949). See also the
formulations achieved by the International Law Commission in the DRAFT CODE oF
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PEA cE AND SEctURTY OF MANKIN arts. 2(4), 2(5), and 2(6);
Report of the International Law Commission, 6th Sess., U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 9th
Sess., Supp. No. 9 (A/2693), at 11 (1954).
164. This problem of coping with "indirect aggression" presents the difficult task
of distinguishing between (a) situations in which there is significant intervention in a
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In connection with efforts to clarify the meaning of "indirect" or nonmili-
tary types of aggression, particular proposals have been made for formulating
a definition of "economic aggression." Concern for this form of coercion is re-
vealed by a number of proposals; however, they have tended to be idiosyn-
factual sense, whatever the precise modalities, by external elites, and (b) rebellion situa-
tions which are wholly or primarily of genuinely indigenous initiation and management.
This distinction must be attempted because of the differences in the relevant fundamental
community policies.
The type of situation in which an external elite attacks a body politic by use of in-
ternal agents poses no new policy problem. Highly intense attacks through such instru-
mentalities, of such impact as to create in the target state a reasonable expectation that
it must resort to the military instrument (and, for instance, strike at the bases of opera-
tions maintained in the external elite's border zones) to preserve its independence and
territorial integrity, are just as inimical to minimum world public order as any other
mode of attack. The fact that attacking external principals utilize and receive aid from
internal agents merely adds a new dimension to the threat, and neither the target state
nor the general community should be required to make too nice discriminations of the
degrees of threat from the "outside" and from the "inside." For dealing with this type
of situation, all the provisions of the U.N. Charter and other documents referred to above
are entirely relevant.
Situations where rebellion ,is of indigenous stimulation and genuine internal direction
pose more difficulty. One of the basic premises of a world arena composed of states is
that territorial communities of peoples whose interactions most directly and immediately
affect each other may establish their own internal public order, with whatever specific
goal values and implementing institutions they choose. The presumption in favor of
"self-determination" by appropriately responsible communities is in substance a pre-
sumption in favor of the human rights-the private choice--of individuals. In the in-
creasingly interdependent contemporary world, however, no community lives entirely
alone. When the balance of global power teeters precariously between two poles, or a
few major centers of concentration, what begins as honest home-grown violence may
easily become a spreading conflagration affected with the deepest international interest.
In such situations, initial preference for self-direction of lesser communities should of
course yield to the necessities of the larger community interest in securing even a mini-
mum of public order. Fortunately, the U.N. Charter affords adequate authority for the
continued surveillance of coercion which begins as internal rebellion and for general
community intervention when such appears necessary. Note the very broad language of
articles 14 and 34 of the U.N. Charter.
In particular instances, it may not, of course, be at all easy to determine whether
internal violence is merely disguised external attack or genuine indigenous revolt. Rebel-
lions may be of many different kinds and occur in many differing contexts under varying
conditions. The recourse of the responsible decision-makers must again be to systematic
and careful examination of all the factors that make up the coercion in its context, at
all possible levels of intelligence. The more obvious observation of lines of communica-
tion and movements of persons and material may again be supplemented by inquiry into
more subtle and covert factors, such as: the relation, if any, of the internal disturbance
to claimed world revolutionary movements; the differential allegiance of various in-
ternal groups to varying competing systems of world public order; the degree of sharing
of power admitted in internal structures of public order; the degree to which internal
practices, institutionalized or not, constitute "provocative conditions" by denial of human
rights to minorities or even whole populations; and so on. The presumption against
general community regulation of indigenous violence is, it must always be recalled, a
presumption in favor of human rights. When the factual bases for such presumption are
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cratic and are frequently characterized by formidable abstraction and ambigu-
ity. For instance, the draft definition formulated by Bolivia provides in part
that:
3 . ... unilateral action whereby a state is deprived of economic re-
sources derived from the proper conduct of international trade or its
basic economy is endangered so that its security is affected and it is un-
able to act in its own defense or to cooperate in the collective defense of
peace shall likewise be deemed to constitute an act of aggression. 1 5
Other proposals include the suggestion of the Afghan representative that
dosing the "historical trade route of a land-locked country or creating diffi-
culty in the way of free and normal trade and commerce" should be condemned
nonexistent or fail, the presumption may, much as in the traditional doctrines of humani-
tarian intervention, be required to give way to more inclusive policies.
Confusion in discussions of these problems may further arise from failure to dis-
tinguish attack by external aggrandizing elites upon a target state, through the medium
of internal groups, from assistance to a state, upon request of its constitutional govern-
ment, in maintaining internal order. In respect of the latter, it is sometimes necessary
to recall that traditional international law imposed no prohibition upon the rendering of
aid to an independent and duly constituted government, inside its own territory, for quel-
ling internal disturbances and it seems difficult, save perhaps where such government has
consistently and ruthlessly denied the most basic human rights to its own people, to find
such a prohibition in the U.N. Charter. It was only where rebel groups had been able to
maintain prolonged civil strife, waging general hostilities and occupying substantial terri-
tory, that some modification of the liberties of the constitutional government was sought
under the somewhat elusive customary law doctrines on "belligerency" and "insurgency."
The suggestion has on occasion been made that when the stage of substantial success is
reached by rebels, provisions of the U.N. Charter (e.g., article 2(4)) may be supplied to
impose comparable limitation upon requests by the de jure government for external aid.
In this connection, see Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 Amr. J.
INT'L L. 112, 119-25 (1959). The basic policy at stake is, as indicated above, the preserva-
tion of the genuine self-direction of territorial communities and not the restraining of
peoples from changing their governments. The long experience under the older "belli-
gerency" and "insurgency" doctrines, however elusive those technical formulations may
have been, may possibly afford relevant guidance to contemporary decision-makers who
must cope with this problem in appraising the genuineness and degree of internal changes
in authority and effective control.
165. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.66/L.9 (1953). Compare article 16 of the Charter of the
Organization of American States which prohibits "the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and
obtain from it advantages of any kind." (Text in 46 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 43, 47 (1952).)
Clearly similar to article 16 of the O.A.S. Charter is article 2(9) of the DRAFT CODE
OF OFFENSES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND, supra note 163, at 11.
Bolivia's concern over "economic aggression" has not been wholly academic. Dumping
of cheap tin on the world markets by the Soviet Union resulting first in the downward
revision of exgport quotas under the International Tin Agreement and later in the col-
lapse of price levels, led Bolivia to raise a charge of "economic aggression" against the
Soviet Union. Bolivia's economy depends in very considerable measure upon her pro-
duction of tin. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1958, p. 17, col. 3; id., Oct. 2, 1958, p. 29. Bownrr,
SELF-DEFENcE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 n.3 (1958) cites examples of cases where
complaints were made to the Security Council of various forms of "economic aggression."
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as "economic aggression."'166 The delegate of Pakistan urged that to deprive
riparian states of their rights with respect to international rivers was an act
of "economic aggression."'167 The most extravagant formulation is that in the
Soviet draft which includes "measures of economic pressure violating [an-
other state's] sovereignty and economic independence and threatening the base
of its economic life."' 68 None of these proposals have met with much enthusi-
asm, partly because of the fear that their inclusion in a definition of aggres-
sion "might suggest the right to go to war in self defense" against "economic
aggression."'16 An appropriate application of the principle of proportionality
would commonly rule out "war" or extensive violence as a legitimate response
to economic coercion which, in many contexts, may be merely of the kind and
level inescapable in the ordinary relations of states. Yet, however tendentious
and destructive of initiative and freedom in ordinary intercourse these pro-
posals may be, their very submission reflects a recognition that, with the de-
velopment and refinement of methods of economic warfare, the flow of goods
and services in the international arena can be so managed as to inflict a sub-
stantial measure of coercion upon a target state and that, with increasingly
tight economic interdependences, the vulnerability of most states to economic
coercion tends to increase.
Awareness of the potentialities of all instruments of coercion may indicate
that what is of particular importance for decision-makers is not the specific
modality or even combinations of modalities employed, considered in typologi-
cal abstraction, but rather the level and scope of intensity achieved by the em-
ployment of any one or more modalities in whatever combination or sequence.
The relevance of the kind of instruments utilized by a participant is rather
limited: it lies primarily in the rough and ready indication-precise quantifi-
cation not presently being practicable-which it affords, first, of the level of
coercion being applied, second (in equally gross terms), of the relative pro-
portionality of the response in coercion, and, third (though indirectly), of the
nature and comprehensiveness of the participant's subjectivities.
The Effects Secured
Dimensions of Coercion. That the effects achieved by the employment of
coercion constitute a factor of the highest relevance for a determination of
166. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 12th Sess., 6th Comm. 50 (1957).
167. Id. at 62.
168. Report of the 1956 Special Committee 30. The items listed in the Soviet draft
as constituting "economic aggressioa" and "ideological aggression," as well as most of the
nonexculpating circumstances specified are, of course, designed to serve the purposes of
political warfare.
Still another illustration of the type of proposals that have been made, formally or
informally, in respect of "economic aggression," is the suggestion of the Syrian repre-
sentative in the 1953 Special Committee that: "If a great Power made exorbitant de-
mands in return for the assistance it gave to a weak nation, it was acting contrary to
the spirit of the Charter. When those demands threatened the independence of the country
concerned, they amounted to aggression." Report of the 1953 Special Committee 25.
169. Report of the 1956 Special Committee 8; See also Report of the 1953 Special
Committee 27.
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lawfulness requires only brief demonstration. Community policy addresses
itself not to objectives and intentions as psychological phenomena alone but
rather to such objectives and intentions in action, to their materialization in
concrete relations between peoples, to the impact of the coercive pursuit of
such purposes upon value processes in the world of time and space. We prin-
cipally refer to the intensity and magnitude of the coercion-its consequences
upon the values of the target state-actually achieved in the process alleged to
have been initiated unlawfully. Just as in the appraisal of the consequentiality
of objectives, the most comprehensive and detailed appraisal of the conse-
quentiality of the achieved coercion involves consideration of factors like the
number and kind of values of which the target state is deprived, the relative
importance of these values to the target state, and the scope of value depriva-
tions, including both the geographical range and temporal dimension of the
damage. The spectrum of possible degrees of consequentiality is obviously a
very wide one.
From perspectives either of realistic descriptions of the past or of projec-
tions into the probable future, it will be seen that not every intensity and
magnitude of coercion may be characterized as impermissible, whether the
purpose be to specify the appropriate precipitating event for lawful recourse
to the military instrument in self-defense, or to initiate coercive repression by
the organized community, or to impose criminal punishment upon particular
individuals. As has been suggested before, a certain degree of coercion is in-
evitable in states' day-to-day interactions for values. Fundamental community
policy does not seek to reach and prohibit this coercion, as indeed it cannot
without attempting to impose moral perfection, not to mention social stagna-
tion, on humanity.
There remains the problem of clarifying the intensity and magnitude of
coercion that, for varying purposes, may appropriately be characterized as
impermissible. The discussions in the United Nations committees on aggres-
sion show increasing awareness of the need for clarification. "To constitute
aggression," the delegate from Iran stated, "the use of force must be suffi-
ciently serious; otherwise the door would be open to dangerous abuses by
States claiming to be acting in self-defense." 170 The Iraqi representative was
170. U.N. Doc. No. A/C.6/SR.405, at 3 (1954). The Iranian representative was
here echoing what the de Brouckere Report of 1926 had observed:
Every act of violence does not necessarily justify its victim in resorting to war.
If a detachment of soldiers goes a few yards over the frontier in a colony remote
from any vital centre . . . then it cannot be maintained that . . . the invaded
country has reasonable grounds for mobilising its army and marching upon the
enemy capital. . . . [The invaded country] could not be so released [from its ob-
ligations under the League Covenant] unless it were the victim of a flagrant ag-
gression of such a serious character that it would obviously be dangerous not to
retaliate at once.
Documents of the Preparatory Commission For the Disarmament Conference, LEAGUE
oF NATIONS, SzNEs III, at 101 (1927). (Emphasis added.)
Cf. the effort to clarify a distinction between a "frontier incident" listed as a non-
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even more explicit in explaining that, under his country's draft definition,
which took account of "both the purpose and the effect of the act in question,"
"the material factor was the gravity of the act, judged by its scale and in-
tensity.'' Similarly, in the 1956 Special Committee, the Netherlands pro-
posed that the Committee dedicate itself to clarifying "armed attack" as used
in article 51 of the Charter. The Netherlands representative stressed that
"the place of Article 51 in Chapter VII indicated clearly that small-scale hos-
tilities connected with border incidents fell outside the scope of that Article,"
and that the "crucial problem" was "to find the criterion distinguishing armed
attack from any other use of force, which did not entitle the [target] State
to take the action provided for in Article 51. ' '172
The Critical Intensities of Coercion--The Test of Impact Upon Expecta-
tions. In indicating the resulting levels of coercion that are of crucial import-
ance for the application of community policy, it is necessary to refer to a con-
tinuum of degrees of coercion, extending from the mildest through an ascend-
ing scale of intensity and scope to the most intense. Coercion located at the
upper ranges of this hypothetical scale of scope and intensity presents little
difficulty. Open and extensive military violence inflicting substantial destruc-
tion upon both peoples and resources, the principal constituent bases of state
power, clearly represents a prohibited intensity of coercion. The sudden uni-
lateral intensification to such high intensities of a process in which coercion
had been at the ordinary minimal level justifies, almost by definition, a reac-
tion on the part of the target state with war in self-defense. The handful of
cases in which the League of Nations achieved an explicit determination of
impermissibility involved highly destructive uses of the military instrument:
the Chaco War,173 the Sino-Japanese (Manchurian) War,174 the Italo-Abys-
sinian War,17 5 and the Soviet-Finnish War..76 Similarly, most of the cases
exculpating circumstance in the Litvinov-Politis definitions and an "act of aggression,"
made in the Report of the Secretary General 62: "[T]he first salient feature to note is
that [a frontier incident] is on a small physical scale, the forces involved being too
slight to enable an invasion or attack to be carried out. This criterion, however, would
not be a very strict one: What amount of force would have to be used to constitute some-
thing which was no longer an incident but an aggression?"
171. Report of the 1956 Special Committee 22.
172. Id. at 24.
173. Upon the acceptance by Bolivia and rejection by Paraguay of the formal recom-
mendations of the League Assembly for the settlement of the Chaco dispute, the Assem-
bly recommended that the arms embargo, which had previously been imposed as against
both parties, be lifted for the benefit of Bolivia and maintained against Paraguay. See
LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. No. 133, at 49 (1935); id., Spec. Supp. No.
134, at 56-57; id., Spec. Supp. No. 135, at 22,26.
174. See id., Spec. Supp. No. 112, at 22 (1933), where 'the Assembly adopted unani-
mously (Japan's negative vote was not counted; there was one abstention) the Lytton
Report finding Japan responsible for resorting to war in violation of the League Covenant.
The text of the Report is found in id. at 56-76.
175. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., 16th year, 1223-25 (1935).
176. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., 20th year, 505-08, 531-41 (1939).
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arising after 1945 in which either article 2(4) or 39 of the Charter was ex-
plicitly or implicitly invoked, whether in their submission or in the proposals
and decisions concerning them, involved overt and substantial uses of armed
force: the Indonesian (II), the Palestinian, the Korean, the Guatemalan, the
Suez, and Hungarian cases. 177 Of course, the cases of coercion dealt with and
penalized by both the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals
were principally cases of the most severe and extensive armed hostilities. The
reference of such descriptive words as "substantial" and "extensive," in terms
of particular quanta of military force, may of course be variable,178 inasmuch
as they are a function of, among other things, the fighting capability of both
the attacking and the target states.
As the level of coercion under consideration moves away from the upper
extreme toward the lower end of the putative scale of intensity and scope,170
when, in other words, a process of accelerating coercion has not reached the
stage of open and extensive violence, the problem assumes some complexity.
Despite the focus upon applications of armed force in article 2(4) of the
Charter, severe destructive uses of the military instrument do not exhaust
the competence of the community to intervene with appropriate police meas-
ures. A sufficiently flexible test of the crucial intensity and scope may be
reached, we suggest, by considering the impact of the coercion exercised upon
the expectation structure of the target state. In these terms, the key effect is
creation in the target state of reasonable expectations, as third-party observers
may determine reasonableness, that it must forthwith respond with exercises
177. See 2 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNrrzm NATIONS ORGANS 334-38 (1955).
178. At Tokyo, in reply to the indictment charging aggression by Japan against the
Soviet Union in the Lake Khassan (1938) and Khalkin Gol (1939) areas, the defense
contended that the operations in both these areas were mere "border incidents caused
by uncertainty as to the boundaries." In the Lake Khassan area, the Japanese attacked
first with "a small number of troops probably not exceeding one company," and later
with "the main forces of one division." The fighting continued for about two weeks and
resulted in the Japanese troops being "practically wiped out." The Tribunal stated that
"the attack having been planned and undertaken with substantial forces cannot be re-
garded as a mere clash between border patrols." JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 833-34 (1948). (Emphasis added.) The fighting at the
Khalkin Gol area was described by the Tribunal as being on an "extensive scale," with
aircraft, artillery, and tanks being committed, and resulting in more than 50,000 casualties
for the Japanese and 9,000 for the Soviet Union. The Tribunal again rejected the defense
that the fighting was no more than a "border incident." Id. at 840. In both cases, the objec-
tive of the Japanese forces was shown to be seizure of strategically important territory.
179. Contexts located at the lower extreme of the hypothetical scale may perhaps be
illustrated by the Spanish Question. In that case, the subcommittee created by the U.N.
Security Council reported that, since no "threat to peace," no "breach of the peace," and no
"act of aggression" had been established, the Council had no jurisdiction to require or
authorize enforcement measures against the Franco regime, but that a "potential threat
to the peace" might be found. See U.N. SEC. COUNCIL OFF. REc. 1st year, 1st series,
Spec. Supp. 1-12 (1946). Whatever coercion existed was largely of the order of a
"moral affront" arising from the disreputable origin and activities of the Franco govern-
ment.
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of military force if it is to maintain its primary values, customarily described
as "territorial integrity and political independence." If the coercion brought
to bear by whatever modality or combination of modalities (falling short of
open and extensive violence) is of such order and proportions as reasonably
to bring about expectations in the target state of the insufficiency of nonmili-
tary countermeasures and of an immediate necessity for a military response,
our submission is that a characterization of such coercion as impermissible may
appropriately be made.1 s0 When this stage is reached in a developing process
of coercion, to require the target state to delay its reaction further may be to
compel it to forego effective defense and submit to its own destruction. At
this stage, conditions of fact, high expectations of impending violence, will have
been generated, requiring immediate intervention by the organized community
to prevent the consummation of the attacking state's objectives. Before this
stage is reached, the destructive use of armed force would, by application of
the proportionality principle, be precluded per definitionem as a legitimate
response. In such anterior stages, collective coercive measures, as distinguished
from collective conciliation, by the organized community may be both improb-
able and impolitic. The location of the crucial stage in any particular process
of coercion or the determination of the reasonableness of the target state's ex-
pectations as to the need for reacting with military force must clearly depend
in large measure upon an appraisal of the other factors detailed above. With
specific reference to contexts of "indirect aggression," the capabilities of the
target state appraised in such terms as the strength of its internal authority
and control structures, the stability or vulnerability of its economic basis, its
military power resources, and the ideological cohesiveness or homogeneity of
its people, may be of special importance.
The clearest and most common illustration of impermissible intensities is
that involving a serious direct threat of an imminent, large scale, military
attack, such as that employed by Nazi Germany against Austria, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Denmark in 1938-1940.' s8 The possible scope of application of the
recommended test of intensity need not, however, be limited to contexts in
which the target state is put under the apprehension that intensifying coercion
is about to culminate in hostile armed violence. The thrust of contemporary
concern about "indirect aggression," "economic aggression," and so on, is that
the skillful management and combination of economic, ideological and diplo-
matic strategies, against a background and implicit threat of military violence,
180. Cf. the specification, proposed by the Netherlands representative, of the inten-
sity of military coercion that would warrant determination of an "armed attack" for
purposes of article 51 of the U.N. Charter, in Report of the 1956 Speoial Committee
24-25. See also the statements of the same representative in Report of the 1953 Special
Committee 20; PomPE, AGGRESSIVE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIIt' 111 (1953). Both
Dr. Pompe and the Netherlands representative, however, limited the reference of aggres-
sion to coercion by military instruments; obviously, we make no such postulation about
the types of instruments by which coercion may be accelerated to such an intensity.
181. See the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, NAZI
CUNSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, OPINION AND JUDGMENT 21-27, 38 (1947).
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may achieve degrees of coercion that leave no effective alternative to the tar-
get state but a military strike (alone or with its allies). The cumulative inten-
sity or value consequences of the coercion applied rather than the particular
modality or modalities of application is of primary significance for legal policy;
the modality need not be a conclusive index to the degree of intensity actually
secured. In many and perhaps most contexts, economic, political, and ideo-
logical measures may result only in relatively low-level coercion calling for
denial of reciprocities or for impositions of retaliation other than the appli-
cation of extensive military force. In some contexts, however, they may in
fact be so intense and swiftly effective as to preclude successful resistance on
the part of the target state.'82
Acceptance or Rejection of Community Procedures
Still another factor of some relevance to judgments about the lawfulness of
coercion is the relative willingness of the contending participants to accept
182. A conception of aggression limited to aggression by overt military means
assumes that coercion emphasizing other instruments of policy may not in any context
present the same danger to territorial integrity and independence that armed violence
may. This assumption is as unnecessary as it may be hazardous. Cf. the point well
stressed in BowErr, SELF-DEFEc'xcC INT aATIONAL LAW 24 (1958):
[W]hen the delict does not involve force or the threat of force, it would simii-
larly seem arbitrary to deny to the defending state the right to use force in
defence of its rights as a matter of fixed principle. . . . [Tihere is somethhng to
be said for the view that economic or ideological aggression can be as detrimental
to a state's security and, if illegal, as dangerous a violation of the state's essential
rights as the use or threat of force. The relevance of any distinction between
delicts involving force and those not so doing lies, in our submission, in the re-
quirement of proportionality. The use of force as a reaction to a delict not involv-
.ing force will scarcely ever be "proportionate," but there is no rule of law to say
it can never be so ....
To accept Dr. Bowett's position is not to open a Pandora's box of real as distinguished
from supposed evils. The tests of "necessity" and "proportionality" are not in any great-
er degree susceptible of abuse here than in other contexts, if the reviewing decision-
makers desire to safeguard them from subverting misuse. Susceptibility to abuse is a
common property of all legal standards and rules.
To the above suggestion that a response with armed force to coercion which has not
assumed the form of overt military violence may, in certain contexts exhibiting the
crucial intensity, be reasonable and appropriate, objection is occasionally raised also
upon the ground that, the conditions of the contemporary arena being what they are,
especially with the growing diffusion of the techniques of nuclear destruction, global or
general war may result from such defensive armed action. One difficulty with this
argument is that it may prove too much. A military response to coercion which has in
fact taken the shape of open violence presents the same possibility of a spreading con-
flagration and expanding destruction, but it has never been seriously contended that, in
such case, armed responding coercion may not lawfully be exercised. It would seem
very difficult to suppose that that possibility is overwhelmingly greater in the first than
in the second type of situation.
In final comment, the alternative to the suggestion made above--tliat is, to reject a
right of self-defense in any and all contexts not exhibiting overt violence and even against
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community procedures for the cessation of hostilities already begun and for the
nonviolent settlement of the underlying dispute. That this factor is relevant
has long been recognized. It was in fact adopted as a test of aggression in a
number of conventions drafted under the auspices of the League of Nations,
all of which conventions, however, failed of ratification. The Geneva Protocol
of 1924, for instance, required the League Council to enjoin an armistice upon
the belligerents and prescribed that any belligerent refusing to accept the ar-
mistice or violating its terms "shall be deemed an aggressor" against whom
sanctions were to be applied.183 Similarly, the 1931 General Convention for
Improving the Means of Preventing War raised a prima facie presumption of
responsibility for aggression-"resort to war" within the meaning of article
16 of the League Covenant-against the party failing to comply with provi-
sional measures ordered by the Council.18 4 The United Nations Charter, while
also expressly recognizing the relevancy of this factor, is less mechanical in its
terms. The Security Council is authorized, for the purpose of preventing "an
aggravation of the situation," to call upon the parties concerned to comply
with provisional measures, including not only "cease fires," truces, and armis-
tices but also arrangements for the withdrawal of armed forces from particu-
lar areas and the establishment of demilitarized zones, and to "take account
of failure to comply with such provisional measures."' 8 5 The 1950 General
Assembly resolution on the "Duties of States in the event of the Outbreak of
Hostilities"'"0 offers still further acknowledgment that attitudes toward com-
munity intervention may be of help in determinations of responsibility. The
resolution recommended that each participant promptly and publicly declare
its readiness, upon assurances of reciprocity, to "discontinue all military opera-
tions and withdraw all its military forces" that have entered the territory of
another; and provided that such a declaration, or a failure to make one, may
the most intense uses of nonmilitary instruments-may, under the same conditions of the
present world, amount to requiring a target state to be the sedentary fowl in an interna-
tional turkey-shoot.
183. Art. 10; LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. No. 24, at 136, 138-39
(1924). It may be noted that in the summary of "factors [which] may provide the ele-
ments of a just decision" about aggression drawn by a Special Committee of the Tem-
porary Mixed Commission For the Reduction of Armaments, there was included: "(e)
Refinal of either of the parties to withdraw their armed forces behind a line or lines
indicated by the Council." Commentary on the Definition of a Case of Aggression, LEAGUE
OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. No. 16, at 184-85 (1923). The formulation proffered
by Professor Wright in 1935 turned wholly upon this factor of refusal to accept an armis-
tice. Wright, The Concept of Aggression in International Law, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 373,
395 (1935). In 1957, he spoke of a "strong presumption" of lawfulness arising when a
state "has indicated willingness to accept a cease-fire order of a United Nations organ
. " Wright, The Legality of Intervention Under the United Nations Charter, 51
PROC. Amr. Soc'Y INT'L L. 79, 87 (1957).
184. Art. 5; LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. No. 93, at 242 (1931).
185. U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
186. Resolution No. 378 (V), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rzc. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20
(A/1775), at 12-13 (1950).
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"be taken into account in any determination of responsibility for the breach
of the peace or act of aggression in the case under consideration and in all
relevant proceedings before the appropriate organs of the United Nations."
The practices of both the Security Council and the General Assembly offer at
least a few instances in which failure to comply with provisional measures
appears to have been weighed in characterizing coercion as impermissible.
These include the condemnation of the attack by North Korea against the
Republic of Korea,8 7 the designation of the Peoples Republic of China as an
aggressor in Korea, 88 and the determination of the existence of a "threat to
the peace" in Palestine.5 9
The significance of relative willingness to accept community intervention is
principally derived from the indication it gives of the real as distinguished
from the ostensible objectives sought by a participant. Just as conduct sub-
sequent to agreement is commonly honored in principles of treaty interpreta-
tion, conduct subsequent to the initiation of coercion is relevant in gauging
the realistic subjectivities of the contending states. The special application of
this principle here is that a refusal to observe an order addressed to both par-
ties to cease using violence is inconsistent with a professed purpose merely to
maintain and defend one's own values. Conversely, a willingness to cease hos-
tilities is evidence of good faith and negates an imputed objective to expand
values by violent means. WIffhen a participant charged with unlawfully initiat-
ing coercion accepts and implements arrangements for cessation of hostilities,
it removes the necessity for defense expressly or tacitly pleaded by the oppos-
ing participant. Accordingly, if the latter rejects these arrangements, it tends
to show that the asserted necessity was unreal in the first place. Disregard of
provisional measures, however, does not offer conclusive indication of the un-
lawful character of a participant's objectives. The initial attacks may, in a par-
187. In its Resolution of June 25, 1950, the Security Council called "for the immedi-
ate cessation of hostilities" and called "upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw
forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel." U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, OFF. REc. 5th
year, No. 15, at 13-14 (1950). In its June 27, 1950, Resolution, the Council "noted . . .
that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their
armed forces to the 38th parallel .... ." Id. No. 16, at 4.
188. Resolution No. 498 (V), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. R.Ec. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20A
(A/1775/Add. 1) (1951). In this resolution, the Assembly noted "that the Central
People's Government of the People's Republic of China has not accepted United Nation,
proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful set-
tlement ......
189. Resolution of July 15, 1948; U.N. SEC. COUNCIL OFF. REC. 3d year, Supp. for
July at 76 (1948). The Council, in this resolution, "[took] into consideration that the
Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a pro-
longation of the truce in Palestine; that the states members of the Arab League have
rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator and of the Security Coun-
cil . . . for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine . . .," ordered a cease-fire, and
declared that "failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to comply
.. . would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of
Article 39 ......
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ticular situation, have created a serious imbalance of power or placed the target
state in a specially vulnerable strategic position with respect to the attacking
state, a position or imbalance which may be frozen by the imposition of a
"cease fire" or truce. Absent international armed forces able effectively and
decisively to aid the complying party in redressing such a disadvantage in the
event that hostilities are resumed, failure to comply promptly with provisional
measures called for by the organized community need not always be incom-
patible with perspectives of defense.' 90 Response to provisional measures must,
like all other factors, be appraised in conjunction with every other factor.
Expectations about Effectiveness of Decision
The final item in the constellation of relevant factors of which explicit men-
tion may be made is the state of expectations of decision-makers as to the
degree of conformity that probably can be secured to a particular demanded
decision. This factor, of special significance to officials of international securi-
ty organizations, is frequently a function of the officials' calculations of the
degree of common responsibility and the amount of effective power that realis-
tically can and will be organized to sustain a characterization of impermis-
sibility if one is made, as well as of their expectations about the probable
costs of an application, or nonapplication, of policy.19 That this factor does
in fact bear upon decisions to characterize or to refrain from characterizing
impermissible coercion 192 obviously reflects the still rudimentary degree of
effective organization which the general community of states has achieved and
the dependence of the organized community upon the bases of power made
available to it by member states.
PART II: THE CONCEPTION OF PERMISSIBLE COERCION
As indicated above, the conception of permissible coercion may usefully be
assigned a three-fold reference. First, there is a relatively low-level coercion
which is "normal" and perhaps ineradicable in the ordinary value processes
taking place across state boundaries and which includes all coercion not ac-
celerated to the levels of intensity and magnitude that signal impermissible
190. Cf. POMPE, AGGREssIVF WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRiNfE 96-97 (1953). See the
discussions preceding the adoption by the General Assembly of the Resolution on "Duties
of States Upon the Outbreak of Hostilities" (note 186 supra). U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF.
REC. 5th Sess., 1st Comm., 249-81 et passin (1950).
191. Some illustration is offered in McDougal & Feliciano, General Principles 807-08
nn.113-115. See also GOODRicH, THE UNITED NATIONS 164-68, 176-88 (1959).
192. It also bears upon the prospects of securing substantial consensus upon any
particular formulation of prohibited coercion. Among the arguments presented against
"defining aggression" was that "the international situation had placed greater emphasis
on the functions of conciliation .and mediation of the United Nations rather than on the
coercive function. Member states were reluctant to undertake collective military action
for fear of provoking a third world war." Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GEN.
Ass, OFF. REc. 12th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 54, at 3 (1957).
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coercion. Secondly, there is the coercion of relatively great scope and intensity,
including the most intense and extensive violence, that is exercised in neces-
sary response to and defense against impermissible coercion by others. Lastly,
there are police measures of varying degrees of comprehensiveness and in-
tensity applied by or under the authorization of the organized community
of states.
Admittedly, various specific acts encompassed in the first type of coercion,
"ordinary coercion," may constitute international wrongs other than aggres-
sion which legitimatize responses in the form of denying reciprocities and im-
posing retaliations other than destructive uses of the military instrument.
Such acts may contravene community prescriptions and policies other and
less fundamental than those concerned with the securing of minimal public
order and the promotion of peaceful modalities of international change, and
entail "legal consequences" differing from those we have detailed above. 1 3
193. In referring to such coercive acts as "permissible," we do so only in the sense
that they do not assume the intensity and dimensions requiring application of international
prescriptions about aggression and self-defence.We do not intend to suggest that such
coercive acts may not appropriately be characterized by an arbitral tribunal, for instance,
as unlawful, "tortious," or "internationally delinquent" acts in requiring, for instance,
financial indemnification, as to which, see, e.g., 1 SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
chs. 31-36 (3rd ed. 1957). Cf. the distinction well expressed in Fitzmaurice, The Founda-
tions of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement, 19 MODERN
L. REv. 1, 5 (1956) :
It is not against law-breaking as such that [U.N. Charter provisions] .. . are
directed, but against that particular type of law-breaking that takes the form of an
act of aggression or of commiting a breach of the peace. Now it is possible to
violate a large part of international law in all sorts of different ways, and to com-
mit breaches of treaties right and left, without ever having recourse to aggression
or breaking the peace or even threatening a breach of the peace.
It is also a source of confusion in relevant community policy that lesser deprivations
or minor interferences are sometimes assimilated to greater deprivations or major in-
terferences under labels as encompassing as "intervention." The literature frequently fails
to make indispensable distinctions. E.g.: the facts of state interaction are not distinguished
from the responses of established decision-makers in application of authority to such
interaction; among facts, beneficial interdetermination is not differentiated from detri-
mental interference (as benefit or detriment may be assessed by a third-party observer
or decision-maker) ; among detrimental interferences, major assaults upon indispensable
bases of power are not distinguished from minor injury to local pride and sensibility; and
among claimed lawful responses to injurious interference, unilateral reprisal for primarily
exclusive purposes is not differentiated from general community measures in support of
inclusive policies. See, e.g., GOULD, Ax INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 596-97,
ch. 19 passim (1957); THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION (1956) ; Lador-Lederer,
General Report on "Zenith and Decay of the Ddctrine of Non-Intervention of States in
the Internal Affairs of Other States," 59TH INTL CONG. ComP. LAW (Brussels, 1958).
The principles we consider in this essay are those designed to assist in identifying
the major deprivations and in clarifying the conditions under which coercive responses,
of differing institutional modality, may be appropriate with regard to community policy
for securing basic order. Comprehensive consideration and identification of all possible
types of lesser deprivation and of the remedies appropriate for them would take us be-
yond reasonable compass. It may suffice to register that we share the common view that
[Vol. 68:10571124
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We focus in subsequent discussion upon the second and third references of
permissible coercion.
The specific contexts of interstate conflict which may confront authoritative
decision-makers commonly include both measures of coercion and measures
of counter or opposing coercion. These processes of coercion and counter co-
ercion give rise to opposed claims that, on the one hand, the coercion applied is
unlawful, initiating coercion and that, on the other, the coercion is lawful self-
defense. When the respective contending participants are viewed in turn, each
may be seen commonly to assert both claims simultaneously: that its opponent
has unlawfully initiated coercion and that it is itself responding with coercion
in self-defense. Obviously, an external decision-maker must make coordinated
inquiry into and assessment of both the coercion claimed to be prohibited
aggression and the coercion claimed to be permissible defense. The theme of
complementarity is thus a dominant one manifesting itself both in the contra-
position of claims asserted in practice and in the necessities of rational analysis
by decision-makers.
Self-Defense Distinguishable From Other Exercises of Coercion
For clarity in thought, that coercion which is claimed to be in defense
against unlawful attack or threat against independence or territorial integrity
must be distinguished sharply from certain other types of asserted coercion
which differ greatly in modality, purpose, specific context, and relevant com-
munity policy but which also are frequently put forward under the name of
self-defense. The claims with which we are primarily concerned in this Article
are claims to exercise highly intense coercion in response to what is alleged to
be unlawfully initiated coercion. The other distinguishable types of assertions
include claims by one belligerent that it is lawful to apply coercion against a
nonparticipant state in response to or anticipation of some operation by the
opposing belligerent in the nonparticipant's territory. They also include
claims to exercise, for varying purposes, limited and occasional jurisdiction
over portions of the oceans and the superincumbent airspace.
Claims of Self-Defense
The first type--claims to employ highly intense coercion in defense against
allegedly impermissible coercion-may be conveniently subcategorized accord-
the prescriptions and policies embodied in the U.N. Charter forbid the unilateral use of
force and violence by way of reprisal for lesser wrongs or "tortious" conduct. See, e.g.,
BowET, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 13-14 (1958); BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 324-26 (5th ed. 1955); WValdock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by In-
dividual States in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 455, 493 (1952). The over-
whelming common interest in basic order, and the exorbitant potential costs of exercises
of force by contemporary weapons, would appear to counterbalance losses states may
occasionally incur from lesser wrongs left inadequately redressed because of deficiencies
in available remedial procedures or the limited ability of a poorly organized community
to create effective remedies for all wrongs.
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ing to the imminence and intensity of the coercion to which response is to be
made. Most conspicuous perhaps are claims to respond with force to intense
coercion that is immediate and current and that may be of varying degrees
of comprehensiveness and continuity. Such is the claim which a target state
makes when reacting violently to military blows initiated and delivered against
it; the United States' declaration of war following the attack by Japanese air
forces on Pearl Harbor is a familiar example.194 Claims to resort to force in
anticipation and prevention of intense coercion are only slightly less promin-
ent. The coercion anticipated may, in the expectations of the claimant, be of
varying degrees of imminence or remoteness. Claims have been made, for in-
stance, to initiate pre-emptive violence under allegedly high expectations of
imminent or impending military attack. Israel's claim that its invasion of
Egyptian territory in 1956 was defensive in character being, among other
things, in anticipation of an "all-out attempt to eliminate Israel by force"'10
presents one contemporary illustration. The notion of anticipatory defense
has at times been given extravagant unilateral interpretation by claimant
states. In the past, states have asserted claims to pre-empt and counter by
armed force not only imminently expected eruptions of military violence but
also more or less remote possibilities of attack. They have asserted, in other
words, the need to preclude a context of "conditions which, if allowed to de-
velop, might become in time a source of danger."'196 What states have in effect
claimed in these assertions, sometimes under an invocation of "self-preserva-
tion," is a competence forcibly to protect their values by forestalling processes
194. The U.S. declaration referred to "the Imperial Government of Japan [having]
committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United
States of America." 55 Stat. 795 (1941).
195. See the statements of the Israeli representative in the General Assembly. U.N.
GE. Ass. Or. REc. 1st Emer. Spec. Sess. 61 (1956). The "inherent right of self-
defense" was explicitly invoked by the same representative. Id. at 22-23.
196. FaNWicK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (3d ed. 1948). Claims of this type were
most prominent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and are of course to be viewed
in the context of the system of power balancing that prevailed in the Europe of those
eras. Such claims were frequently justified by the claimants in terms of maintenance
of equilibrium. The assumption was basic in such system of power balancing that con-
ditions which resulted in marked preponderance of power of one participant were con-
ditions of potential danger to all the other participants in the arena. See LISKA, INTER-
NATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM ch. 1 (1957); Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 AM,.
J. INT'L L. 514, 516-17 (1956). Secretary of State Elihu Root spoke of the struggle to
preserve the balance of power in Europe as depending upon the principle that affirms
"the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in
which it will be too late to protect itself." ROOT, The Real Monroe Doctrine, in ADDRESSE,;
ON INTERNATIONAL SuBJaEcTs 105, 111 (Bacon & Scott ed. 1916).
It need not be supposed, however, that such claims, or analogous ones, have entirely
departed from the international arena. See, for instance, the Soviet attempt to justify its
invasion of eastern Poland in 1939 on the basis, among others, of self-defense. Ginsburgs,
A Case Study in the Soviet Use of International Law: Eastern Poland in 1939, 52 A,1.
J. INT'L L. 69, 75-76 (1958). See also the claims made by Pakistan in connection with the
entry of Pakistani troops into Kashmir in 1948. U.N. SEc. COUNCIL OFF. RE(. 5th year,
464th meeting 1-40 passim (1950).
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which, they argue, may in the future develop into highly intense coercion or
violence. Hence they seek to strike while these processes still embody only
a low level of coercion.
Assertions of Coercion Against Third States
Claims by a belligerent to use force against a third state-a nonparticipant
in the original conflict-in order to prevent or counter some anticipated hos-
tile operation by the opposing belligerent in the territory of the third state,
have been made under differing words: "self-defense," "self-preservation,"
"right of necessity," "necessity in self-preservation" and so on. The force em-
ployed against the third state under these assertions has varied widely in in-
tensity, scope and continuity, from isolated acts to full-scale invasion and oc-
cupation of the third state's territory. The classic illustration of a single limit-
ed application of force was the seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807 by British
naval forces, following a severe bombardment of Copenhagen, to prevent ac-
quisition of the fleet by Napoleon. 197 A comparable instance arose in 1940
when the British destroyed the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir and Oran to
preclude capture of the fleet by German forces.'9 8 Assertion of more compre-
hensive claims of this type may be documented by reference to the German
invasions of Belgium in World War I and of Norway in World War II. In
1914, in its ultimatum demanding permission for German troops to march
through Belgium, Germany declared that it was "essential for [her] self-
defense that she should anticipate" what was alleged to be a French intention
to mount an attack through Belgian territory. 99 In 1946, it was contended by
the defense at Nuremberg that "Germany was compelled to attack Norway to
forestall an Allied invasion and [that] her action was therefore preventive. ' '2°°
Another comprehensive (though less extravagant) claim was the Anglo-Soviet
occupation of Iran in 1941 to prevent further German infiltration and "fifth
column" activities.2 0 1
Assertions of Temporary and Limited Authority on the High Seas
Claims of the third type, frequently asserted with an invocation of "self-
defense," or "self-protection," or "security," or "general security," compre-
197. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 326-28 (8th ed. Higgins 1924); Karlsrud, The
Seiure of the Danish Fleet, 1807, 32 Am. J. INT'L L. 280 (1938).
198. 1 OPPENHEIm-LAUTERPACHT 270-71; THE INITIAL TRIUMPH OF THE Axis,
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1939-1946, at 209-211 (Royal Institute of Int'l Af-
fairs 1958).
199. 2 GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 188-89 (1920).
200. OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF Axis CRIMINALITY,
NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, OPINION AND JUDGMENT 36 (1947). The same claim
was made with respect to the German invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg in 1940, both at Nuremberg, id. at 40, and at the commencement of the invasion,
THE INITIAL TRIUMPH OF THE Axis, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1939-1946, at
159 (Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs 1958).
201. See KIRx, THE 'MIDDLE EAST IN THE WAR, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1939-1946, at 129-41 (Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs 1952).
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hend a rich variety of particular claims to exercise limited or temporary and
episodic authority over certain events on the high seas and in the airspace
above the high seas. Of the specific claims of this type, some relate to the
maintenance and protection of the military security interests of the claimant
state: unilateral establishment of "Air Defense Identification Zones" extend-
ing hundreds of miles seaward; placement of radar warning platforms in con-
tiguous areas of the high seas; surveillance, visitation and search of vessels in
contiguous zone areas; establishment beyond territorial waters of "defensive
areas" in which navigation is limited or temporarily excluded; and temporary
exclusive use of high-seas areas for weapons testing and maneuvers. 02 Other
specific claims that relate to the protection of coastal interests other than mili-
tary security-claims for customs inspection, antismuggling controls, conser-
vation and exclusive exploitation of mineral and organic marine resources-
have also been frequently couched in the language of "self-defense" or "self-
protection" or "security. '20 3 These claims are of course supported by threats
of deprivation, as are all claims to state authority. But they constitute exer-
cises of coercion of such a relatively low level of intensity and magnitude as
frequently to be indistinguishable from the ordinary coercion inescapable in
a world of states interacting and competing for values. Further, they are
general in character in that they are commonly directed not against a particu-
lar target state defined as an enemy but rather against all other states.
Differences in Policy Issues
While the three broad types of claims are often made under the same or
similar verbal designations and while there may be some overlap between the
first and second types, the specific demands made commonly refer to different
activities moved by varying purposes, arising in varied contexts, and posing
greatly different issues of community policy. Indiscriminately to group the
several types of claims together and to subsume them under some single ver-
bal rubric such as "self-defense" or "necessity" or "self-preservation" may
tend only to conceal their disparity in activity, purpose, context and policy
and possibly to induce confusion.2 4
202. For detailed documentation and analysis of these claims, see McDougal & Schlei,
The Hydrogen Bcnb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J.
648, 666-82 (1955) ; McDougal & Burke, Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Per-
spectives Versus National Egoism, 67 YALE L.J. 539, 553-54, 563-64, 581-88 (1958).
See also the convenient listing of claims in Boggs, National Claims in Adjacent Seas,
41 GEOGRAPHICAL Rv. 185 (1951).
203. See Bowlr, SEF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 4 (1958); JEssur,
TnE LAW or TERRIToRIAL WATERS AND MARITIMsE JURISDICTION ch. 2 (1927); Memor-
andum on the Regime of the High Seas (Gidel), U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/32, at 45
(1950).
204. Subsumption of disparate things under a common rubric is observable not only
in the rhetoric of claims but also in some of the learned literature. See, e.g., CHENG,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES or LAW 29-102 (1953); HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 322-26 (8th
1128 [Vol. 68:1057
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In respect of claims to exercise highly intense coercion in response to pro-
hibited aggression, the fundamental community policy at stake is the common
interest of all the world's peoples in securing a minimum of public order. This
most basic policy seeks to preserve an existing distribution of values among
states against modification by destructive coercion and to that end permits
the unilateral use of force and other intense coercion only in necessary reac-
tion to coercive reconstruction. In the contemporary world, low expectations
as to the effective competence of the general organization of states to protect
individual members, among many other factors, make indispensable the per-
mission of some self-defense. Even in an arena with a much higher degree of
effective organization than the present world exhibits, self-defense must, if
experience in municipal arenas can be projected,20 5 still be regarded as an
emergency, interim authorization subsisting until the public force of the or-
ganized community is effectively brought to bear.
In contrast, the distinctive characteristic of the claims to apply coercion
against a third state is that coercion is claimed as permissible against a state
which has not attacked the claimant. Such claims, when they are something
more than veils for aggrandizement, are moved by the claimant's expectations
that certain hostile operations will imminently be carried on by its opponent in
the territory of the third state and that the third state will be unable or un-
willing to prevent those hostile operations. In short, the claimant seeks to
anticipate or counter such hostile conduct. The relevant context is not simply
one of the claimant-belligerent initiating coercion against the third state but
rather the broader one of continuing coercion between the claimant-belligerent
and the opposing belligerent. The claims against the third party are made in
the course of and as an incident in an on-going process of highly intense co-
ercion. The community policy most immediately involved is not merely that
emphasizing peaceful change; it extends to the limitation of the area of in-
volvement and limitation of the aggregate destruction of values. The problem
is that of accommodating the contraposed policies of securing military effec-
tiveness and of minimizing the disruption of the value processes of nonpartici-
pating states. The relevant prescriptions applicable to implement these policies
include not merely the prohibition of aggression and the permission of self-
defense, but also the rules on the rights and duties of belligerents and neu-
trals. 2 00 In view of these differences, we suggest that these claims-to the
ed. Pearce Higgins 1924); RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NEcEssITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1928) ; Weiden, Necessity in International Law, 24 TRANSACT. GROr. Soc'Y 105
(1938). Bowett attempts to establish a distinction, intra the third broad group of claims,
between "defense of [a state's] security" by exercise of "the right of self-defence upon
the high seas adjacent to its territory" on the one hand, and, on the other, "protection of
certain essential interests of the state" with respect to which "customary rights of a
jurisdictional character" may have developed; when the latter "customary rights" "exist,"
there is, in his view, no need to invoke the former. Bowrr, op. cit. mspra note 203, at 86.
205. See note 21 supra.
206. The specific rules directly relevant include those on the belligerents' duty to re-
spect and the neutral's duty to preserve the "inviolability" of neutral territory, waters,
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extent that the supporting expectations relating to imminent enemy operations
in the third state's territory and such third state's inability or unwillingness
to prevent those operations are determined to be genuine and reasonable-
are more appropriately considered under the second major problem of the
international law of coercion, that is, the regulation of participation in coer-
cion. If, of course, the claimant's expectations prove fictitious, the assertion
of force against the third state may, when the other detailed variables noted
earlier are considered, be characterized as a new, unlawful initiation of co-
ercion. Such is implicit in the Nuremberg Tribunal's rejection of the defense's
claim respecting Germany's invasion of Norway, as well as of Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg.20 7
The problems raised by claims to exercise limited or occasional jurisdiction
on the high seas and superjacent airspace are completely distinct from those
raised by the claims to respond to unlawful initiating coercion and to employ
corecion against a third state. Although often urged in the rhetoric of "self-
defense" or "self-protection," these claims to prescribe and apply authority
and airspace and those relating to the conversion of such territory, waters, and airspace
into permissible areas of hostile operations by the neutral's tolerance of or inability to
prevent their violation by one of the belligerents. See, e.g., CAsTREN, THE PRESENT
LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY 442-43, 462-63 (1953) ; HALL, op. cit. supra note 204, at
721-24; 2 OPPENHEIm-LAuTERPACHT 678-80; 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2337-39,
2340-41 (2d rev. ed. 1945) ; The Anna Maria, Case No. 174, ANNUAL DIGEST (1946);
Coenca Brothers v. German State, Case No. 389, ANNUAL DIGEST (1928-29).
It may be noted that after the German invasion of Belgium in World War I, Ger-
many sought to justify her actions in terms other than those of "self-defense," "self-
preservation" and "necessity." Charges were made that, before the delivery of the Ger-
man ultimatum, France had already violated Belgian neutrality with the consent of the
Belgian government. 2 GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 203-06
(1920). Similarly, the Allied occupation of Saloniki and other measures taken against
Greece when it was still a neutral in the same war were sought to be justified upon the
ground that Greek territory was long used as a source of supplies and a base of operations
by Germany with the approval of the Greek government. Id. at 254-55.
207. Although the evidence submitted at Nuremberg indicated that there had in
fact been an Allied plan to occupy harbors and airports in western Norway, it also
appeared that at the time of the German invasion of Norway, Germany did not know of
this Allied plan and in fact ruled it out as a serious possibility. As the Tribunal pointed
out, anticipation and preemption of an Allied landing was not, in point of fact, the pre-
cipitating purpose of the invasion of Norway which Germany had projected and pre-
pared long before the Allied Powers found it necessary to plan a landing. OFFInC OF
U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF Axis CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND
AGGRESSlON, OPINION AND JUDGMENT 35-38 (1947).
Similarly, with respect to the German invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxem-
bourg, the Allied Powers agreed, one month before such invasion, to "press for a pre-
ventive entry of their troops into Belgium." Belgium, however, rejected their demand
and publicly reiterated its determination to maintain its neutrality. The German decision
to attack the Low Countries had been taken, again, long before the Allies sought per-
mission for "preventive entry." Id. at 39-40; THE INITIAL TRIUMPH OF THE Axis, Sur-
VEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1939-1946, at 125-26, 155-58 (Royal Institute of Int'l
Affairs 1958).
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to certain events for many differing purposes, are commonly made not in
contexts of high level interstate coercion but in those phases of the persua-
sion-coercion continuum in which persuasion is still relatively dominant. The
general community policy here most directly at stake is not the maintenance
of world public order, in its minimal sense; it is, rather, the promotion of the
fullest, conserving, peaceful use of such great common resources as the oceans
by achieving the most economic balance possible between the special exclusive
demands of coastal states and other special claimants and the general inclusive
demands of the other members of the community of states.20 8 Authorized de-
cision-makers seek to secure this common interest by formulating and apply-
ing the bodies of authoritative myth commonly referred to as the "law of the
sea" and the "law of the air." These domains of doctrine and practice are
obviously distinct from, for instance, the prohibitions and permissions about
coercion established in the United Nations Charter. The type and range of
conditioning variables of which account must be taken in determining the
reasonableness (in detailed context) of, for example, a claim to a contiguous
zone, are very different from the kinds of variable factors that bear upon the
necessity and proportionality of an assertion of extensive violence in self-
defense. In fine, claims of jurisdiction and those of defensive violence have too
little in common to warrant their continued subsumption under a single
label.2 0
203. Amplification is offered in McDougal & Burke, supra note 202; McDougal &
Schlei, supra note 202. Cf. the formulation expressed in Memorandum (Gidel), supra
note 203, at 10. Compare Sorensen, Law of the Sea, IN'L CONC. No. 520, at 198-99
(1958), the force of whose criticism is impaired by failure to distinguish between differ-
ing levels of abstraction.
209. In McDougal & Schlei, supra note 202, at 674-88, 686, it was suggested that
the nuclear weapons tests by the United States off the Pacific atolls could be justified
both as reasonable measures in the interests of "security" and as "in substance a claim
to prepare for self-defense." (Emphasis added.) In so far as this suggestion depends
upon the traditional technical conception of "self-defense," it may be regarded as an
"over-kill." In conducting these tests, the United States was not employing the military
instrument against any opponent state. The United States was rather seeking to assert
merely a temporary, exclusive control or jurisdiction over a portion of a common, shared
resource, the Pacific Ocean. To establish the lawfulness of the United States' claim, it
is necessary only to establish its reasonableness by traditional criteria of the law of the
sea. This necessary "reasonableness," it was suggested, is primarily indicated by the deeply
vital importance of the tests to the security of the United States, and indeed of all free
peoples, as contrasted with the minimal and temporary interference with shared interests
in navigation and fishing. The same essential community policy of maintaining a basic
public order in which peoples are free from attack and threats of attack, underlies of
course both the broader concession of jurisdiction for "security" purposes, authorizing
lesser interferences with less fundamental interests of others and the narrower permis-
sion of "self-defense" authorizing the application of military force in response to major
and grievous threats; and comparable tests of necessity and proportionality, in sum of
"reasonableness," are relevant in applications of both concepts. The latter concept, that
of "self-defense," simply is not necessary, by Occam's razor, to sustain lesser interfer-
ences.
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SELP-DEFENSE
The Requirements of Self-Defense: Necessity and Proportionality
These preliminary distinctions make it possible now to focus more sharply
upon the class of claims with which we are immediately concerned-claims
to use highly intense coercion in defense against what is claimed to be im-
permissible initiating coercion. The principal requirements which the "cus-
tomary law" of self-defense makes prerequisite to the lawful assertion of these
claims are commonly summarized in terms of necessity and proportionality.
For the protection of the general community against extravagant claims, the
standard of required necessity has been habitually cast in language so ab-
stractly restrictive as almost, if read literally, to impose paralysis. Such is the
clear import of the classical peroration of Secretary of State Webster in the
Caroline case-that there must be shown a "necessity of self defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. 21 0
The requirement of proportionality which, as we shall develop below, is but
another application of the principle of economy in coercion, is frequently ex-
pressed in equally abstract terms. One example is M. de Brouckere's formula-
tion: "Legitimate defense implies the adoption of measures proportionate to
the seriousness of the attack and justified by the imminence of the danger."- 1'
There is, however, increasing recognition that the requirements of necessity
and proportionality as ancillary prescriptions (in slightly lower-order gen-
eralization) of the basic community policy prohibiting change by violence,
can ultimately be subjected only to that most comprehensive and fundamental
test of all law, reasonableness in particular context.21 2 What remains to be
stressed is that reasonableness in particular context does not mean arbitrari-
ness in decigion but in fact its exact opposite, the disciplined ascription of
policy import to varying factors in appraising their operational and functional
significance for community goals in given instances of coercion.
The Decision-Makers: Provisional Characterization and Subsequent
Review
The authoritative decision-makers whom community expectation estab-
lishes to pass upon coercion claimed to be in response to prior coercion from
others are of course the same decision-makers who assess the coercion which
210. Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, April 24, 1841, in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1840-1841). See generally Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases,
32 A-M. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938). Cf. Professor Wright's formulation: "[T]he plea of
defense will justify otherwise illegal action only if the action was taken to prevent an
immediately impending, irreparable injury and for that purpose alone." Wright, The
Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 Am. J. INT 'L L. 39, 54 (1933).
211. Report of de Brouck~re, supra note 170.
212. Cf. SCHWARZENERGER, REPORT ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-
DEFENCE IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE Topics COVERED BY THE
DUBROVNIK RESOLUTION 23 (Int'l Law Ass'n 1958).
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is alleged to be prohibited aggression. But the determination of whether the
coercion directed against a target state constitutes unlawful initiating coercion
and therefore justifies an assertion of responding coercion in self-defense is,
in the first instance, made by the target-state claimant itself. Competence to
make an initial and provisional determination without previous authorization
from the organized community must be conceded to the claimant pending the
completion of a much more viable world public order. "To wait," Professor
Brierly explained, "for authority to act from any outside body may mean
disaster."2 13 The recommendation of a distinguished scholar that even "a true
war of defense" should be permitted only as a "war of sanctions" by delega-
tion from and with the prior permission of the organized community 214 must,
despite the modern technology of communications, seem unreal and utopian.
The inevitable time-lag between initiation of highly intense coercion and ap-
propriate determination and authorization by the general security organiza-
tion, and the ever present possibility of the organization's failure to reach
any determination at all, make such a recommendation potentially disastrous
for defending states. The provisional characterization of the target state-its
assertion of a claim of self-defense--must, however, be subject to subsequent
appraisal by other, external, decision-makers, both international and national.
The statement that the acting state "alone is competent to decide whether
the circumstances require recourse to war in self defense '215 cannot be taken
literally without in effect repudiating fundamental community policy.216 Thus,
the general competence of both the Security Council and the General As-
sembly to characterize impermissible coercion necessarily implies that the par-
213. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 320 (5th ed. 1955).
214. VEHBERG, THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR 100-03 (Zeydel transl. 1931).
215. Identic Note of the Government of the United States, June 23, 1928. (Text in
MILLER, THE PEACE PACT OF PARIS 213-14 (1928).)
216. At the Tokyo Trial (as at Nuremberg) the defense relied on Secretary Kel-
logg's note in contending that, under the Pact of Paris: "(4) the nation resorting to
measures of self-defense was to be the sole judge on the question of self-defense, (5)
that the question of self-defense was not to be submitted to any tribunal, (6) that no
nation should have anything to do with deciding the question of self-defense regarding
the action of any other nation unless such action constituted an attack on itself." TACA-
YAIAGr, THE Torio TRIALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-37 (1948). The Tribunal re-
jected this argument, saying: "Under the most liberal interpretation of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, the right of self-defence does not confer upon the State resorting to war
the authority to make a final determination upon the justification for its action. Any
other interpretation would nullify the Pact; and this Tribunal does not believe that the
Powers in concluding the Pact intended to make an empty gesture." JUDGMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 68 (1948). See also 2
OPPENHEIm-LAUTERPACHT 187-88; LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 179-82 (1933); Wright, supra note 210, at 41-50. Professor
Brierly stressed that "the practice of states decisively rejects the view that a state need
only declare its own action to be defensive for that action to become defensive as a mat-
ter of law .... [I]t is clear that the defensive or non-defensive character of any state's
action is universally regarded as a question capable of determination by an objective
examination of the relevant facts." BRIm.Y, THE LAW OF NATIONS 320-21 (5th ed. 1955).
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ticipant claiming to exercise coercion in self-defense does so at its peril. The
same implication flows from article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which
requires that measures taken under claim of self-defense be immediately re-
ported to the Council and which explicitly reserves the "authority and re-
sponsibility" of the Council "to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
'217
The Appraisal of Alleged Defending Coercion
Inquiry into the factors that are relevant to an appraisal of coercion claimed
to be permissible self-defense parallels our earlier inquiry into factors that
rationally bear upon judgments about impermissible initiating coercion. Ac-
cordingly the same categories of variables, that is, participants, objectives,
methods, conditions and effects, are equally useful in this examination. Like-
wise, all the factors elicited in our analysis of initiating coercion are equally
relevant to the appraisal of coercion alleged to be lawful defense. The prin-
cipal emphasis here, however, must be upon the need of relating particular
factors to the requirements of necessity and proportionality.
The Characteristics of Participants
At the outset, there may arise the problem of identifying participant groups,
to whose mutual applications of coercion and violence the community policy
and prescriptions distinguishing between permissible and impermissible coer-
cion may appropriately be applicable. Allegations of impermissible coercion
and accompanying claims to use intense coercion in self-defense have been
made not only by officials of bodies politic universally recognized as nation-
states but also by officials of territorial communities and governmental or-
ganizations not formally recognized as states by their opponents and, at times,
by some members of the community of states as well. The Arab-Israeli con-
flict in Palestine in 1948 and the Korean war of 1950 afford familiar illus-
trations. The Jewish Agency for Palestine, even before issuing the proclama-
tion on establishing an independent state of Israel, raised a charge of aggres-
sion against Trans-Jordan and Egypt before the United Nations Security
Council and, at least inferentially, claimed a right to self-defense. 218 The Arab
states refused to recognize Israel as a state and indeed asserted that, with
the termination of the British Mandate, Palestine had become an independent
nation in which the Jews constituted a rebellious minority.219 In the Korean
conflict, neither of the initial participants-the Republic of Korea and the
21.7. See JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONs 165 (1948).
218. See the letter of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the President of the Securi-
ty Council, May 14, 1948, and the statements of the representative of the Jewish Agency,
U.N. SEC. CouNCIl. OFr. REc. 3d year, No. 66, 292d meeting 2, 4-7 (1948).
219. 'See, e.g., the statements of the representative of the Arab Higher Committee,
id. at 7-9, and the statements of the Egyptian delegate, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL OFF. RF.
3d year, No. 68, 294-295th meetings 5, 8-9 (1948).
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North Korean Peoples' Republic-recognized the other as a state. The Soviet
Union argued to the United Nations that the exercise of violence in Korea
could not be characterized as unlawful coercion since the conflict was an in-
ternal or civil one and the Charter prescriptions are not applicable to coer-
cion between two groups within a single state.2 0 The decisions reached by
the United Nations in the Palestine and Korean cases 221 suggest that con-
flicts involving a newly organized territorial body politic, or conflicts between
two distinct territorial units which the community expects to be relatively
permanent, are, for purposes of policy about coercion, to be treated as con-
flicts between established states. Thus, the applicability of basic community
policy about minimal public order in the world arena and competence to de-
fend against unlawful violence are not dependent upon formal recognition of
the technical statehood of the claimant-group by the opposing participant. 222
This conclusion is but an obvious corollary of effective community policy; a
contrary view would permit the thrust of fundamental policy to be avoided
by the simple device of refusing to perform a ceremonial ritual. It is not the
ceremony of recognition by others that constitutes a group an effective, self-
directed, territorially organized community, but the facts of the world power
process.
The Nature of Clainiants' Objectives
The objectives of the participant claiming self-defense may best be ex-
amined in terms of the same factors found useful for inquiry into the objec-
tives of the participant claimed to have unlawfully initiated coercion: exten-
sion or conservation, degree of consequentiality, and the degree of inclusivity
or exclusivity. The first two factors may require some additional discussion.
Limitation of Permissible Conservation
Characterization of the real objectives of the claimant in terms of exten-
sion or conservation is most directly related to the requirements of permis-
sible self-defense. The very conception of self-defense implies that the purpose
220. U.N. SEC. COUNCIL OFF. REc. 5th year, No. 24, 482d meeting 6-10 (1950). See the
answering arguments made by the United Kingdom representative, id. No. 28, 486th
meeting 4-6 (1950).
221. As to the Palestine case, see the Resolutions of May 22, 1948, U.N. SEc. COUN-
cIL OFF. REc 3d year, Supp. for May 97 (1948), and of July 15, 1948, id. Supp. for
July 76 (1948). As to the Korean case, see note 187 supra.
222. For indication of the complexities of policy relating to internal strife within
bodies politic, see note 164 supra.
Our emphasis here is merely that rational community policy must be directed to the
coercive interactions of territorially organized communities of consequential size, what-
ever the "lawfulness" of their origin and whatever the prior niceties in the presence or
absence of the ceremony of recognition. This necessity appears acknowledged in measure
even in the older doctrines of "belligerence" and "insurgency." See, e.g., LAuTERPACHT,
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947).
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of the defender is to conserve its values rather than to extend them through
acquiring or destroying values held by the opposing participant. Conservation,
as the legitimate objective of self-defense, is commonly referred to by com-
mentators in such terms as "stopping or preventing 223 or repelling "any
imminent or present invasion of the rights [of the defender]. ' 224 Such con-
fining language is doubtless intended to induce restraint in the assertion of
claims to self-defense. 2 5 Nonetheless, a rational appraisal of particular pur-
poses must depend upon a consideration of all relevant conditioning factors
in particular detailed contexts, including especially the condition of necessity
which impelled the response in coercion. Permissible objectives of self-defense
against massive military attack and invasion, for instance, need not necessarily
be limited to stopping and repelling or pushing back invading enemy troops
to their own side of the frontier; realistically, the necessity to which the tar-
get-claimant is responding may not, in the circumstances of a particular case,
be wholly terminated merely by repulsion of the enemy invasion, and may
reasonably require counter-invasion of the enemy's own territory.20
The problem of clarifying the permissible limits of conservation as the only
legitimate objective of self-defense may perhaps be put in sharper focus by
referring to the objectives of the Allied (United Nations) Powers in World
War II. Allied objectives, as formulated and developed in the course of the
prolonged struggle, were not limited to physically stopping or repelling the
aggressive violence exercised by the Axis Powers.2 27 Prominent among these
purposes was the comprehensive, long-term aim of preventing any recurrence
of aggression by Germany and Japan. This aim was sought by imposing upon
the entire territory of the enemy states what might be called "therapeutic"
occupation-occupation designed to permit the modification and reconstruction
of certain basic enemy political, economic, social and legal institutions, the
reorientation of mass and elite perspectives, the removal or limitation of
223. Waldock, The Regulation, of the Use of Force by Individual States in Interza-
tional Law, 81 HAGUE REcUBiL 455, 464 (1952).
224. Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 HAGUE
RECUEIL 195, 335 (1955).
225. "[T]here is a natural temptation, when force has been resorted to, to continue
its use after the needs of defence have been fairly met." BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONs
316 (5th ed. 1955).
226. Cf. Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87
HAGUE RECUML 195, 334 (1955). The factual question, from the perspective of an in-
dependent observer, is whether the repulsion of the enemy invasion, together with cal-
culations as to the probable costs of mounting another attack, have effectively modified
the expectation and demand structure of the enemy elite. The question would in measure
depend upon the comprehensiveness of and the value assigned by such elite to their orig-
inal objectives.
227. 'See generally 1 WAP AND PEACE Arms OF THE UNITED NATIONS-SEPTEMBER
1, 1939-DECEMBER 31, 1942 (Holborn ed. 1943); 2 id. JANUARY 1, 1943-SEPTEmBER I,
1945 (1948).
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enemy potential for war, and so forth.22 8 From the perspective of prediction,
perhaps this and other objectives of comparable degrees of comprehensiveness
will not present a serious problem of legal policy if certain conditions of power
are secured in the future. Such conditions include at the minimum, first, the
achievement and maintenance of a rough equilibrium between the polar
powers in capacity for delivering as well as in vulnerability to annihilating
thermonuclear destruction; second, the recognition by both powers of their
common interest in keeping coercion below a ruinous level of destruction; and
third, the constant awareness by the powers of the close relation that prospects
of limiting violence bear to limitation of the moving purposes of violence.2 29
To the extent, in other words, that the hope that only limited war may take
place is realism, the deliberate postulation and prosecution, by defending as
well as by attacking states, of objectives as comprehensive as those of the
Allied powers may become unlikely. From perspectives of preference, com-
petence to pursue and implement an objective of ensuring against recurrence
of aggression in the more or less remote future by "therapeutic" reconstruc-
tion of the institutions and fundamental demand and identification patterns
of the defeated aggressor more appropriately belongs to the organized com-
munity of states. Such measures should be exercisable only by, or under an
unambiguous authorization from, the entire community, rather than impliedly
included in the permission of self-defense.23 0 A restrictive definition of the
scope of permissible conservation that excludes this and similar "pedagogic" '23 '
objectives accords both with the Charter's conception of self-defense as an
interim and emergency authorization, and with the imperatives of limiting the
dimensions of violence. The viability of such definition, we are aware, depends
upon the degree of effective, centralized organization secured in the arena,
228. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH & ASSOCIATES, AMERICAN EXPERIENCES IN MILITARY Gov-
ERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II chs. 1-2, 12 (1948) ; Loewenstein, Law and the Legislative
Process in Occupied Gernmany, 57 YALE L.J. 724 (1948) ; Loewenstein, Reconstruction
of the Administration of Justice in Anwrican-Occupied Germany, 61 HARV. L. REv. 419
(1948) ; Plischke, Denazification Law and Procedure, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 807 (1947) ;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 2671, FAR EASTERN SERIES, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN:
POLICY AND PROGRESS 17 (1946).
229. The principal reference here is to the conditions of so-called "mutual deter-
rence" and "limited war." See McDougal & Feliciano, General Principles 797, 813-14.
See also APPADORAI, THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 19-20 (1958).
230. In respect of the comprehensive Allied objectives of reconstruction in the last
world war, it is relevant to point to the observation made by Dr. Yokota: "[T]he very
fact that the 51 allied nations opposing the Axis in the last war, represented the over-
whelming majority of all the nations of the world, may be considered as the imposition
of an ultimate sanction by the international community." Yokota, War as an Interna-
tional Crine, in FOUNDAMENTAL [sic] PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, FESTSCHRIFT
FOR JEAN SPIRoPouLos 453, 458 (1957).
231. The term is borrowed from KEcsKEmETi, STRATEGIC SURRENDER: THE POLITICS
OF VICTORY AND DEFEAT 239 (1958). Mr. Kecskemeti makes able inquiry into some as-
pects of the problem of limitation of objectives.
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and upon the degree of success achieved in establishing and maintaining the
supporting arrangements of power.
Consequentiality of Values Conserved
Characterization of the particular objectives of a claimant as conservation
rather than extension need not be conclusive as to the lawfulness of the co-
ercion exercised; such objectives must also, among other relevant considera-
tions, be appraised for the degree of consequentiality of the values sought to
be protected and conserved. The values which states have on occasion sought
to conserve and protect present a wide spectrum in degree of consequentiality;
they range from the most trifling to the most fundamental. In this connection,
certain propositions, derived by distinguished scholars as inferences from the
judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel (Merits)
case,232 appear to confuse the milder coercion unavoidable in the relation of
states with intense attacks upon independence and territorial integrity. In the
view of Professor Waldock, the court held, among other things, that:
[A] threat and, indeed, use of force-the demonstration of naval force
in Albania's territorial waters-is not contrary to Article 2(4) when it
is in affirmation of rights which have been illegally and forcibly denied..23 3
More recently, Dr. Schwarzenberger has written:
[The] case appears to suggest three propositions regarding the inter-
pretation of Paragraph 4 of Article 2 and Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations:
(1) The exercise of a right for the purpose of testing whether it is
threatened by armed attack, and in such strength as to discourage the
repetition of such an attack or its prompt repulsion is not an illegal threat
under Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
More specifically, it does not deprive a passage through an international
strait of its innocent character.
(3) If it is legal to take precautionary measures of the kind discussed,
it must be compatible with the international quasi-order of the United
Nations to take armed action in self defense against any actual armed
interference with the enjoyment of rights under international law.2 3 4
These generalizations, as Dr. Schwarzenberger concedes, rest on the assump-
tion that articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter were applicable to the situation
presented by the passage of British warships through the channel on October
22, 1946, and are derived wholly from the failure of the court to charac-
terize their passage as violative of article 2(4). It is difficult to find much
basis in the judgment for this assumption and derivation, since neither article
232. [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 5.
233. Waldock, supra note 223, at 500.
234. SCHWARZENBERGER, REPORT ON SomE ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DE-
FENCE IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE Topics COVERED BY THE
DUBROVNIK RESOLUTION 24 (Int'l Law Ass'n 1958). (Emphasis added.)
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2(4) nor article 51 was mentioned by the court, and the plea of self-defense
was never raised by the United Kingdom as a justification for the passage
of its warships on October 22, 1946.23" 5 The complete silence of the court on
this matter is, at the very least, ambiguous. It is equally explainable by the
contrary assumption-that the court did not regard article 2 (4) and the per-
mission of self-defense as bearing upon the particular case. The issues raised
and conclusions reached by the court in the Corfu case seem too narrowly
drawn to support, by process of necessary implication, the inferences urged.
The extrapolations under discussion appear open to yet more fundamental
objections. To the extent that they seem to suggest, for failure of appropriate
qualification, that the enjoyment of any "right under international law," with-
out regard for any other factor such as the consequentiality of the "right"
involved, may be "affirmed" or defended by the employment of force, the
formulations submitted by Dr. Schwarzenberger 236 and Professor Waldock
come perilously close to emasculating the basic community policy on minimum
public order. The need for imposing limits on the kind and character of
"rights" or values that may legitimately be defended by highly intense coer-
cion must seem obvious. The denial, even by "actual armed interference," of
inconsequential or trivial "rights" or value claims warrants proper reciproci-
ties, retaliations and remedies other than high-level coercion. It is not neces-
sary to invoke self-defense to sustain ordinary reciprocities and retaliations
against such tortious conduct of another state, in other words, in contexts in
which the level of coercion falls far short of highly intense and destructive at-
tack upon fundamental and indispensable values. If, as we suggest, the permis-
sion of self-defense is most appropriately conceived as a permission to exercise
destructive coercion, a requirement of a certain degree of consequentiality in
the values sought to be conserved by such coercion is a substantial, if implied,
effect of the combined principles of necessity and proportionality.
235. The pleas of "self-defence and self-redress" and of "self-help" were made by
the United Kingdom agent with respect to the sweeping of the Channel on November
12-13, 1946 ("Operation Retail"). See 2 CORFU CHANNEL CASE--PFADINGS, ORAL
ARGuMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS 280-84 (I.C.J. 1950) ; 3 id. at 293-97; 4 id. at 572-92. The
pleas were rejected by the Court. The passage of October 22, 1946, was sought to be
justified by the U.K. agent not in terms of "self-defence" or "self-help" but as being
"fully within the right of innocent passage." 3 id. at 293. See also 2 id. at 301. It may
also be noted that the specific right involved was the right of innocent passage by war-
ships and that such a right can neither be exercised in the first instance nor subsequently
"affirmed" without instrumentalities of force, i.e., warships, being used.
236. Dr. Schwarzenberger had previously written that: "This prerequisite [that the
need must be overwhelming] limits self defence to action in protection of vital, or at
least important, rights or interests and precludes such action in cases of merely formal
or trivial breaches of international law." Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles
of International Law, 87 HAGUE RECUEIL 195, 333 (1955). (Emphasis added.) Barely
five pages later, however, he also wrote that "The [Corfu] Judgment clarifies beyond
doubt that the prohibition of the use of force in Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter
does not preclude action in self defence, as distinct from self help at large, against the
forcible denial of any right." Id. at 339. (Emphasis added.)
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The conception of requisite consequentiality can be assigned functional
references only in particular contexts. On one level of abstraction, there would
generally be no necessity for highly intense coercion-nor could such coercion
be characterized as proportionate--except in response to an unambiguous and
imminent threat or present imposition of severe deprivations of values so im-
portant that their loss or destruction will substantially impair the function-
ing of the territorially organized community or preclude its continued exist-
ence as a distinct polity. On another level of abstraction, a finding that ap-
propriate standards of consequentiality have been met may be most easily
reached when the claimant shows the particular "rights" or values or interests
threatened or attacked to be indispensable components of its "territorial in-
tegrity" or "political independence." As our discussion of impermissible co-
ercion indicated, the primary reference of the words "territorial integrity"
and "political independence" is to the more important bases of community
power. These bases are comprised of a community's continuing, comprehen-
sive control over its geographical base and physical resources, over its people,
and over its institutions. This control over institutions extents to both the in-
tegrity and continuity of the community's internal arrangements of authority
and effective power and its freedom of self-direction and self-commitment in
customary interaction with other communities. In considering the reasonable-
ness of asserted expectations about the serious impact of a threat or depriva-
tion of particular values upon a claimant's "territorial integrity" or "political
independence," the territorial location of the values affected may have an ob-
vious relevance. If a threat or an actual deprivation is directed, for instance,
against the person or property of a stray national or two in some distant land,
it would seem most unlikely, even if carried out by violence, to have any appre-
ciable effect upon the fundamental bases of power of the home state.2 37 But if,
on the other hand, the values threatened or attacked are located within the
community's territorial base, a strong presumption that fundamental power
bases are significantly affected may be appropriate. There seems, in gross il-
lustration, an evident distinction between the sinking of a small boat in some
internal river of China 238 and the destruction of eight battleships in Pearl
Harbor. We do not, of course, mean to suggest that geographical situs has
anything like conclusive significance.23 9 What we suggest is that the relation
of the particular value or interest affected to the essential bases of community
power is a capital aspect of consequentiality, and physical location of the value
or interest may be one index to that relationship.
237. Cf. BowETr, SELF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (1958).
238. E.g., the sinking of the U.S.S. Panay on the Yangtze River by Japanese air-
craft. See 15 BULL. OF INT'L NEws 9 (1938).
239. Thus the relevance of geographical location may be relatively minimal in cases
of attack upon a state's strategic military bases situated in third countries. For an ex-
ploration of the importance of overseas bases for the military security of the United
States under present power conditions and current strategic doctrines, see Hoopes, Over-
seas Bases in American Strategy, 37 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 69 (1958).
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The Modalities of Response
The methods the claimant of self-defense employs in exercising coercion
may, like those employed by the participant charged with having initiated
unlawful aggression, comprise any one or all-in combinations and sequences
of varying emphases-of the policy instrumentalities familiarly categorized as
diplomacy, mass communication, control over goods and services, and armed
force. Here again the relevance of modality lies principally in its utility as
a crude and prima facie indicator of the general level of intensity reached by
the coercion claimed to be in self-defense and, in equally rough evaluation,
of the proportionality or disproportionality of the allegedly responsive coer-
cion when measured against the necessity created by the initial coercion.240
Military violence is of course easily distinguishable from nonmilitary coercion;
the distinction is, in terms of susceptibility to direct or optical observation,
similar to the popular sub-distinction between "conventional" arms and "nu-
clear" weapons. But, in the regulation of resort to coercion just as in regula-
tion of the conduct of combat, rational policy is and must be primarily con-
cerned not with modality as such but with the effects of coercion, the level
of intensity and scope, actually obtained in particular contexts. Appraisal of
the level of coercion exercised in specific contexts and of the degree of pro-
portionality exhibited is not rationally limited to application of a single-factor
test of modality.
Conditions and the Expectation of Necessity
Inquiry may next be directed to the conditions under which coercion
claimed to be in self-defense is exercised. The conditions we noted as relevant
for scrutinizing allegedly unlawful coercion, conditions including both the
general elements pervasive in power processes in the world arena and certain
particular conditions of more direct significance, are, again, of equal relevance
for reviewing assertions of self-defense. The most important condition that
must be investigated is the degree of necessity-as that necessity is perceived
240. As to the possible function of modality as a quick index of intensity, cf. Nl'zE,
SYMMETRIY AND INTENSITY OF GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT IN LIMITED WARS, MILITARY
POLICY PAPERS 55 (Wash. Center of Foreign Policy Research 1958):
[T]he means actually employed can be roughly graded as to intensity. One can
start with normal diplomatic and political support; go on to more intense advice
and propaganda support; to the furnishing of economic and military supplies and
the active training of personnel; to manpower support in gradations from volun-
tcers to participation by satellites or allies on to direct and open military participa-
tion by the great power itself; and the military participation by the major power
can be graded from air and sea support to direct participation by all services; the
weapons used by the supporting forces can be conventional, tactical atomic, or
without restriction; the geographic area subject to hostilities can be expanded by
gradations to any given approximation to a global conflict. The possible grada-
tions and combinations of gradations do not fall neatly on a linear scale of in-
tensity. It is, however, generally meaningful to say that one set of means involves
a greater intensity of major power intervention than some other set of means.
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and evaluated by the target-claimant and incorporated in the pattern of its
expectations-which, in the particular instance, impels the claim to use in-
tense responding coercion.241 All other conditions must be assessed for their
bearing upon this fundamental condition of necessity. Since necessity is gen-
erated by and represents the total impact of the opposing participant's appli-
cation of coercion upon the claimant's expectations about the costs of con-
serving and protecting its values, an appraisal of the condition of necessity
must involve an estimate of the entire coercion applied by the opposing par-
ticipant. The most comprehensive specification of functional indices of neces-
sity must logically include all the factors we have detailed for considering
coercion alleged to be prohibited aggression. The relative size and power of
the participant charged, the nature and consequentiality of its objectives, the
character of its internal institutional structures, the kind of world public order
it demands, the intensity and magnitude of the coercion applied, its expecta-
tions about effective community intervention, all are relevant. The tight com-
plementarity of the conceptions of permissible and impermissible coercion and
the interdependence of the factors comprising a detailed context may once
again be underscored.
The Exacting Standard of Customary Law. The structure of traditional pre-
scription has established a standard of justifying necessity commonly referred
to in exacting terms. A high degree of necessity-a "great and immediate"
necessity,242 "direct and immediate," 243 "compelling and instant" 244-was
prerequisite to a characterization of coercion as "legitimate self-defense."
Necessity that assumed the shape of an actual and current application of vio-
lence presented little difficulty. It was of course the purpose of high require-
ments of necessity to contain and restrict the assertion of claims to apply
pre-emptive violence, that is when the necessity pleaded consisted of alleged
expectations of an attack which had yet actually to erupt. In the Caroline
241. What must, in other words, be ascertained and appraised by a third-party de-
cision-maker are the claimant's perceptions and evaluations that culminated in assertion
of the claim. It has been emphasized in Sprout & Sprout, Environmental Factors in the
Study of International Politics, 1 J. OF CONFLICr RESOLUTION 309, 319 (1957) that
"what matters in policy-making is how the milieu appears to the policy-maker, not how
it appears to some sideline analyst or how it might appear to a hypothetical omniscient
observer." Id. at 324: "If the problem is to explain or to predict a policy decision, the
analyst has to answer such questions as: What environmental factors (or aspects of the
situation) did the decision-maker [claimant] recognize and consider to be significant?
What use did he make of his environmental knowledge in defining what was to be at-
tempted and the means to be employed?"
For an antithetical perspective, see Schwarzenberger, The Principle of Self-Defcice
in International Judicial Practice, in ESTUDIOS DE DEREcHO INTERNACIONAL 213, 216
(Universidad de Santiago de Compostela 1958), referring to "putative self-defence."
242. 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 300 (1904).
243. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (2d ed. 1897).
244. Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 HAGUE
REcURIL 195, 334 (1955).
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case, it will be recalled, the British claim with which Secretary of State Web-
ster was confronted was an assertion of anticipatory defense..2 45 There is a
whole continuum of degrees of imminence or remoteness in future time, from
the most imminent to the most remote, which, in the expectations of the
claimant of self-defense, may characterize an expected attack. Decision-makers
sought to limit lawful anticipatory defense by projecting a customary require-
ment that the expected attack exhibit so high a degree of imminence as to
preclude effective resort by the intended victim to nonviolent modalities of
response.
One illustration of the application of the customary-law standard of neces-
sity for anticipatory defense is offered in the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East in respect of the war waged by Japan
against the Netherlands. Japan contended that "inasmuch as the Netherlands
took the initiative in declaring war on Japan, the war which followed [could]
not be described as a war of aggression by Japan. '246 The Netherlands de-
clared war on Japan on December 8, 1941, before the actual invasion of the
Netherlands East Indies by Japanese troops and before the issuance of the
Japanese declaration of war against the Netherlands, both of which took place
on January 11, 1942. The evidence showed, however, that as early as No-
vember 5, 1941, the Imperial General Headquarters had issued to the Japa-
nese Navy operational orders for the attacks upon the Netherlands East
Indies, as well as the Philippines and British Malaya,247 and that on Decem-
ber 1, 1941, an Imperial Conference had formally decided that Japan would
"open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the Nether-
lands."2 48 The Tribunal held that the Netherlands, "being fully apprised of
the imminence of the attack," had declared war against Japan "in self de-
fense. -2 4 1 Similarly, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in
rejecting a defense argument that the German invasion of Norway was "pre-
ventive" in character and designed to anticipate an Allied landing in Norway,
pointed out that the German plans for invasion were not in fact made to fore-
stall an "imminent" Allied landing, and that, at best, such plans could only
prevent an Allied occupation "at some future time. '250 The documentary
evidence submitted to the Tribunal did indicate that there was a "definite"
Allied plan to occupy harbors and airports in Norway. The Tribunal found,
however, that the expectations of Germany at the time of launching the in-
vasion did not as a matter of fact include a belief that Britain was about to
land troops in Norway.2- 1
245. Note 210 supra.
246. JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 994
(1948).
247. Id. at 964-66.
248. Id. at 976-78.
249. Id. at 995.
250. OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF Axis CRIMINALITY,
NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, OPINION AND JUDGMENT 37 (1947).
251. See note 207 supra.
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M'aintenance of Custonzary-Law Standard in the U.N. Charter. It is
against the background of the high degree of necessity required in traditional
prescription that article 51 of the United Nations Charter should be con-
sidered. Article 51 states in full:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of in-
dividual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Meas-
ures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self defense shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
There has been considerable contention about the impact of this article upon
the standard of required necessity projected in the customary law of self-
defense. Some scholars have taken the view that article 51 demands an even
higher degree of necessity than customary law for the characterization of co-
ercion as permissible defense, that it limits justifying necessity to an "armed
attack" as distinguished both from an expected attack of whatever degree of
imminence and from applications of nonmilitary types of intense coercion, and
that it absolutely forbids any anticipatory self-defense. For instance, Professor
Kunz, insisting that article 51 provides a "clear and unambiguous text,"
wrote, in characteristic exegesis:
[F]or this right [of self-defense under article 51] does not exist against
any form of aggression which does not constitute "armed attack." Second-
ly, this term means something that has taken place. Article 51 prohibits
"preventive war." The "threat of aggression" does not justify self-defense
under Article 51. Now in municipal law self-defense is justified against
an actual danger, but it is sufficient that the danger is imminent. The
"imminent" armed attack does not suffice under Article 51.252
Most recently, Dr. Nini6 has argued from the canon exceptiones sunt strictis-
sinmae interpretationis that:
[T]his means that nothing less than an armed attack shall constitute an
act-condition for the exercise of the right of self-defense within the mean-
ing of Article 51 (i.e. "subversion" and . . . "ideological" or "economic
aggression" does not warrant armed action on the basis of Article 51).
It further stipulates that the armed attack must precede the exercise of
the right of self-defense, that only an armed attack which has actually
materialized, which has "occurred" shall warrant a resort to self-defense.
This clearly and explicitly rules out the permissibility of any "anticipa-
tory" exercise of the right of self-defense, i.e. resort to armed force "in
anticipation of an armed attack. 20 3
252. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, 41 Am. J. INT'I L. 872, 878 (1947).
253. Reply from Dr. Nin6i6, in SCHWARZENBERGER, REPORT ON SOME AsrEcrs oF
THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENCE IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
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The major difficulties with this reading of what appears to be an inept piece
of draftsmanship are two-fold. In the first place, neither article 51 nor any
other word formula can have, apart from context, any single "clear and un-
ambiguous" or "popular, natural and ordinary" meaning that predetermines
decision in infinitely varying particular controversies. 254 The task of treaty
interpretation, especially the interpretation of constitutional documents de-
vised, as was the United Nations Charter, for the developing future, is not
one of discovering and extracting from isolated words some mystical pre-
existent, reified meaning but rather one of giving that meaning to both words
and acts, in total context, which is required by the principal, general purposes
and demands projected by the parties to the agreement.255 For determining
these major purposes and demands, a rational process of interpretation per-
mits recourse to all available indices of shared expectation,- including, in par-
ticular, that which Professor Kunz casually de-emphasized, 256 the preparatory
work on the agreement. Such a process of interpretation would, moreover,
seek to bring within the attention frame of the interpreter and applier not just
one element of a context suggested by one rule or principle of interpretation,
such as that upon which Dr. Nini6 relied, but all the relevant variable factors
of a particular context. It is of common record in the preparatory work on
the Charter that article 51 was not drafted for the purpose of deliberately
narrowing the customary-law permission of self-defense against a current or
imminent unlawful attack by raising the required degree of necessity. The
Topics COVERED BY THE DUBROVNIK RESOLUTION 69 (Int'l Law Ass'n 1958). (Emphasis
in the original.) Professor Kunz and Dr. Nin~iE have not been alone in their position
on this matter. See KELsEzN, THE LAW OF THE UNImD NATIONS 797-98 (1950) ; MAR-
TIN, COLLECTIVE SECuRITY 169 (1952); 2 OPPENHEIm-LAuTERPACHT 156; Tucker, The
Interpretation of War Under Present Interzational Law, 4 INTI'L L.Q. 11, 29-30 (1951).
254. Of the numerous eloquent exposures of the fundamental flaw of such a view, it
suffices to quote Pollux, The Interpretation of the Charter, 23 BRIT. YD. INT'L L. 54, 67
(1946):
It does not seem very helpful to state that "the ordinary methods of interpreta-
tion" shall be used in order to determine the "clear" meaning, "the plain terms,"
the "natural," "grammatical," "logical," "categorical," or "ordinary" meaning of
one or more words. These terms beg the question for two reasons. In the first
place, there may be words which have no such fixed meaning, and secondly, words
may be used in a sense quite different from the usual one. Moreover, the fore-
going expressions are not really at all informative. In practice they usually veil
the process whereby a person, a court, or another body reaches a certain conclu-
sion which inclines them to regard a particular meaning as the natural and plain
meaning of a given word.
255. Some development of this general point is offered in McDougal & Gardner,
The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258 (1951).
See also HUDSON, THE PERMIANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTIcE 1920-1942, at
641-45 (1943) ; 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1468-72 (2d rev. ed. 1945); Harvard Re-
search in International Law, The Law of Treaties, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 937-71
(1935); Stone, Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation--A Study in the Interna-
tional Judicial Process, 1. SYDNEY L. REV. 344 (1955).
256. Supra note 252, at 873.
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moving purpose was, rather, to accommodate regional security organizations
(most specifically -the Inter-American system envisioned by the Act of Chapul-
tepec) within the Charter's scheme of centralized, global collective security,
and to preserve the functioning of these regional systems from the frustration
of vetoes cast in the Security Council.257 Further, in the process of formulat-
ing the prohibition of unilateral coercion contained in article 2(4), it was
made quite clear at San Francisco that the traditional permission of self-de-
fense was not intended to be abridged and attenuated 'but, on the contrary, to
be reserved and maintained. Committee 1/I stressed in its report,2 5 8 which
was approved by both Commission I and the Plenary Conference, 25 9 that "The
unilateral use of force or similar coercive measures is not authorized or ad-
mitted. The use of arms in legitimate self defense remains admitted and un-
impaired."
More comprehensively considered, the principle of restrictive interpretation,
of which exceptiones sunt strictissimae interpretationis is but one variant, may,
with at least equal cogency, be invoked against the position Dr. Nin6i6 has
taken. "Legitimate self-defense," encompassing anticipatory defense, has long
been honored in traditional authoritative myth as one of the fundamental
"rights of sovereign states." In accordance with one variant of the principle
of restrictive interpretation, limitations or derogations from sovereign com-
petence are not lightly to be assumed.2 60 The view urged by Nin6i6 pro-
257. See 12 U.N.C.I.O. 680-82; 11 id. 52-59. See also, e.g., BowET, 'SELF DEFENCE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 182-84 (1958); GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 297-99 (2d rev. ed. 1949); RUSSELL & MATHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 'CHARTER 688-704 (1958) ; Bebr, Regional Organizations: A United Nations
Problem, 49 Aa!. J. INT'L L. 166 (1955) ; Lleras Camargo, El Sistema Regional Ameri-
cano, 1 REVISTA COLOMBIANO DE DER cHO INTERNACIONAL NO. 2, at 5 (1947). Professor
Kunz himself was quite familiar with the purpose that lay behind article 51. See Kunz,
supra note 252, at 872-73; Kunz, The Inter-American System and the United Nations
Organization, 39 Am. J. INT'L L. 758 (1.945).
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, it may also be recalled, contained no provision at
all on self-defense. At Dumbarton Oaks, in connection with a question raised by China
as to who was to determine whether a state claiming self-defense was using force con-
sistently with the purpose and principles of the projected organization, "it was agreed
that the Charter could not deny the inherent right of self-defense against aggression...."
RUSSELL & MATHER, op. cit. supra at 465-66. See also id. at 599.
258. Report of Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I, as adopted by Com-
mittee 1/I, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 446, 459.
259. See Verbatim Minutes of Fifth Meeting of Commission 1, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 202,
204; Report of Rapporteur of Commission I to Plenary Session, id. at 245, 247. For the
approval of this Report by the Plenary Conference, see Verbatim Minutes of the Ninth
Plenary Session, 1 id. at 612, 620.
260. 'On the principles of restrictive interpretation, see, e.g., the North Atlantic Coast
Fisheries Case, in BRIGGS, THE LAw OF NATIONS 313, 315 (2d ed. 1952); FIORE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW CODIFIED 345 (Borchard transl. 1918); HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 394-
95 (8th ed. Pearce Higgins 1924) ; 2 PHILLImORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 110, 111-13 (3d ed. 1882) ; Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT.
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ceeds from the hypothesis that self-defense is an "exception" whose recog-
nition tends to nullify the "general rule" of prohibition of coercion and which
must therefore be confined within the narrowest of limits. Even apart from
the essential complementarity of prohibited and permissible coercion to which
we have so very often adverted, the permission of self-defense embodied in
customary prescription cannot of itself, if appropriately applied, render in-
effective or illusive either the fundamental community policy against change
by destructive coercion projected in the Charter, or the peace-maintaining
functions of the United Nations. As noted above, customary prescription has
always required a high degree of necessity-specifically, in the case of an
anticipated attack, a high degree of imminence-to support the lawfulness of
intense responding coercion. One index of the required condition of necessity
is precisely the degree of opportunity for effective recourse to nonviolent
modes of response and adjustment, including invocation of the collective con-
ciliation functions of the United Nations. Furthermore, permitting defense
against an imminently expected attack does not, any more than permitting
defense against an actual current attack, impair or dilute the "authority and
responsibility" of the organized community "to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security."'26 1 Whether the events that precipitate the claim
YB. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1956). Sir Gerald attaches a curious label on this principle--"sub-
sidiary interpretative finding."
In most comprehensive and accurate formulation, the principle of restrictive inter-
pretation is a full complement of the principle of effectiveness, or interpretation by major
purposes. Each principle serves merely to weight certain features of the process of agree-
ment, as bases of inference of the shared expectations of the parties, for the guidance of
decision-makers, and both principles are designed to preserve the integrity of the agree-
ment-making process as an instrument by which states may securely project policies as
to their future interrelations. The principle of effectiveness is a positive formulation that,
when unfolding events inevitably lay bare contradictions, gaps, and omissions in the
reference of an agreement, such deficiencies must be remedied by an interpretation best
designed to promote the more general, essential purposes of the parties. The principle
of restrictive interpretation is a negative formulation that the clarification of contradic-
tions, completion of gaps, and resolution of ambiguities should not be carried beyond what
is absolutely necessary to implementation of major purposes and should not be extended
to imposing new purposes and unnecessary detailed obligations upon the parties.
For determining the shared expectations of the parties with respect to article 51 of
the United Nations Charter, the tvo principles, or formulations, fortunately reinforce
each other in indicating a single conclusion. It is scarcely conceivable, as developed in
our text, that the major "security" purposes of the parties to the Charter could in con-
temporary conditions be adequately, if at all, served by an interpretation which would
reduce "self-defense" to assumption of the posture of the sitting duck. Similarly, to re-
quire the parties to the Charter to give up their traditional right of self-defense for so
illusory a return would certainly be to impose upon them deprivations nowhere clearly
stipulated by the records of the Charter, and, in conformity with a policy of protecting
the integrity of agreements, should not be done.
261. U.N. CHARTm art. 51. Professor Kunz and Dr. Nin6i6 are in effect purporting
to discover in article 51 words not written there in printer's ink. They interpret the
phrase "if an armed attack occurs" as if it read "if, and only if, an armed attack occurs."
A proposition that "if A, then B" is not equivalent to, and does not necessarily imply,
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of self-defense constitute an actual, current attack or an imminently impending
attack, the claim remains subject to the reviewing authority of the organized
community. Finally, the continuing refusal of most of the members of the
United Nations to accept the Soviet or Litvinov-Politis type of definition of
aggression appears significant. If the members did concur in the narrow con-
struction of article 51, if their demands and expectations were that the justi-
fying conditions of necessity for self-defense should be and have been limited
to an "armed attack" and that responding coercion must in all circumstances
be postponed until unlawful coercion has exploded into destructive violence,
then the Soviet first-shot test of aggression would have been embraced, it
might be supposed, as a matter of course.2 62
The second major difficulty with a narrow reading of article 51 is that it
requires a serious underestimation of the potentialities both of the newer
military weapons system and of the contemporary techniques of nonmilitary
coercion. If, in scholarly interpretation of authoritative myth, any operational
reference is seriously intended to be made to realistically expected practice
and decision, an attempt to limit permissible defense to that against an actual
"armed attack," when increases in the capacity of modem weapons systems
for velocity and destruction are reported almost daily in the front pages of
newspapers, reflects a surpassing optimism. In these circumstances, "to cut
down," Professor Waldock suggests forcefully, "the customary right of self
defense beyond even the Caroline doctrine does not make sense ... ,-, 3
the proposition that "if, and only if, A, then B." To read one proposition for the other,
or to imply the latter from the former, may be the result of a policy choice, conscious
or otherwise, or of innocent reliance upon the question-begging latinism inclusio unis
est exclusio alterus; such identification or implication is assuredly not a compulsion of
logic. If a policy choice is in fact made, it should be so articulated as to permit its as-
sessment.
262. That acceptance of the construction of article 51 objected to above would logi-
cally require adoption of the Soviet first-shot definition of aggression was made clear
by the Soviet representatives to the U.N. committees in defining aggression. See, e.g.,
the statement of the Ukrainian SSR delegate that "the negative reference to the right
of self-defense in operative paragraph 1 [of the draft definition submitted by Iran and
Panama] did not stress the point that defensive measures were only permitted after an
act armed attack [sic] had been committed by the opposing party. The draft resolution
of Iran and Panama thus obscured the essence of Article 51 of the Charter, while the
Soviet proposal was the perfect complement of that Article." U.N. GEar. Ass. OFF. REc.
12th Sess., 6th Comm. 59 (1957).
263. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in Inter-
national Law, 81 HAGUE REcUEL 455, 498 (1952).
This indicates a major difficulty in the position taken in Tucker, Force and Forcign
Policy, 47 YALE REV. 374 (1958). Professor Tucker would compel policy makers to
choose between deference to "standards set by the United Nations Charter" and the
achievement of "American security" and "preservation of Western interests." Id. at 379.
He assumes the wholly unnecessary view that what the U.N. Charter prescribes is the
excessively narrow construction of article 51, id. at 375, and proceeds to describe such
a "doctrine" as "divorced from political reality," id. at 380. There are other dichotomies
drawn by Professor Tucker-such as "national interests" and "international standards,"
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For illustration of the tergiversations and curious distinctions that become
necessary in any attempt to accommodate the position insisted upon by, inter
alia, Professor Kunz and Dr. Nin&i6, with the actualities and potentialities of
the contemporary technology of violence, reference may be made to the recom-
mendations of M. Singh.2 64 While vigorously stressing that "the sole condition
on which the right [of self-defense] can be exercised is restricted to an armed
attack, '2 5 M. Singh, recognizing at the same time that "in nuclear warfare
time is of the very essence, 2 60 proposes a conception of "armed attack" that
would permit the target state to respond with violence at some time before
an attack is actually delivered or physically felt in its territorial domain. He
writes:
[I]f the provisions of Article 51 are carefully examined, it would ap-
pear that what is necessary to invoke the right of self defense is an
armed attack and not the actual, physical violation of the territories of
the State. . . . [A]s long as it can be proved that the aggressor State
with the definite intention of launching an armed attack on a victim
member-State has pulled the trigger and thereby taken the last proximate
act on its side which is necessary for the commission of the offense of
an armed attack, the requirements of Article 51 may be said to have been
fulfilled even though physical violation of the territories by the armed
forces may as yet have not taken place.2 67
Thus, M. Singh illustrates, submarines known to the target state "as a result
of secret intelligence" to be about to undertake a nuclear attack may be at-
tacked and destroyed "as soon as," but not before, they leave the territorial
waters of the aggressor state. Similarly, the moment an initiating state has
allowed its aircraft "to take off" and its guided missiles "to be shot," such
instrumentalities of attack may be "repelled" by the target state. The justi-
fication offered is in terms of a locus poenitentiae admitted by "the general
principles of law":
• . . before the submarine fleet had left territorial waters, there was the
possibility of the aggressor state changing its mind and hence it may be
premature to attack the fleet while still within the territorial limits of
the aggressor state.268
It is not difficult to achieve the impression that these lines between "attack"
and "actual preparation for the mounting of the attack" are largely unreal
and arbitrary. On the one hand, imaginary boundaries on the sea and in the
"renunciation of force" and "international order," "security" and "survival," "justice"
and "order"-which others may find difficult to make with the same confidence. For a
presentation somewhat more concerned with community perspectives of authority, see his
earlier article, The Interpretation of War Under Present International Law, 4 INT'L
L.Q. 11 (1951).
264. Singh, The Right of Self-Defence in Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons,
5 INDIAN YB. OF INT'L AFFAIRS 3 (1956).
265. Id. at 24.
266. Id. at 24-25. See also id. at 18.
267. Id. at 25.
268. Id. at 26.
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air have no necessary realistic relation to the limits of a hypothetical locus
poenitentiae. On the other hand, considering the state and potentialities of
modern telecommunications and guidance systems, there may in fact be no
"last irrevocable act"-in respect of the instrumentalities M. Singh referred
to: submarines, aircraft and guided missiles-short of dropping or exploding
a nuclear weapon. Thus, the whole tenor and effect of consistently requiring
a "last irrevocable act" would seem to be to compel the target state to defer
its reaction until it would no longer be possible to repel an attack and avoid
damage to itself. In case of delivery by ballistic (as distinguished from
guided) missiles, whose trajectory is traversed in a matter of minutes and
against which effective repulsion measures have yet to be devised, it should
be even clearer that to require postponement of response until after the "last
irrevocable act" is in effect to reduce self-defense to the possible infliction,
if enough defenders survive, of retaliatory damage upon the enemy. It is pre-
cisely this probable effect that gives to the narrowly restrictive construction
of article 51, when appraised for future application, a strong air of romantic-
ism.
In particular connection with exercises emphasizing nonmilitary forms of
attack, we have suggested that, in many contexts, the use of political, eco-
nomic and ideological instrumentalities may indeed result in no more than a
modest degree of coercion, a degree which may constitute part of the ordinary
coercion implicit in the power and other value processes in the world arena.
To say, however, that article 51 limits the appropriate precipitating event for
lawful self-defense to an "armed attack" is in effect to suppose that in no
possible context can applications of nonmilitary types of coercion (where
armed force is kept to a background role) take on efficacy, intensity and pro-
portions comparable to those of an "armed attack" and thus present an anal-
ogous condition of necessity. Apart from the extreme difficulty of establishing
realistic factual bases for that supposition, the conclusion places too great a
strain upon the single secondary factor of modality-military violence. A
rational appraisal of necessity demands much more than simple ascertainment
of the modality of the initiating coercion. The expectations which the contend-
ing participants create in each other are a function not only of the simple fact
that the military instrument has or has not been overtly used but also of the
degree and kind of use to which all other instrumentalities of policy are be-
ing put. What must be assessed is the cumulative impact of all the means of
coercion utilized; policy-oriented analysis must be configurative analysis. The
kind, intensity and dimension of political, economic or ideological pressure
applied may, through this analysis, serve in some contexts as relevant indices
of the imminence or remoteness of an allegedly expected armed attack.
Effects and the Proportionality of Responding Coercion
We turn, finally, to appraisal of the effects of coercion claimed to be in
self-defense. The principal reference here is to the degree of intensity and
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scope exhibited in this coercion-factors long-recognized to be of special
relevance in judgments about the lawfulness of particular claims to self-de-
fense. It is primarily in terms of its magnitude and intensity-the consequen-
tiality of its effects-that alleged responding coercion must be examined for
its "proportionality." "Proportionality" which, like "necessity," is customarily
established as a prerequisite for characterizing coercion as lawful defense, is
sometimes described in terms of a required relation between the alleged ini-
tiating coercion and the supposed responding coercion: the (quantum of)
responding coercion must, in rough approximation, be reasonably related or
comparable to the (quantum of) initiating coercion.2 69 It is useful to make
completely explicit that concealed in this shorthand formulation of the re-
quirement of proportionality are references to both the permissible objectives
of self-defense and the condition of necessity that evoked the response in co-
ercion. Proportionality in coercion constitutes a requirement that responding
coercion be limited in intensity and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary
promptly to secure the permissible objectives of self-defense .2 " For present
269. See, e.g., the formulation in the report of de Brouckere quoted in text accom-
panying note 211 supra. Weightman, Self-Defense in International Law, 37 VA. L. REv.
1095, 1097 (1951), summarizing the conclusions of Giraud, La Theorie de la Legitini
Defense, 49 HAGvE REcUEIm 691 (1934), and JExxs, THE CommoN LAW OF MANKIND
141-43 (1958), observe that proportionality is a common requirement of self-defense in
municipal systems. See also Sancho Izquierdo, La Guerra Defensiva y la Doctrina de
la Legitinia Defensa, in 3 LA GuramuA MODEaNA 29, 41, 51-53 (Universidad de Zaragoza
1956).
Kunz, Individual and Collective Self Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947), made the astonishing statement
that "If 'armed attack' means illegal armed attack it means, on the other hand, any illegal
armed attack, even a small border incident; necessity or proportionality are no con-
ditions for the exercise of self-defense under Art. 51." This of course reduces funda-
mental community policy to nonexistence. To say, further, that even a few shots across
a border gives rise to a right of self-defense, while maintaining that the most imminent
threat of massive violence does not, is to make an absolutistic fetish of certain irrelevant
aspects of modality.
270. This mode of formulating the proportionality principle, which would relate the
response directly to legitimate objectives of defense rather than mediately to the stimulus
of initiating coercion, may acquire new significance should contemporary possibilities of
achieving instrumentalities of coercion that would incapacitate without killing, maiming,
or otherwise producing permanent incapacity, be realized. The possibility of securing such
instruments in the form, for instance, of a "P-bomb" (paralysis bomb) or a "P-beam"
(paralyzing beam), as one approach to the "problem of harmonizing considerations of
humanity with the use of whatever coercion cannot be avoided," was referred to in
Lasswell, The Political Science of Scienwe: An Inquiry into the Possible Reconciliation
of Mastery and Freedom, 50 Am. PoL Sca. REv. 961, 968 (1956). More recently, the
U.S. Army is reported to have "held out the hope" that chemical and biological agents
with such capabilities "could prevent small wars or help win nearly bloodless victories
in a big conflict." Among the items specifically mentioned are means of producing tem-
porary blindness, a "debilitating disease" "that would not kill but would leave enemies
listless," and "psycho-chemicals" that would induce temporary "irrational behaviour"
(such as trying to "fly across a room"). N.Y. Times, May 10, 1958, p. 10, col. 3.
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purposes, these objectives may be most comprehensively generalized as the
conserving of important values by compelling the opposing participant to ter-
minate the condition which necessitates responsive coercion. Put a little dif-
ferently, the objective is to cause the initiating participant to diminish its co-
ercion to the more tolerable levels of "ordinary coercion." This is the import
of Secretary of State Webster's somewhat cryptic statement that "nothing
unreasonable or excessive [must be done], since the act, justified by the
necessity of self defense, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly
within it."'271 Thus articulated, the principle of proportionality is seen as but
one specific form of the more general principle of economy in coercion 27 2 and
as a logical corollary of the fundamental community policy against change by
destructive modes. Coercion that is grossly in excess of what, in a particular
context, may be reasonably required for conservation of values against a par-
ticular attack, or that is obviously irrelevant or unrelated to this purpose, it-
self constitutes an unlawful initiation of coercive or violent change.
From this perspective, it should be evident that an appropriate appraisal
of the magnitude and intensity of an exercise of self-defense for its propor-
tionality-a determination, in other words, of the amount of coercion reason-
ably necessary in a particular instance for achieving the lawful purpose of
self-defense-requires functional reference to all the various factors relating
to the opponent's allegedly aggressive coercion as well as to all the other
factors relating to the claimant's coercion, which together comprise a detailed
context. More particularly, the determination of proportionality is not, as is
sometimes suggested, necessarily exhausted by ascertaining the qualitative
similarity or dissimilarity of the weapons employed by one and the other
contending participant. It has been urged, for instance, that a lawful defense
against an attack executed with "conventional" weapons may not utilize "un-
conventional" or nuclear weapons; the use of nuclear arms, the argument
271. Note 210 supra.
272. Some amplification of this principle may be found in McDougal & Feliciano,
General Principles 796-98. As a reading of the literature there referred to will indicate,
the conception of proportionality or economy in coercion has acquired increased signifi-
cance as recognition of the difficulties of keeping violence limited has grown. The con-
ception, put in one form or another, appears to underlie many of the current theories of
"graduated deterrence" and "limited war" strategies. It is perhaps most conspicuous in
proposals on "proportional" or "measured deterrence" which envisage almost mechanical
equilibration of response and attack, for example, response by delivering the same number
of bombs on the attacker's cities as that detonated by the attacker on the replier's cities.
See Amster, Design for Deterrenwe, 12 BulL. OF ATomic SCIENTISTS 164 (1956) ; Sher-
win, Securing Peace Through Military Technology, id. at 159. The soundness of ex-
clusive reliance upon a theory of "massive deterrence," i.e., where deterrence from any
initial act is sought to be effected by the very disproportion of the promised reaction,
under present power conditions, has been insistently questioned. See, e.g., Nitze, Syn,-
inetry and Intensity of Great Power Involvenzet in Limited Wars, in MiLiTARY POLICY
PAPERS 55 (Wash. Center for Foreign Policy Research 1958). Compare Kaplan, The
Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence, 1 WORLD POLITICS 20 (1958).
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runs, would be a disproportionate and excessive reaction.2 73 We have re-
peatedly indicated that modality may be useful as quick index to intensity and
scope. But, as we have just as frequently suggested, modality is no more than
a prima facie rule of thumb which cannot dispense with more detailed inquiry
into the consequentiality of coercion, and which must be taken in conjunction
with all other relevant variable factors. Thus, in particular respect of the
"conventional-nuclear" dichotomy, it would, we suggest, be an extremely
hazardous prediction to say (as M. Singh appears in effect to be saying) that
in no possible set of events will an authorized decision-maker regard the use
of nuclear weapons-the "yield" of which, it should be recalled, is subject to
control and may vary enormously-as reasonably necessary to stop and turn
back an attack initiated with "conventional" weapons. It is perhaps symp-
tomatic that M. Singh himself would concede one "possible exception": when
the target state, "facing certain defeat, with a view to upholding the law and
to prevent the aggressor from becoming victorious, after giving full trial to
permissible weapons, uses prohibited nuclear weapons as a last resort against
the law-breaker. '27 4
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
The permission of collective self-defense recognized in article 51 of the
United Nations Charter has, in the context of continuing conflict between
the major demanded systems of world public order and of consequently low
expectations about the reliability of effective intervention by the organized
community, acquired special prominence and importance. That importance, of
course, flows from the faculty afforded by article 51 of taking collective action
in defense against initiating coercion without need of securing prior authori-
zation from the general security organization. The last decade or so has seen
the proliferation of regional defense arrangements or organizations which has
culminated in the emergence of two principal sets of opposing, mutually ex-
clusive, agreements that impart, in substantial effect, formal expression to
the contemporary phenomena of systemic conflict and of polarizing power in
the world arena. There are, on the one hand, the agreements among Western
and Western-oriented states, such as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance of 1947, the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty
of 1949, the Pacific Security (ANZUS) Treaty of 1951, and the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty of 1954.275 On the other hand, there are the
273. Singh, The Right of Self-Defence in Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons,
5 INDIAN YB. OF INTL AFFAIRS 3, 32-34 (1956). Cf. the statement of the Indian repre-
sentative in U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rzc. 12th Sess., 6th Comm. 54 (1957): "If the use
of atomic weapons was declared illegal, even in self-defence, any state which used them
to defend itself against an attack using conventional weapons would become an aggres-
sor. It was a general principle that self-defence must be legitimate and must be propor-
tionate to the attack."
274. Singh, supra note 273, at 33.
275. See note 12 supra. The text of the Brussels Treaty may be found in 43 Am. J.
INT'L L. Supr,. 59 (1949). See generally ROYAL INSTrUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
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Warsaw Treaty of 1955 between the Soviet Union and her protected states,276
the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of 1950 between
the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China,2 77 and the network of
bilateral treaties of the Soviet Union with Bulgaria,2 7 8 Roumania,2 79 Hun-
gary 2, 0 and Finland,28 1 and of the protected Eastern European states inter
se.2 82 In addition to these major groupings, -there is the Joint Defense and
Economic Cooperation Treaty of 1950 between the members of the Arab
League.2 8 3 These regional arrangements or organizations together embrace a
very substantial number of the countries of the world that have any power
capability. Some scholars have eloquently deplored that "the right to collective
self defense has been used to emasculate the world organization in favor of
regional organization" 214 and that "collective self defense" and "collective
security" are poles apart, "as distant from each other as order is from
chaos." 28 5 These lamentations appear to assume that only that security is col-
lective which is also universal and to ignore that not the permission of col-
lective self-defense but the rising power and the dynamics of totalitarian world
orders have imperiled the aspiration for universal security. The real point of
the development of regional defense arrangements and organization is the
increased recognition that, the facts of contemporary international life being
what they are, defense must be collective if it is not to be an exercise in in-
dividual suicide.
Establishment of a collective defense organization represents a claim to
prepare for collective defense. Objection to treaties establishing such organi-
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: NATO'S ROLE IN THE FREE WORLD (1952); ROYAL INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, CoLLEcrvE DEFENSE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE MANILA
TREATY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (1956).
276. 49 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 194 (1955).
277. 44 Am,. J. INT'L L. Suoy. 84 (1950).
278. 48 U.N.T.S. 142 (1950).
279. 48 U.N.T.S. 196 (1950).
280. 48 U.N.T.S. 170 (1950).
281. 48 U.N.T.S. 156 (1950).
282. 1 U.S. DEBT. OF STATE, DOCUMENTS AND STATE PAPERS 238-49 (1948); id. at
681 (1949). On the Soviet network of treaties generally, see Kulski, The Soviet System
of Collective Security Compared with the Western System, 44 Am. J. INT'L L. 453
(1950) ; Schapiro, The Post War Treaties of the Soviet Union, 4 YB. OF WORLD ArFAms
130 (1950); Yakobson, World Security and Regional Arrangements-Soviet Position,
44 PRoc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 15 (1950).
283. 49 Am. J. INT'L L. Sure. 51 (1955).
284. LEVI, FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION 84 (1950).
285. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 264 (1954). See also
Wolfers, Collective Security and the War in Korea, 43 YALE REV. 481 (1954), where
the assertion is made that the action taken in Korea was "collective self-defense" rather
than "collective security," at least on the part of the United States, upon the theory that
the United States had vital "national interests" in taking the action it did. For Dr.
Wolfers, no concerted action may appropriately be described as "collective security"
unless the members participating "actually chose the long run advantage at the expense
of immediate security." Id. at 485.
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zations has, in the past, been made upon the ground that the permission of
self-defense, whether individual or collective, is available only at the precise
moment of "armed attack," and that apprehension of attack does not justify
military preparations.286 It is not necessary to take this objection seriously;
the permission of self-defense, particularly under the conditions posed by the
present technology and techniques of coercion, must be quite meaningless if
read to exclude "peacetime" preparatory arrangements to meet coercion.
Claims to the actual exercise of coercion in collective self-defense are of more
important concern to the present inquiry. Review and appraisal of the law-
fulness of these claims present no special or unique intellectual difficulties.
Exactly the same kind of multiple-factor analysis we have recommended for
passing upon coercion claimed to be in individual self-defense seems necessary
for making judgments about coercion avowed to be in group self-defense, and
all the categories of detailed factors relevant for the one are in general relevant
for the other. It remains necessary, however, to deal with a few objections to
the entire concept of collective self-defense and, in so doing, to examine cer-
tain factors that relate peculiarly to claims of group defense.
The deprecatory attitude toward collective self-defense begins with a strong
preoccupation with a dogmatic conception limited to the defense of single,
territorially-organized polities like those which broke away from feudalism
several centuries ago. This preoccupation is evident in Professor Kelsen's
analysis:
[Self-defense] is a right of the attacked or threatened individual or state,
and of no other individual or state. Article 51 confers the right to use
force not only upon the attacked state but also upon other states which
unite with the attacked state in order to assist it in its defense. This is
probably the meaning of the term "collective self defense." If so, the
term "collective self defense" is not quite correct. It is certainly collec-
tive "defense," but not collective "self"-defense .... [T]he action on the
part of the states which are not attacked, but only assist the attacked
state against its aggressor, is not exactly self-defense. 287
The strictures of Professor Stone are comparable:
[U]nder general international law, a State has no right of "self-defense"
in respect of an armed attack upon a third state. The very notion of
collective self-defense seems contradictory, except as resorted to by two
or more victims simultaneously attacked by the same Power.288
The most recent detailed statement on collective self-defense is built upon the
same limited conception. The "essence" of collective self-defense "properly
termed," Dr. Bowett writes, is "that the participants base their action on a
286. See the statement issued by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January
29, 1949, asserting the nonconformity of the North Atlantic Treaty with the U.N.
Charter. 3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 400-06 (1949). See also Schick, The North
Atlantic Treaty and the Problem of Peace, 62 JURIDIcAL REV. 26, 49 (1950).
287. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 792 (1950).
288. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 245 (1954).
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violation of their own legally protected rights or interests."2 8 9 Upon this
premise, Dr. Bowett submits that:
[T]he situation which the Charter envisages by the term is ... a situa-
tion in which each participating state bases its participation in collective
action on its own right of self-defense. It does not, therefore, generally
extend the right of self-defense to any state which desires to associate
itself in the defense of a state acting in self-defense. 290
The intervening state which has no legal right in the security of the
actual victim, which has not itself the right of self-defense, must justify
its action as being in the nature of a sanction; it is not self-defense, in-
dividual or collective.2
91
The most fundamental difficulties in these formulations are two-fold. The
first lies in the implicit or explicit assumption that only single nation-states
are authorized to claim self-defense, that, in other words, the "self" which
may be defended is simply, as indicated, that of the particular form of body-
politic inherited from the decay of feudalism. That assumption leads almost
inevitably to a misconception of the core problem-identification of the "self"
which may lawfully claim to exercise defending coercion. A claim of collective
self-defense arises whenever a number of traditional bodies-politic asserting
certain common demands for security as well as common expectations that
such security can be achieved only by larger cooperative efforts, and purport-
ing to define their respective identification structures so as to create a com-
mon overlap and interlock, confront an opponent and present themselves to
the rest of the general community as one unified group or collectivity for pur-
poses of security and defense.2 92 Each member of the group in effect asserts,
singly and in combination, defense of the new and more comprehensive "self."
The question is whether the comprehensive group or collective "self" pro-
jected for purposes of security should be accepted by authorized decision-
makers and be entitled to lawful defense. In view of the power processes
existing in the world arena, a group "self" that comprehends several tradi-
tional territorial polities need no more be dismissed as a "legal fiction" than
a "self" consisting of only one such polity. It can indeed be dismissed as a
"legal fiction" only if the prior, question-begging assumption is made that
the individual "self" of a particular nation-state is a constant for all purposes
and may alone be protected and maintained by lawful coercion. The identifi-
cations which human beings make, the "self" systems which they establish
for many different purposes, may be of many differing degrees of geographical
289. BowETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 206 (1958).
290. Id. at 216.
291. Id. at 217.
292. Cf. the formulation of the "general rationale behind collective defense" in King,
Collective Defense: The Military Commitment, in MILITARY POLICY PAPERs 25, 28
(Wash. Center of Foreign Policy Research 1958). See also Haas, Regional Integration
and National Policy, INT'L CoNc. No. 513 (1957).
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range and scope ;293 the territorial state, as we know it today, is only one
such system for certain particular purposes. Groupings of states, regional or
functional, constituted in many varied degrees of organization and integration,
are familiarly recognized as authorized participants for equally varied pur-
poses in many authority processes. 294 There is no compelling reason why they
may not or should not be recognized as authorized units of claim and par-
ticipation for the most important purpose of all, defense and security. If the
provision for collective self-defense in the United Nations Charter has any
point, it is the recognition that, in particular contexts, an unlawful attack
upon one component of a group may, in its objectives, dimensions and prob-
able effects, so involve and endanger the whole as to make prompt response
by the group necessary, meet and reasonable. Community authority joins, we
submit, with realistic observation in recognizing that the "self" systems by
and on behalf of which claims to exercise defending coercion may be reason-
ably asserted may exhibit differing measures of comprehensiveness. These
systems range from the primary "self" of a single state, through a more com-
prehensive group "self" established by two or a few states, to the most in-
clusive "self" that may be organized in a particular situation and which may
include the bulk of the community of states.
The second principal difficulty is the apparent failure to perceive that the
same fundamental community policy runs through all the varying specific
forms that permissible coercion may assume. "Individual-self defense," "col-
lective self-defense," "regional enforcement action," and "collective security
action" or "police action" are indeed but differing remedial techniques and
institutional modalities designed to secure the first and most basic policy of
any legal system: the prevention and suppression of unilateral change by
293. Introduction to "self" or identification systems is provided in LASSWELL & KAP-
LAN, POWER AND SociETY 11-13, 30-31 (1950). On the state considered as one (among
many) system of interlocking identifications, see LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND
POLITICS ch. 13 (1930). For the social psychological bases and processes of "self' for-
mation, see the influential accounts in COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
(1902) and SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (1909) (both reprinted sub norn. THE Two MAJOR
WoRKs or CHARLES H. COOLEY (1956)); MEAD, MINI, SELF AND SOCIETY (1934). See
also KRECH & CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1948);
SHERnI & CANTRiL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EGo-INVOLVE-MENTS (1947). A recent discussion
of the processes and conditions of community formation, the construction and integration
of a larger "self," among several states in a particular geographical region, is found in
DEUTSCH & ASSOCIATES, POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA
(1957). See further DEUTSCH, POLITICAL COMMUNITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL:
PROBLEM.S OF DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT (1954).
294. For indication of the range of relevant organizations, see, e.g., EAGLETON, IN-
TER.,.ATIONAL GOVERNMENT (3d ed. 1957) ; HILL, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1.952) ;
LEONARD, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1951); MANGoNE, A SHORT HISTORY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1954); Jenks, Co-ordination in International Organization:
An Introductory Survey, 28 BIrT. Y1. INT'L L. 29 (1951) ; Potter, World Institutions,
in THE WORLD COMMUNITY 259 (Wright ed. 1948); Bebr, Regional Organizations:
Their Functions and Potentialities in the World Community, 1951 (unpublished thesis
in Yale Law Library).
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destructive coercion and thereby the maintenance of those conditions of mini-
mal order indispensable for the continued and fruitful functioning of all human
value processes. In these terms, "individual self-defense" and "police action"
represent the opposed ends of a spectrum of degrees of community involve-
ment and participation in the forcible redress of breaches of world public
order. "Collective self-defense" and "regional enforcement action" refer to the
degrees of involvement in the middle ranges of the spectrum where more
than one nation state but less than the whole or the bulk of the community
is engaged in the task of securing public order. Thus a wide variation may
exist, first, in the range and comprehensiveness of the "self" on behalf of
which the exercise of lawful coercion may be claimed, and, second, in the
specific institutional techniques by which primary community policy may be
implemented.
We do not mean to suggest that, in terms of the more particular require-
ments of common, unifying, fundamental policy, differences may not exist
between "individual self-defense," "collective self-defense" and "collective
security action" (the last including both "regional enforcement action" and
more general "community police action"). Broad, basic policy must be adapted
to the varying specific types of contexts in which it is to be secured by the
varying institutional modes of implementation. Thus, the differences in the
structure and comprehensiveness of the "participant" or "self" may rationally
require differences in appraisal of the other constituent factors of a particular
context. For instance, in assessing the conditions under which collective self-
defense is asserted, it may be appropriate to require a higher degree of im-
minence of attack and more exacting evidence of compelling necessity for
coercive response by the group as such than would be reasonably demanded
if the responding participant were a single state. The larger "self" of a group-
participant ordinarily means greater bases of power at its disposal and, vis-a-
vis a single opponent state, a substantial preponderance of force. Indeed a
major, if somewhat obvious, premise of the multiplication in recent decades
of collective defense arrangements and organizations is that a consolidated
and coordinated group is less easily threatened than a lone and isolated state.
Again, the limitations on the scope of permissible objectives of self-defense,
individual or group, in which force is asserted without previous specific au-
thorization from the organized general community, need not necessarily be
regarded as restricting the competence of the organization itself inclusively
to determine upon more comprehensive objectives for police action.
From this perspective, Dr. Bowett's focus upon the "individual right" of
self-defense of each single participating state would seem essentially mis-
directed. It is not, we submit, an atomistic inquiry into the existence of an
"individual right" to self-defense in each component member of a group-
claimant, but rather a determination of the reasonableness of coercion by the
group considered as a unified whole, as a collective "self," that is demanded
by basic policy and prescription. Reasonableness here, as in individual self-
defense, refers to the total configuration of relevant variables in context, and
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depends, in broadest statement, upon the character of the objectives sought
by the group and the necessity for and proportionality of the group response.
Appraisal of the real as distinguished from the proclaimed goals of the group-
claimant involves appraisal of the genuineness of the asserted common identi-
fications for defense and security. It also necessitates an evaluation of the
realism of the avowed expectation that the defense and security interdepend-
ences of the members are such that an attack upon any member seriously
prejudices the security of every other member.295 A first step in the deter-
mination of reasonableness (that is, lawfulness) is thus an inquiry into the
substantiality of the collective "self" alleged for security and defense, and into
whether a purported grouping for common protection is in reality a facade
for other unlawfully expansive, purposes.
For similar reasons, the dilemma Dr. Bowett constructs between, on the
one hand, the necessity of showing an "individual right" of self-defense in
each element of a group-participant and, on the other hand, the imposition
of inaction, however dire the emergency, until previous authorization for "col-
lective security" or "police action" is obtained from the organized communi-
ty,290 appears specious. Dr. Bowett himself recognizes the probable "serious
disadvantages" which acceptance of his analysis would entail "once we assume
the impotency of the competent organs of the United Nations": "piece-meal
aggression" whereby "each victim would fall in turn with no hope of assist-
ance from friendly nations. ' 29 7 Dr. Bowett insists, however, that these con-
sequences are reasons for "questioning the political wisdom" of the Charter
scheme, not for "extending and distorting the legal concept of self defence. '2 9 8
He adds that neither the "political conditions of post war" nor the numerous
collective defense treaties adverted to earlier "can alter the concept of self
defence."29 9 M11oreover, under the Uniting For Peace Resolution, the argu-
ment continues, the inability of the United Nations to authorize "collective
[security] action" can no longer be assumed.30 It is difficult to ascribe much
force to this plea for maintaining the purity of a particular past conception
of self-defense. Outside the celestial abode of juristic concepts, in the world
of time and space where the global processes of power are located, it must
seem a curious conviction that this concept of self-defense must remain un-
altered despite profound changes in the conditions and features of those proc-
esses. A "legal concept" of self-defense, like any other legal concept, can be
given empirical reference only in terms of who, for what purposes and under
what conditions, uses and applies the concept. The expectations both of the
295. Dr. Bowett approaches this view in stating that "the important question is al-
ways, in final analysis, whether an attack upon one state in fact threatens the security
of the other." Bowrr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (1958).
296. Id. at 239-43.
297. Id. at 245.
298. Id. at 246.
299. Id. at 241.
300. Id. at 246.
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general community and of particular authorized decision-makers about lawful-
ness (that is, reasonableness) do and must change through time as the con-
ditions of use and application change. Fortunately, with the Uniting For
Peace Resolution, a somewhat higher exponent can be placed on the prob-
ability of obtaining an authorization-a characterization of the permissibility
of particular coercion-by the organized community. This very expectation,
however, makes it all the more difficult to concede point to Dr. Bowett's
version of collective self-defense. A group claim of self-defense, no less than
an individual claim, remains subject to review by the organized community.
It is to the necessities arising in the interim between initiation of the unlaw-
ful coercion and subsequent authorization or characterization that the per-
mission of self-defense, individual or group, addresses itself. A final indica-
tion of the extent to which Dr. Bowett's analysis escapes contact with reality
lies in the character of the alternatives that he offers for meeting those neces-
sities: disarmament and world federation.301
COMMUNITY POLICE ACTION
The third and final reference of permissible coercion is to police or enforce-
ment action. It is sometimes suggested with undertones of cynicism that
"police action" in fact means going to "war. ' '30 2 In the sense that police action
undertaken by or on behalf of the organized general community may be as
immediately destructive of values as an unauthorized application of violence.
this is true. But the inclusive policy at stake in police action is the exact
opposite of the exclusive purpose projected in unauthorized violence. The one
is the overriding community policy of establishing and maintaining that mini-
mum order in which all value processes may peacefully go forward; the other
is unilateral expansion by force that directly repudiates and attacks minimum
order. Whatever the similarity in the physical destruction wrought or in the
instrumentalities of policy employed, significant differentiation is to be found
in the identifications of the participants and the nature of their objectives.
The agreements envisaged in article 43 of the United Nations Charter,
agreements for the supply of "armed forces, assistance and facilities" to the
Security Council, have never been concluded, and in all likelihood will not be
concluded in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the probability of unanimity
among the permanent members of the Council-except, perhaps, in a conflict
between small powers not involving any appreciable interest of the polar
powers-seems apt to remain negligible. As a result, the participants in a
301. Id. at 247. We do not, it may be added, seek to disparage these alternatives as
long-term goals. What is open to grave doubt is the probability of their realization in
the (now) discernible future and the wisdom of rejecting group defense while those goals
as yet remain out of reach.
302. The suggestion appears, with varying nuances in reference, in, e.g., APPA.oOR.m,
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONs 98-99 (1958); Wolfers, Collective
Security and The War in Korea, 43 YALE REV. 481, 484 (1954). See also Borchard, The
Impracticability of "Enforcing" Peace, 55 YALE L.J. 966 (1946).
1160 [Vol. 68:1057
HeinOnline -- 68 Yale L.J. 1160 1958-1959
INTERNATIONAL COERCION
police action probably will consist of individual members or groups of mem-
bers acting as agents of the organized community upon the basis of a per-
missive authorization or delegation from the General Assembly. The operative
assumption behind any police action is thus that the organization has suc-
ceeded in characterizing coercion in a particular case as impermissible.
The appropriate objectives of a particular police action are to be determined
by the security organization itself. The ample range of U.N. authority in this
regard is indicated by the high level of generality with which the grant of
competence is formulated in the Charter: "to maintain or restore international
peace and security. '30 3 On the one hand, police action cannot, without making
nonsense of fundamental community policy, seek the destruction of the poli-
tical independence and the disposition of the territory and other values of
the aggressor state for the exclusive aggrandizement of the participating mem-
bers. On the other hand, the restrictions in respect of permissible conservation
customarily established for unilateral self-defense need not be regarded as
necessarily applicable to police action authorized by the organized community.
The significant policy difference would seem to lie in the inclusive character
both of the identifications of the participants and of the decision process by
which the appropriate objectives of a specific police action are formulated and
established. 30 4 More specifically, neither the Charter of the United Nations
nor other basic authoritative policy would preclude the organization from
setting, in a particular case, objectives for police action more comprehensive
than the mere "repelling" or "halting" of the unlawful attack. Authority, for
instance, may well be conceded to the organized community to reconstruct
those basic institutions of the target aggressor-state which outrage all con-
ceptions of human dignity, or otherwise to modify conditions which, in rea-
sonable expectation, may give rise to future violations of public order.30 5 For
a public order committed to human dignity, however, a fundamental consti-
tutional principle is that individuals must not be coerced beyond a level rea-
sonably necessary to maintain the order itself. In addition, objectives may be
limited by the differential operation in differing cases, or even in differing
303. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. See also article 1(1). In article 24(2), it is stipulated
that "in discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."
304. From this viewpoint, the related controversy, aroused by the very broadness and
generality of the authority granted by the Charter, as to whether the organization is
"bound" by "principles of justice and international law" in the characterization of pro-
hibited coercion and the application of sanctions, appears largely unreal. The details of
this contention may be found in Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense
Under the Charter of the United Nations, 42 Am. J. INTL' L. 783 (1948); Kelsen, Sanc-
tions h; International Law Under the Charter of the Unted Nations, 31 IowA L. REV.
499 (1946); Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under Present International Law, 4
INT'L L.Q. 11, 25-27 (1951). See also Schick, Peace o Trial-A Study of Defence in
International Organization, 2 WEST. POL. Q. 1, 13-15 (1949).
305. Cf. the argument on desirability of such authority made in LOEWENSTEIN, POLI-
TICAL RECONSTRUCTION (1946).
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stages of the same case, of the cost factor-the expectations of the general
community about the tolerable or unbearable character of the probable costs
of achieving a particular objective.
The experience in Korea affords documentation of the effect of this cost
factor upon the definition of objectives. The Security Council resolution of
June 27, 1950,306 after noting that the North Korean authorities had "neither
ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel,"
recommended assistance to the Republic of Korea "to repel the armed attack
and to restore international peace and security in the area." Later, on October
7, 1950, with the military position of the United Nations forces dramatically
improved and the North Korean armies being pushed back toward the 3Sth
parallel, the General Assembly asserted authority to determine upon a general
objective that went beyond the mere repulsion of the unlawful North Korean
attack. The Assembly authorized the United Nations forces to take "all ap-
propriate steps . . . to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea",
as well as "all constituent acts . . . including the holding of elections, under
the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, in-
dependent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea."30 7
Upon the initiation of massive unlawful intervention by the "Peoples' Repub-
lic of China," however, and the change in the prevailing expectations, realistic
or otherwise, of the members about the costs and risks of pursuing the objec-
tive of unification, the General Assembly redefined and re-interpreted that
objective in the following more modest terms: "to bring about a cessation of
hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in
Korea by peaceful means ... .
Police action may be carried out, like any other coercion, by all the familiar
instrumentalities of policy, and may present a considerable variety in the kind
and extent of participation and assistance undertaken by various members.
For clarity, police action in this sense-the application of coercive sanctions
against a participant inclusively determined to have initiated prohibited coer-
cion-must be distinguished from the operations of an international "police
force" like the "United Nations Emergency Force" created during the Suez
crisis of 1956.309 While the mere presence of the UNEF in the conflict area
may have induced restraint in the contending belligerents, it was neither de-
306. U.N. SEC. COUNCIL OFF. REC. 5th year, No. 16, at 4 (1950).
307. Res. No. 376 (V), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20 (A/1775)
at 9 (1950). (Emphasis supplied.)
308. Res. No. 498 (V), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20A (A/
1775/Add. 1.) at 1 (1951). See also Res. No. 500 (V), id. at 2; No. 711 (VII) A, id.
7th Sess., Supp. No. 20B (A/2361/Add.2) at 1 (1953); GooDlRCH, KOREA, A STUDY OF
U.S. POLICY IN THE UNITn NATioNs cbs. 5-9 (1956); Goodrich, Korea: Collective
Measures Against Aggression, INT'L CONC. No. 494 (1953); Wright, Collective Security
in the Light of the Korean Experience, 45 PROc. Am. Soc'y INT'L L. 165, 171-75 (1951).
309. Res. No. 1000 (ES-1), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 1st Emer. Spec. Sess., Supp.
No. 1 (A/3354) at 2 (1956). See generally Goodrich & Rosner, The United Nations
Emergenwy Force, 11 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 413 (1957).
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signed nor equipped actually to exercise force and to "influence the military
balance" against an identified violator.310 Its functions were limited to super-
vising and policing the cease-fire and withdrawal of forces called for by the
General Assembly. The modest character of these functions is perhaps most
clearly indicated by the fact that the consent of the country in whose territory
they were to be performed was regarded by the organization as indispen-
sable.31' In making this distinction between "police action" and a UNEF-
type of "police force," we do not mean to minimize the latter. There are, on
the contrary, a number of conceivable situations in which such a "police
force" can be a valuable device for the localization of conflict.312
In contrast with the customary-law permission of unilateral self-defense,
the competence of the organized community to order or authorize police ac-
tion is not circumscribed by Charter specification of a required degree or
condition of necessity. No specific standard has been accepted as authorita-
tive for the organization in "determining the existence of" the appropriate
precipitating events--"a threat of the peace," "breach of the peace," "act of
aggression"-for requiring or authorizing coercive action to "maintain or re-
store international peace and security." It is precisely for rationality in such
determinations, for maintenance of the most delicate adjustment of specific
decision to fundamental community policy, that configurative analysis of
changing contexts of coercion, by appropriate standards like those recom-
mended above, is most essential. The conditions under which, in a particular
instance, police action is authorized by the organization may exhibit a very
high and even an extreme necessity for arresting an unlawful attack and for
aiding the victim. As a practical matter, participation in police action carries
with it burdens and risks which states do not lightly assume. There are, as
a result, built-in safeguards against premature or officious initiation of police
action. Indeed, the constant danger to world public order is not that police
action may be precipitously taken in circumstances of actually inadequate
necessity, but that it may not be taken at all.
POLICY CLARIFICATION A FIRsT STEP TowARD MINIMAL PUBLIC ORDER
The main purpose of this study has been to establish that, even in the con-
temporary cloven and disjointed world, it is both intellectually possible and
310. Second and Final Report of the Secretary General on the Plan for an Einer-
gency International United Nations Force, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 1st Emer. Spec.
Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 5, at 19, 20 (1956).
311, The Secretary General stated, id. para. 9, that "While the General Assembly is
enabled to establish the Force with the consent of those parties which contribute units
to the Force, it could not request the Force to be stationed or operate on the territory
of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country." This was
approved by the General Assembly. Res. No. 1001 (ES-1), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc.
1st Emer. Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1 (A/3354) at 3 (1956).
312. See FRYE, A UNrrED NArOiS PEAcE FoRCE chs. 7-9 (1957); Nitze, Where
and Under What Circumstances Might a United Nations Police Force be Useful in the
Future?, in FRYE, op. cit. supra at 111.
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practically indispensable for peoples genuinely dedicated to the values of
human dignity to clarify in some detail a rational community policy concern-
ing resort to international coercion. The principal emphases comprising our
theme have been:
that in a world of accelerating interdependences with respect to all values,
minimal order-in the sense of freedom from expectations of unauthorized
violence and coercion-is as indispensable in the general community of states
as it is in single states to an order of freedom and abundance in the produc-
tion and sharing of values;
that existing world prescriptions, expressed in the United Nations Charter
and other authoritative pronouncements and judgments, and accepted, for-
mally at least, with near universality, make the necessary distinction between
permissible and nonpermissible coercion and project a basic policy which
seeks to prohibit the use of intense coercion as an instrument of international
change, that is, for purposes of extension rather than defense of values;
that by orderly examination of processes of coercion in context, with appro-
priate significance being accorded to principal features such as participants,
objectives, methods, conditions and effects, an observer or decision-maker
may, in particular instances, make the specific interpretations of basic com-
munity policy best designed to promote the values of human dignity and
progress toward a more complete international order in which these values
are more secure;
that from perspectives seeking movement toward a world order of human
dignity, the coercion characterized as "nonpermissible"-and prohibited in
general community prescription as "acts of aggression," "breaches of the
peace," "threats to the peace," and so on-is most rationally conceived as
extending to all coercion, by whatever instrument or combination of instru-
ments, military and other, which is directed with requisite intensity against
such substantial bases of power as the "territorial integrity" and "political
independence" of the target state;
that, from similar perspectives, the coercion characterized as "permissible"
and authorized by the general community in the cause of "self-defense,"
should be limited to responses to initiating coercion that is so intense as to
have created in the target state reasonable expectations, as those expectations
may be reviewed by others, that a military reaction was indispensably neces-
sary to protect such consequential bases of power as "territorial integrity"
and "political independence";
that general community measures-from gestures of conciliation to armed
police action-as well as individual self-defense, collective self-defense and
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regional enforcement are all appropriately regarded as modes of securing, and
as being limited by, the same basic policy of minimum change by coercion,
and that explicit focus upon basic policies, with constant relation to the prin-
cipal features of processes of coercion in context, is as helpful to appropriate
decision by one authoritative decision-maker as by another, whatever the de-
gree of community involvement and action;
and, finally, that the explicit examination and weighting of major features
in processes of coercion in terms of relation to values of human dignity, and
the explicit appraisal of alternatives in decision for their relative impact upon
a projected public order of these values are, far from being an abnegation
of law, in fact of the very essence of a reasoned decision grounded, without
dependence upon a transcendant metaphysic, in the most persuasive authority
our world today offers-the most deeply held demands and expectations of
peoples about the kind of public order in which they wish to live.
It has not been our purpose, by all this emphasis upon the importance of
clarifying basic community policies, to underestimate the importance of such
other tasks as the evaluation and invention of structures of authority and
sanctioning procedures for the more effective application of basic policies. The
assumption upon which we have proceeded is, rather, that clarity about funda-
mental goals and policies, about principal premises and the type of public
order demanded, so insistently and continuously affects choices about author-
ity structures and sanctioning procedures that it affords an economic first
focus of attention. The primacy of basic policies over institutional modalities
is the primacy of ends over means: the possible models for improving struc-
tures of authority and implementing procedures that could be projected, ab-
sent systematic clarification of fundamental policies, are countless; further,
very different structures and procedures may in some contexts serve the same
policies; and comparable structures and procedures may in other contexts
serve very different policies. Conversely, however, it must be recognized that
available means and knowledge of means affect the rational choice of ends
and, hence, that the potentialities and limitations of achievable and known
structures of authority and sanctioning techniques affect the realism with
which basic policies can be projected and maintained. The most fateful chal-
lenge to lawyers and scholars in our time may, accordingly, be seen to embrace
the dual tasks of inventing the structures of authority and sanctioning pro-
cedures designed most economically to move the peoples of the world from
our immediate, precarious balance of terror toward minimal security and a
more complete world public order of human dignity, and after investigating
controlling conditions, of recommendifig the measures in communication and
other action most effectively calculated to affect the predispositions of leaders
and peoples to accept these structures and procedures and to put them into
practice. In a subsequent study, we propose to examine some of the more
important contributions presently being offered to meet this challenge.
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